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ABSTRACT 
A qualitative case study of a self-initiated change in South Korea 
Baul “Paul” Chung 
Dissertation Chair: Andy Hargreaves, Ph. D. 
 
After a decade of large-scale educational reform there is now a growing interest in 
grass-roots self-initiated change (Datnow et al., 2002; Hargreaves, 2009; Hargreaves & 
Shirley, 2009; Shirley, 2009). Yet, self-initiated change (SIC) remains largely 
undertheorized in the literature of educational change. Even the advocates of self-initiated 
change do not clearly specify the underlying mechanisms and the multi-dimensional 
processes by which SIC occurs. 
Utilizing a qualitative case study approach and a conceptual framework that 
draws from incremental institutional change theory and the literature on social 
movements within institutions, this study explored the following research questions: 
 What mechanisms do the change agents of SIC employ, How do they implement 
these mechanisms and why do they employ these mechanisms?  
 What are the characteristics of the processes of SIC? What is the pacing and 
sequencing of the change?  
 How does SIC unfold over time, and why?  
 
In answering these three initial questions a fourth research question emerged that 
summates the other three: 
 What implications does an investigation of self-initiated change in one school 
have for understanding existing theories of self-initiated and imposed educational 
change? 
Findings from this study revealed that self-initiated change involved a 
recombination that embodied the ideal of “change without pain” by balancing change and 
stability (Abrahamson, 2004). The process of self-initiated change turned out to be slow-
moving (Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). Mindful juxtaposition (Huy, 2001) 
and a dialectical perspective (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009) were required to address 
the multiple and contradictory dimensions of change. Based on these analyses, I propose 
ways of conceptualizing SIC as: “change without pain”; “slow-moving change”; and 
“dialectical/ cyclical change.”   
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CHAPTER I 
 Introduction  
 
Preface 
This study examined the dynamic growth and evolution of a self-initiated school 
change in South Korea from 2001 throughout 2010.  In this study, I explored whether a 
small incremental SIC can sustain change and even become consequential at a system 
level. While I was searching for a topic for my dissertation, one day I came across news 
articles introducing the transformation of SCE, which was my alma mater, in spring in 
2007.  While my connection with SCE was obviously relevant to my interest in this 
research, it was not the only or even primary source of my research motivation.  My 
fascination with this study grew out of my long-standing research interest in teacher and 
educational change.  This interest was influenced by my personal background of family 
of teachers.  And this led me to go to graduate school.  Given my background and 
research interest, SCE‘s teacher-initiated change seemed to me a perfect topic.  
The attraction subsequently became stronger by the recognition that the 
development of SCE raised intriguing questions for our understanding of self-initiated 
change and large-scale reform. The remarkable success and growth of Self-initiated 
change demanded explanation.  I thought analyzing the case would provide insight into 
change theories in a different way large-scale reform advocates assume.  Large-scale 
reformers regard self-initiated change as minor, superficial, and ephemeral. Instead, the 
large-scale reformers focus on generating even bigger, faster, and tighter reforms across 
large number of schools at once like big bang theories of change. It is not surprising that 
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large scale reform advocates who want quick turnarounds and wholesale reform find self-
initiated change unattractive.  However, the common portrayals of self-initiated change 
as ephemeral, unsustainable, and unspreadable are inaccurate and misleading.  
Christensen (2000) claims that ―in any sector, a radical and fundamental innovation 
sneaks in from below (p. 104).‖  Indeed, consequential change often begins as a 
challenge to that authority.  One way to visualize self-initiated change is similar to a boy 
who beats a giant by taking advantage of a giant‘s underestimation of him.  Instead of 
challenging the existing system head-on, change agents of self-initiated change work 
within the institutional system by engaging in creative recombination and reinterpretation.  
This way change agents infiltrate the existing system without unnecessary pain.  Thus, 
we need to think more carefully about these taken-for-granted assumptions or myths in 
the discourse of large scale reform. 
The theoretical framework of this study integrates approaches to social 
movements and institutional theory.  I developed this approach as I discovered that 
neither was able to fully account for the development of this particular school change.  
Social movement theory could not fully account for institutional activists who occupy 
formal but paradoxical positions within the institution and deploy piecemeal or small-win 
change strategies.  However, institutional change theory that emphasizes abrupt and 
external shocks in accounting for fundamental change overlooks or even dismisses 
endogenous or gradual forms of change.  Thus, I started to look at more recent social 
movement literature and institutional change theory in the hope of finding the tools to 
account for this case.   Along the way, I found the tools available in endogenous 
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incremental change theory and literature social movement within institutions.  This 
combined framework provides a useful guide for self-initiated change and fills gap in 
both literature.  
Chapters 4 through chapter 6 are the finding parts of this study.  They are 
chronological in organization.  SCE‘s innovation was not produced in a vacuum.  It 
occurred under the noses of the hierarchical and bureaucratic Korean school system.  It 
was still subject to conventional definition of schooling and institutional pressures.  How 
could SCE fit into the existing system?  In chapter 4, I addressed this question. 
Self-initiated change is neither easy to establish nor sustain once they are set in 
motion. From the outset, survival and sustainability had always been the most immediate 
and crucial issue for SCE.  Chapter 5 addressed how SCE overcame the challenges 
embedded in self-initiated change.  Then, beyond its survival, I also examined how it 
amplified change and generated system-level change while seeking to maintain the 
original mission.   
The adherence to idealistic notion of organic and spontaneous governance, ad hoc 
problem solving, and symbolic innovation inadvertently caused recurrent conflicts and 
internal contradictions.  Furthermore, the continued growth and success of SCE 
paradoxically triggered problems that amounted to an ―attrition of change‖ even at the 
height of SCE‘s development.  What happens when David becomes Goliath? ―Remaining 
David can be even more challenging than becoming David in the first place (Ganz, 2009: 
21).‖  Chapter 6 addresses this question of how SCE addressed the formidable challenges 
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and dilemmas of sustaining change while maintaining original innovation by examining 
the institutionalization process of SCE.   
The primary purpose of this study was to open up the black box of self-initiated 
change, specifically focusing on the change mechanisms, processes, and multi-
dimensional nature of self-initiated change. Based on these findings, in chapter 7, 
discussion section, I discussed the change mechanisms, the slow-moving and multi-
dimensional change processes of self-initiated change.  This section shows that self-
initiated change can provide an alternative approach to change that is less destructive, 
destabilizing, and painful but nevertheless consequential over time.  With regard to 
change process, I show that the incremental approach enables change agents to manage 
risks of attempting disruptive change by balancing change and continuity and solidifying 
early gains. Regarding the change dimensions, I suggest that while in isolation self-
initiated changes can proceed in uneven ways and be insufficient, incomplete, and 
sometimes even painful due to limited capacity, resource, and power, self-initiated 
change can lead to consequential change when they occur in a proper sequence and pace.  
Thus, we can better understand the complexities and paradoxes that are common to self-
initiated change and many contemporary educational changes by employing more 
longitudinal and historically grounded studies that trace the evolution of educational 
change over long periods.  
Large-scale reform may be necessary, and even preferable in certain situations.  
Large-scale reform is not, however, the only option.  Meanwhile, Self-initiated change 
provides no silver bullets either. When large-scale reform and self-initiated change 
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combine in a more delicate, creative and rhythmic way, a consequential change is more 
likely, much quickly, and far less painfully.  It is my hope that this study can help rethink 
the dominant discourse about large-scale reform towards endogenous and incremental, 
but nevertheless consequential and widespread, self-initiated change from the bottom-up 
and from the peripheries.  
Introduction 
  The past decade has seen the rise (or dramatic return) of large-scale reform (LSR) 
and the decline of self-initiated change (SIC) (Fullan, 2001, 2009; Hargreaves, 2009). 
This return is evident in recent legislation such as No Child Left Behind policy (USA) 
and the Every Child Matters policy (UK) (Hargreaves, 2009). Many other countries are 
following suit, making this a global phenomenon.  This rise of LSR tends to be 
legitimized by the premise or judgment of its proponents that SIC generates at best minor 
and superficial adjustments to a largely stable system (Thelen & Streeck, 2005; Thelen & 
Mahoney, 2010).  They claim that we need to look at more system-wide and well-
coordinated reform than unpredictable SIC (Barber, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2005; 
Fullan, 2000, 2009; Honig, 2004; Hopkins, 2007).   
I argue that there are many reasons to be skeptical about these claims – 
skepticisms that are expressed in a growing literature that examines LSR (Berliner, 2006; 
Day & Smethem, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2010; Hargreaves, 2009; Hargreaves & 
Shirley, 2009; Ravitch, 2010; Sahlberg, 2011; Zhao, 2009).  Drawing on the literature, I 
argue that legitimizations and rationales for the promotion of LSR are theoretically and 
empirically weak and misleading.  First, the underlying causes of the return of LSR are 
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much more complicated politically and educationally than a simple reaction to the SIC 
(Hargreaves, 2009; Honig, 2004; Sarason, 1990).  The idea of LSR has been used by 
conservatives to create an ideological climate that suggests that school choice and 
competition among schools based on standardized test results contributes to national 
economic competitiveness in the globalized and knowledge-based economy (Hargreaves, 
2003, 2009).  Some more liberal researchers and reformers have also embraced the idea 
of LSR and used it to attempt to close the achievement gap between haves and have-nots 
(Fullan, 2000, 2005).  Advocates of both positions claim that LSR is necessary because 
of the ineffectiveness of SIC.  This underlying thesis of LSR about SIC needs to be 
subjected to empirical scrutiny.  Without this effort, I argue that the aggressive 
advancement of LSR might enhance political expediency.  Until we think more carefully 
about the taken-for-granted reasons for the rise of LSR (e.g. ―What values are involved? 
Who will benefit from the change? How achievable is it?‖), the power of LSR will 
remain unchecked, thus making SIC suffer further (Fullan, 2000).  
Second, I argue that the propensity to downplay SIC is misleading for it is based 
on premature judgment.  Contrary to the claim of LSR that SIC is not consequential, 
research in the business and social sectors suggests that many important changes are not 
systematically organized at the beginning or dramatically consequential in their intentions.  
Nor do they depend on managerial authority or professional change agents.  Indeed, SIC 
often proceeds as a challenge to authority, sometimes in unpredictable ways, still the 
results can be consequential (Armstrong, 2002; Chen, 2009; Huy and Mintzberg, 2003; 
Lounsbury and Schneiberg, 2008; Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Reay et al, 2006).  I argue 
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that existing educational change literature has not yet developed adequate understandings 
of SIC that might better explain the abovementioned patterns of change. Indeed, most 
SICs have been devised as first-order changes that aimed to improve the quality of what 
already existed rather than as second order changes that meant to disturb basic 
organizational features and substantially alter the way that schools perform their roles in 
the first place (Bartunek, 1984; Cuban, 1988; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Reay et al., 2006; 
Scully & Segal, 2002).  This analytical blindspot within the existing educational change 
literature leaves us without proper tools for understanding SIC and thereby results in 
researchers and reformers gravitating towards LSR repeatedly. In other words, it is the 
impoverished theoretical state of SIC that makes SIC more vulnerable to the pressure 
from LSR advocates.  This tendency has trapped policy-makers in a vicious cycle of 
―repetitive large-scale change syndrome‖ in which problems generated by one wave of 
LSR are followed by yet another wave of LSR that only compounds the problems 
(Abrahamson, 2004).  In response, some scholars are looking for alternative and more 
radical directions such as SIC, while other scholars who still stay with LSR also look to 
SIC as a source of inspiration to improve LSR (Hargreaves, 2009). As a result, there is an 
opportunity for greater receptivity to the possibilities for SIC and a growing interest in 
how to bring about SIC.  
However, even the advocates of SIC do not clearly specify the underlying 
mechanisms and the multi-dimensional processes by which SIC occurs. As a result, SIC 
resembles mysterious black boxes whose contents need to be unpacked and examined. 
Vague concepts such as ―bottom-up change‖ or ―school-based change‖ undermine the 
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theoretical and empirical credibility of SIC and make the public more sympathetic to 
LSR. It is thus crucial to articulate tighter and more convincing arguments and evidence 
about the mechanisms and processes underlying SIC.  
Identifying the mechanisms, the processes, and the multiple dimensions 
underlying SIC is by no means straightforward.  The mechanisms of SIC often proceed in 
small and incremental steps. They may be layered on top of old ones, and involve the 
recombination of already existing practices and principles.  The process of SIC is often 
not as neat and linear as top-down reform (Huy, 2001) and often requires change agents 
to be mindful of and alert to temporal ordering, sequencing, and pacing. Identifying 
multiple dimensions of SIC is even more tricky since the processes of SIC might be 
uneven (Campbell, 2004), thus demanding understanding of the various combination and 
juxtaposition of its dimensions over time.  
This study explores an incremental but consequential SIC that relies on local, 
organic changes.  It cautions against premature judgment of the inefficacy or inadequacy 
of SIC that is often presumed within the core arguments of LSR. Rather, I argue that 
although less dramatic than LSR, the gradual and piecemeal process of SIC can be 
cumulatively consequential for bringing about substantial educational change (Thelen & 
Mahoney, 2010).  
Two emerging bodies of literature provide useful guidance in answering these 
questions: endogenous incremental institutional change theory and social movements 
within institutions.  Incremental institutional change theories offer useful analytical tools 
for making sense of the change mechanisms of SIC that often recombine existing 
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elements or practices in new ways at the change agents‘ disposal (Abrahamson, 2004). 
This literature is rooted in a longer term perspective that appreciates the temporal 
processes, such as timing, sequence, and pacing, in accounting for various slow-moving 
changes.  It offers new and helpful conceptualizations that allow us to understand gradual 
and endogenous educational change processes.  
The literature of social movements within institutions may enable us to recognize 
how ―institutional activists‖ who occupy formal status within a variety of institutional 
arenas achieve social change or social movement goals by drawing on the pre-given 
arrangements and practices around them rather than undertaking wholesale destruction or 
disruptive replacement of existing structures and practices (Abrahamson, 2004; Campbell, 
2004; Hargreaves, 2004; Schneiberg, 2007; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010).  These bodies of 
work help us understand and theorize the patterns of SICs that unfold incrementally and 
evolve in subtle and unpredictable ways over time.  
South Castle Elementary school (SCE) is particularly suited for this study‘s 
purpose of examining small, gradual, but nevertheless consequential SIC. Amid an 
unfavorable climate under the entrenched bureaucratic school systems and the ongoing 
neo-liberal assault on schools since 1990 in South Korea, SCE has cultivated an inspiring 
grass-roots and bottom-up SIC. SCE has successfully sustained its innovation since its 
inception in 2000 and has been replicated in more than 20 schools on a voluntary basis. 
Moreover, in 2010, the progressive superintendent launched a bold plan to create more 
than 100 innovative schools in the region based on the design and practices of SCE. The 
process of SCE‘s innovation has often not been as neat and linear as top-down reform but 
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has been full of stops, starts, reversals, and redirections (Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 2001).  
Moreover, study of SCE is able to capture this non-linear longitudinal process of change 
rather than cross-sectional or snapshot (Pierson, 2004; Hargreaves & Goodson, 2006). 
By conducting a qualitative case study of a distinctive SIC in South Korea and its 
evolution over a decade and by applying conceptions developed in institutional change 
theory and social movement theory to the case, this study advances understanding of the 
mechanisms, processes, and dimensions of SIC and therefore contributes to the 
development of educational change theory in general.  
My dissertation will explore three questions 
 What mechanisms do the change agents of SIC employ, how do they implement 
these mechanisms and why do they employ these mechanisms?  
 What are the characteristics of the processes of SIC? What is the pacing and 
sequencing of the change?  
 How does SIC unfold over time, and why?  
 
In answering these three initial questions a fourth research question emerged that 
summates the other three: 
 What implications does an investigation of self-initiated change in one school 
have for understanding existing theories of self-initiated and imposed educational 
change? 
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 The review of the related literature for this study, as presented in Chapter two, 
focuses on four distinct areas: LSR and SIC, change mechanisms, change dimensions, 
and change processes.  
Large-scale reform (LSR) 
A brief review of LSR provides a useful background for introducing and 
extending the self-initiated change model that will be the focus of this paper. LSR refers 
to ―deliberate policy and strategy attempts to change the system as a whole‖ (Fullan, 
2009: 102). Here, the system is defined as ―a government and all its schools—what is 
called tri-level reform: schools and their communities, districts or region, and state‖ 
(Fullan, 2009: 102).  This new language and move represents a shift either from the 
traditional top-down strategies in which innovations or reforms were mandated and 
imposed by districts and states or from the decentralized and democratic strategies in 
which teachers and schools have the freedom and autonomy to pursue their own needs. 
LSR seeks to move towards more system-wide and well-coordinated reform that 
integrates top-down and bottom-up strategies (Barber, 2009; Fullan, 2000, 2009; Hopkins, 
2007).  
However, critics raise questions about LSR strategy and its underlying 
assumptions. First, they argue that the integration of top-down and bottom-up strategies is 
misleading. They claim that although LSR sought to synthesize the two approaches it 
often slipped into favoring the top-down end of the pole over the other because of 
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accountability measures, district pressures, and financial incentives (Datnow et al., 2002; 
Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Hopkins, 2007).  I argue that this tendency has created a 
vicious cycle of ―repetitive large-scale change syndrome‖ in which policy-makers 
addressed problems generated by one wave of LSR with yet another wave of LSR - only 
to compound the initial problems (Abrahamson, 2004).  
Second, the underlying assumptions of LSR are weak. For example, one of the 
assumptions of LSR is that individual school reform will never add up to large-scale 
reform (Fullan, 2000, 2009; Honig, 2004; Park & Datnow, 2009). Significant bottom-up 
innovations existed only as outliers that failed to spread and last over an extended period 
to reach widespread and effortless stages of institutionalization (Hargreaves, 2009). In a 
similar vein, Honig (2004), in her article on policy implementation, argues that bottom-
up reform as a policy strategy for decades has faltered in implementation. She claims that 
―bottom-up reform falters in part because implementation efforts largely focus on 
changes in schools or at the bottom of hierarchical education systems but not on the ―up‖ 
in bottom-up reform (Honig, 2004: 529).‖ As Park and Datnow (2009) claim,  
―The contemporary education policy marks a shift away from the idea that 
change happens organically, one school at a time. Instead, there is a focus 
on creating a systematic infrastructure to support change across a large 
number of schools at once (p. 209).‖  
Yet research in the business sector and in social reform suggests that many 
consequential changes are not systematically organized when they begin, are not 
dramatically consequential in their intentions, and do not depend on managerial authority 
or professional change agents.  They often begin as a challenge to that authority 
  
13 
 
(Armstrong, 2002; Chen, 2009; Huy and Mintzberg, 2003; Lounsbury and Schneiberg, 
2008; Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Reay et al, 2006). 
Until we think more carefully about these taken-for-granted assumptions or myths, 
the power of LSR will remain unchecked, making SIC further suffer. My purpose in this 
study is not to launch a comprehensive attack on the LSR thesis that includes a thorough 
and exhaustive examination of each and every type of LSR, but to develop articulated 
arguments about the mechanisms, processes and multi-dimensional aspects of SIC that 
can be make it sustainable and consequential.  Because of the limitations of LSR, there 
are signs of a renewal of interest in grass-roots self-initiated change efforts (Datnow et al., 
2002; Hargreaves, 1994, 2000; Oakes & Lipton, 2002; Oakes & Rogers, 2006, 2007; 
Shirley, 1997) and in modified versions of LSR that are inspired by SIC.   
Self-initiated change (SIC) 
Contrary to conventional understanding, it is not always straightforward to tell 
whether a change is internally initiated or not in the first place.  SIC is often 
conceptualized as change purely driven by internal actors without any external elements 
or impositions (Hargreaves, 2004). SIC is, therefore, often associated with autonomy. Yet, 
beneath the surface of the sharp distinction between LSRs and SICs, LSRs do not always 
begin as fresh inventions or brand new changes (Campbell, 2004; Hargreaves, 2004).  
These puzzling findings prompt us to question the nature of self-initiated changes. 
There is never a clean slate. Most changes in social arenas emerge through ―multiple 
waves, over time, via sequences or successive stages of translation, layering, theorization 
and assembly that elaborate and innovate on previous, partial accomplishment‖ 
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(Lounsbury and Schneiberg, 2008:  664). Even failed change efforts or legacies of 
previous mobilizations serve as platforms and foundations for subsequent change 
initiatives in the same or other directions (Schneiberg, 2007).  Educational scholars have 
offered surprisingly little empirical guidance about how to determine which pattern of 
change has occurred (Hargreaves, 2004). A notable exception is Hargreaves‘ insightful 
study of examining educators‘ distinctive emotional responses to SIC and to mandated or 
imposed top-down changes. In his study, Hargreaves (2004) reveals that ―many 
seemingly self-initiated changes have always had their origins in external reform 
movements and initiatives‖ (p. 303). Hargreaves‘s (2004) solution to this puzzling 
finding is to redefine top-down reform as exclusive reform and SIC as inclusive reform. 
Hargreaves‘ findings and resolution open up promising questions and stimulate 
theoretical developments: ―Why and in what way does SIC adopt or recombine the 
elements of externally mandated reforms?‖ ―What are the change mechanisms of SIC? 
―What are the processes of SIC over time?‖ ―How can we reconcile LSR with SIC in a 
more organic way?‖ Two emerging bodies of literature that provide useful guidance in 
addressing these questions: endogenous incremental institutional change theory and 
social movements within institutions.  
SIC: an endogenous and incremental model of change  
Prevailing change theory has emphasized exogenous shocks and critical junctures 
in accounting for fundamental changes and radical reconfigurations that disrupt the status 
quo (Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 2001; Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Streeck, 2005). Scholars 
thus commonly look outwards to explain transformation, invoking external shocks or 
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abrupt reforms as key conditions for change (Schneiberg, 2007) and overlook how 
endogenous or gradual forms of change can accumulate into consequential change 
(Pierson, 2004; Reay et al., 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010).  In 
the absence of analytical tools to characterize and explain the modes of endogenous and 
gradual change, much of the institutional change and organizational change literature 
explicitly or implicitly relies on a punctuated equilibrium model that draws an ―overly 
sharp distinction between long periods of institutional stasis periodically interrupted by 
some sort of exogenous shock that opens things up, allowing for more or less radical 
reorganization‖ (Thelen & Streeck, 2005: 3; see also Gold, 1999). In a similar vein, in the 
literature of organizational change, incremental change tends to be understood as a first 
order change rather than second order change (Bartunek, 1984; 2006; Cuban, 1988; 
Fullan, 2001).  A first-order change comprises a modest and minor modification in the 
established ways of organizational functioning and meanings. Second-order change, on 
the other hand, refers to ―qualitatively discontinuous shifts in the interpretive schemes, or 
schemata, that organization members use to understand underlying dimensions of their 
organization (Bartunek, 2006:1884)‖.  In recent literature, however, researchers have 
attempted to provide analytical tools for understanding endogenous gradual change 
(Campbell, 2004; Schneiberg, 2007; Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Streeck, 2005; Thelen & 
Mahoney, 2010).  
First, scholars argue that attributing institutional change to critical junctures or 
jolts is in conflict with the social constructivist roots of institutional theory in the first 
place (Huy & Zott, 2007; Munir, 2005). From the perspective of a social constructivist, a 
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crisis or a critical juncture is not inherently disruptive (Campbell, 2004; Munir, 2005). It 
is meaning, or sense-making, that makes it disruptive. Unless jolts or critical junctures are 
perceived as such, they do not necessary lead to change or transformation (Campbell, 
2004; Munir, 2005). Even exogenous shocks must be endogenously interpreted as such to 
become a trigger of change (Munir, 2005). This leads us to re-examine the complex 
process by which institutional change comes about. Rather than looking for the trigger in 
highly visible external factors,  we need to pay close attention to how actors convert an 
otherwise mundane or unremarkable event into a critical juncture or crisis through 
ongoing sense-making or the construction of meaning (Fullan, 2001; Munir, 2005). The 
point is that, for change to occur, the change agents have to convince various 
stakeholders who are resistant or nervous that their change is worthy of support through 
the construction of meaning or sense making (Fullan, 2001; Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; 
Hargreaves, 2004; Huy & Zott, 2007). The change agents need to substantiate the 
ineffectiveness and injustice of existing practices or raise the ―sense of urgency‖ (Kotter, 
2008). They also need to come up with alternative solutions and change projects to the 
problems and convince their constituents that the proposed change would resonate with 
the institutional context. 
Second, an emerging body of work from historical institutionalism has identified 
endogenous sources of change that have been overlooked. They argue that change may 
emerge endogenously from the loophole or structural hole of apparently stable 
institutions (Fullan, 2001; Thelen and Mahoney, 2010). In other words, change may 
occur in the ―gaps‖ and ―ambiguity‖ between the rules and their interpretation or the rules 
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and their enforcement without the presence of exogenous shocks and critical junctures 
(Thelen and Mahoney, 2010). This suggests that it is not useful to draw a sharp line 
between stability and change. Overemphasizing the static and locked-in aspects of 
institutional stability and the unfettered nature of institutional change may ignore the 
reality that many significant changes can still be generated within the continuity of 
existing institutional arrangements. The ambiguities that institutions embody provide 
critical openings for the creativity and agency of change agents. By exploiting or 
capitalizing on these openings, the change agents can establish new precedents for action 
that can transform the way institutions allocate power and authority in their preferred 
direction (Fink, 2000; Scully & Segal, 2002; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010).  These forces of 
change may come unexpectedly from surprising quarters in ways that cannot be predicted. 
Even a seemingly revolutionary change may, on closer examination, be reduced and 
folded into a series of endogenous changes and a process of continuous evolution 
(Campbell, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). Thus, institutional scholars maintain, in 
order to adequately conceptualize these forms of endogenous change, we need to redefine 
the ontological concept of institutions such that institutions are entities that are fraught 
with tensions and ongoing contestations (Clemens and Cook 1999). For example, 
Schneiberg and Clemens (2006) argue that institutions do not just generate stability and 
positive feedback, they also "generate grievances (through political exclusion) ... actors 
who are aggrieved but not co-opted are an important source of pressure for institutional 
change" (Schneiberg and Clemens, 2006: 35). Within this definition of institutions, the 
sources of change are often profoundly political in nature (Hacker, 2005; Palier, 2005; 
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Schneiberg, 2007; Thelen, 2004; Thelen and Mahoney, 2010). This requires us to focus 
on the role of actors and the internal dynamics in the process of change.   
Third, the construction of meaning for change or the endogenous sources of 
change do not automatically precipitate change. We thus need to identify the mechanism 
and processes of change (Campbell, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). In order to actually 
introduce significant change into entrenched and resilient systems (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977), change agents often deploy low profile change initiatives that are designed to 
remain somewhat ―under the radar‖ (Reay et al., 2006: 994; See also, Fink, 1999, 2000). 
High profile changes may trigger potential opposition and the resistance of institutional 
incumbents who seek to maintain the status quo (Fink, 2000; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; 
Pierson, 2004; Scully & Segal, 2002). On the other hand, institutional change can be 
generated, for example, through working around existing rules and constraints or 
implementing changes alongside or on top of the existing system (Abrahamson, 2004; 
Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Raeburn, 2004; Reay et al., 2006; 
Scully & Segal, 2002; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). Changes may thus be often passed and 
implemented on the basis of an ambiguous agreement, yet they may still be 
transformative in nature.  Later in this chapter, I discuss three change mechanisms 
underlying the endogenous and gradual forms of change: layering, conversion, and 
recombination. 
Fourth, the process of endogenous and gradual change tends to be slow and 
incremental.  ―Important change often takes place incrementally and through seemingly 
small adjustments that can cumulate into significant institutional transformation‖ (Thelen 
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& Mahoney, 2010: xi).  This change process is also known as the small win strategy 
defined as one in which people ―identify a series of controllable opportunities of modest 
size that produce visible results‖ (Weick, 2001: 427; See also, Reay et al., 2006). 
Although this slow and incremental process can seem like a glacial move for those who 
want change very badly (Huerta, 2002; Reay et al., 2006), the accumulation of small wins 
can result in consequential accomplishments while sustaining the energy of change by 
projecting a sense of progress (Huy, 2001; Reay et al., 2006). This suggests that temporal 
sequencing and pacing matter a great deal in accounting for endogenous and gradual 
changes (Campbell, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Reay et al., 2006).  
SIC: a small-scale social movement or micro-mobilization  
In identifying and elaborating endogenous and incremental forms of change, a 
number of scholars draw on social movement theory (Armstrong, 2002; Campbell, 2004, 
2005; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006, 2009; Raeburn, 2004; Scully & Segal., 2002). 
Classic social movement theory tends to depict movements as outsider groups protesting 
the policies of a state (Armstrong, 2002; Binder, 2002; Davies et al., 2005; Hargrave & 
Van de Ven, 2006; Lounsbury & Schneiberg, 2008; Raeburn, 2004 ).  
Collective efforts to achieve social change in a variety of institutional arenas 
including workplaces, education, religion, and the military fit uneasily, or not at all, and 
seem pointless with classic social movement theory because the classic social movement 
theory ―focuses on change efforts initiated by the powerless that designed to redress 
economic and political inequalities through non-institutionalized channels‖ (Armstrong, 
2002, p. 6.; see also Katzenstein, 1998; Raeburn, 2004; Santoro & McGuire, 1997; Scully 
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& Meyerson, 1995).  However, a number of scholars define social movements more 
broadly. Armstrong (2002) defines social movements as ―collective efforts to change the 
rules of the game – action that is not simply reproducing the rules of a given area or the 
status quo (p. 11).‖ She argues that social movements differ from other kinds of 
collective action in that they seek to change the terms of some established social 
arrangement. Binder (2002) also argues that ―the kinds of struggles that have become far 
more common ... take place within institutions rather than ―in the streets‖; and they target 
institutional power rather than what is ordinarily considered to be ―political‖ power‘ (p. 
11). This redefinition of social movements highlights how classic social movement 
theory marginalizes collective efforts to achieve social change in a variety of institutional 
arenas.  
Forms of social movements that occur within institutions may differ from 
conventional social movements in terms of movement participants and their strategies 
and tactics. Social movement participants, in this approach, are more likely to be 
―institutional activists‖ (Santoro & McGuire, 1997) who occupy ―formal statuses within 
the government and who pursue social movement goals through conventional 
bureaucratic channels‖ (p. 503). Similarly, Meyerson and Scully (1995) coined the term 
―tempered radicals‖ to describe the paradoxical status of activists embedded in multiple 
institutional contexts. They defined ―tempered radicals‖ as ―individuals who identify with 
and are committed to their organizations, and also committed to a cause, community, or 
ideology that is fundamentally different from, and probably at odds with, the dominant 
culture of their organizations‖ (p. 586). This conceptualization challenges the widely held 
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view that social movement participants are necessarily non-institutional actors (McCarthy 
& Zald, 1997; Tilly, 1978; McAdam 1982; W. Gamson, 1990).  
Within this renewed framework SIC can be conceptualized as micro-mobilization. 
McAdam (1988) has defined a micro-mobilization context as ―a small group setting in 
which processes of attribution are combined with rudimentary forms of organization to 
produce mobilization for collective action‖ (p. 133). The smaller scope of action implied 
in the term "micro-mobilization" may be appropriate for the type of challenges SIC poses 
to the existing system and the changes they hope to affect. The change agents of SIC may 
avoid large-scale actions for fear of painful repercussions from the institutional 
incumbents if their changes are seen as too disruptive or pose too great a threat to the 
existing order. Instead, institutional activists may have to balance their sense of justice 
and moral purpose, and their desire for radical change with the need to minimize risks to 
their careers and their organizations (Scully & Segal, 2002). Institutional activists may 
have to garner management support and even occupy positions of power by themselves to 
secure ―a counter center‖ (Rojas, 2007) to achieve their goals (Scully & Segal, 2002). 
Activists may have to deploy piecemeal or small-win change strategies by asserting that 
cumulatively such changes can significantly alter a formative context (Scully & Segal., 
2002; Reay et al., 2006).   
This reconceptualization of SIC may also provide an alternative way in which 
LSR top-down reforms and social-movement like bottom-up change can also be 
reconciled in a more organic way than is proposed by LSR advocates. The LSR model 
proposes that the two approaches (imposed and self-initiated) can be combined by 
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deploying rigorous external accountability mechanisms for building local capacity. 
However, the obsession with control, data, and required professional development has 
often impeded genuine local capacity and authentic student learning (Hargreaves & 
Shirley, 2009), making everything ―too‖ systematic (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003). Instead, 
bottom-up change (SIC) can occur within and alongside the existing institutional contexts, 
generating cumulative effects that can transform broader institutions over time 
(Armstrong, 2002; Hargreaves, 2003; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Huy & Mintzberg, 
2003; Oakes & Lipton, 2002; Raeburn, 2004). In this renewed framework, there is no 
sharp distinction between LSR and SIC. Rather, systematic planning, data, and 
professional development programs from the top can be used to create an environment 
more conducive to organic change or SIC that can be consequential over time 
(Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Huy & Mintzberg, 2003).  For example, Warren (2001) 
claims that the Texas Industrial Area Foundation (IAF), a grass-roots educational 
movement, was able both to create broader, state-level change initiative and to maintain a 
focus on participatory democracy because it simultaneously engaged in both bottom-up 
and top-down change processes. In sum, SIC can be more consequential than is usually 
appreciated, and the simple dichotomy of SIC and LSR should be reconsidered.   
The change mechanisms 
According to Elster (1989), ―mechanisms are the nuts, bolts, cogs, and wheels that 
link causes with effects‖ (p. 3; cited from Campbell, 2004). The identification of change 
mechanisms enables us to understand the details of causal processes. ―It reduces the risk 
of lapsing into either erroneous functionalist accounts in which institutional outcomes are 
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explained by their consequences, or spurious accounts that mistake correlations among 
variables for causal relationships‖ (Campbell, 2004: 63). Institutional scholars have 
proposed three mechanisms which can account for endogenous and incremental change: 
institutional layering and conversion and recombination.   
1. Institutional layering  
Institutional layering has been proposed as a distinct mechanism of incremental 
change. Given the recognition that formal established institutions may be difficult to 
replace wholesale (Pierson, 2004), in a layering process, an institution is never wholly 
replaced but rather evolves by the addition of rules alongside what already exists (Thelen 
& Streeck, 2005). Each additional layer is set in motion as a ―refinement‖ of or 
―correction‖ to existing systems, but this process can cumulate into a transformative 
change in the long run. In other words, institutional layering involves the ―partial 
renegotiation of some elements of a given set of institutions, while leaving others in place‖ 
(Thelen, 2003: 22). Layering may also involve the creation of ―parallel‖ or potentially 
―subversive‖ institutional tracks. Institutional actors lacking the capacity to overturn 
existing institutional arrangements may try to nurture new ones, in the hope that over 
time they will be able to assume more and more prominence, and in the long run such 
layered arrangements can present successful challenges to the institutional status quo 
(Thelen, 2003; Pierson, 2004). Since the new layers crafted in this subtle way do not 
disrupt and may directly challenge vested interests and established institutions, they 
typically do not provoke direct and highly visible counter-movements by upholders of the 
status quo (Thelen and Streek, 2005). Thelen (2005: 23) argues that the underlying logic 
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of change through layering is ―different growth‖ that operates and grows more quickly 
than the existing system so that over time newly added layers fundamentally change the 
overall trajectory of development as existing institutions ―stagnate and lose their grip‖ 
over time.   
2. Institutional conversion 
The second mechanism is institutional conversion: the process in which existing 
institutions or policies are reoriented to serve new ends. Institutional conversion occurs 
when rules remain formally the same but are interpreted and enacted in new ways 
(Thelen, 2003). Conversion is not driven by neglect in the face of a changed setting. 
Instead, it is produced by actors lacking the capacity to destroy an institution who 
actively exploit the inherent ambiguities of that institution. Through redeployment and 
recombination (Abrahamson, 2004; Campbell, 2004), they convert the institution to new 
goals, functions, or purposes. In some cases, conversion results from the incorporation of 
marginal actors who build a new coalition that uses existing institutional arrangements in 
new ways rather than dismantling them (Thelen and Mahoney, in press). Thelen (2005) 
argues that ―conversion is different from layering in the sense that in this process 
institutions are not amended or allowed to decay as much as they are redirected to new 
goals, functions, or processes (p. 26).‖ Conversion is more likely when there are new 
environmental challenges to which actors respond by deploying pre-given institutional 
repertoires in new ways; it can also occur through shifts in power relations such that 
marginal actors who had been blocked out of the system take it over and transform it in a 
subversive way. 
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Previously, while layering and conversion have been posited as separate and 
distinct mechanisms, these two change mechanisms are increasingly conceptualized as 
intimately interconnected in the sense that the two processes often coexist at two different 
levels in the vested hierarchy of institutions and systems. For example, layering is often 
the means by which conversion ultimately occurs since actors typically cannot change a 
whole system with one single dramatic measure (Boas, 2007). Similarly, Kay (2007) 
coined the concept of a ―tense layering‖ to describe the fact that a significant change 
requires multiple and tense layering that can accumulate over time.  The two mechanisms 
are path-dependent
1
 in the sense that the range of repertoires with which actors can 
innovate through those process are more or less fixed by existing institutional principles 
and processes and that the resulting change ―differs from but still resembles old ones by 
virtue of their containing many elements from the past (Campbell, 2004: 70).‖ The 
unifying approach of conversion and layering mechanisms is more capable of accounting 
for the complex process of gradual institutional change. Because the evidence supporting 
these models remains limited, there is room for empirical studies that can address them. 
Particularly, existing research has not yet adequately addressed the way in which actors 
may choose to change certain rules but not others, in one way but not another, and why. 
                                                 
1
 According to Djelic and Quack (2007), there are two versions of path-dependence:  
―In the general sense (soft version), it refers to the idea that events occurring at an earlier 
point in time will affect events occurring at a later point in time. In a stronger sense path-
dependence characterizes historical sequences in which contingent events set institutional 
patterns with deterministic properties into motion (p. 162).‖ 
The varieties of literature oscillate in their use of the concept of path dependence between these 
two poles of soft and strong versions.  
  
26 
 
This is why we need to turn to the change mechanism of recombination (Abrahamson, 
2004).  
3. Recombination  
As Meyer and Rowan (1997: 345) observe in their study, ―the building blocks for 
organizations come to be littered around the social landscape; it takes only a little 
entrepreneurial energy to assemble them into a structure.‖ Similarly, the mechanisms of 
SIC may often involve the rearrangement of elements that are already at hand or are 
inherited from the past (Hargreaves, 2004). They may also entail the blending in of new 
elements (Abrahamson, 2004). In either case, the result is an innovative recombination of 
elements that constitutes a new way of configuring organizations, social movements, 
institutions, and other forms of social activity (Campbell, 2004).  
In contrast to the mechanism of creative destruction often deployed by the 
advocates of large-scale and abrupt change that destroys and removes existing 
organizational assets to make room for newly created ones in which excessive and 
unnecessary emotional pains is involved (Abrahamson, 2004; Hargreaves, 2004), the 
mechanism of recombination suggests alternative, less disruptive and less painful 
approaches to change by using organizational resources that already exist in a new 
fashion. Recombination can be a useful strategy for SIC in the sense that ―because little is 
destroyed, there is less to have to defend or justify‖ within the existing institutional 
context (Abrahamson, 2004: 17). Moreover, people typically tend to view change 
initiatives that recombine existing arrangements in a new way as more bottom-up than 
top-down (Hargreaves, 2004; see also, Abrahamson, 2004: 17). In this way, 
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recombination mechanisms help the change agents of SIC bypass unnecessary 
interruptions from the district bureaucracy while avoiding change-related anxiety and 
pain.  
Moreover, recombination may be a continuous process rather than just a single 
burst of organizational change. The recombination mechanism often involves repetitive 
and recursive changes (Denis et al., 1996, 2001). It may often emerge through cyclical 
processes and via sequences or successive stages of layering and conversion that 
elaborate on previous accomplishments (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Recombination may 
be path-dependent insofar as the range of choices for recombinant change is largely fixed 
by the set of elements that are already available in the existing repertoire (Campbell, 
2004; Thelen, 2004; Thelen and Streek, 2005). The possibility that multiple models or 
initiatives may exist side by side suggests that change created by the mechanism of 
recombination may be less straightforward than is generally recognized. As a result, the 
changes may often be made up of potentially contradictory and conflicting dimensions or 
logics.  
Change dimensions: three perspectives of educational change 
Educational change and innovation is multidimensional, involving different, 
interrelated, and sometimes conflicting dimensions (Bascia & Hargreaves, 2000; 
Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 2001; House & McQuillan, 2005; North, 1990; Scott, 2001).  As 
such, if we want to examine how educational change has occurred and what pattern it has 
followed, it is important that we specify and track multiple dimensions over time (Bascia 
& Hargreaves, 2000; Bolman & Deal, 2003; Campbell, 2004; Hargreaves et al., 2007; 
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Scott, 2001). Identifying the relevant multiple dimensions is particularly important 
insofar as educational change unfolds over an extended period of time.  One way to 
analyze educational change that unfolds over time is  to examine multiple ―frames‖ 
(Bolman and Deal, 2003) or ―perspectives‖ (House & McQuillan, 1998) (Campbell, 2004; 
Hargreaves et al., 2007). House and McQuillan (1998) indicate that three perspectives 
provide a useful guide to analyze educational change through interrelated perspectives. 
Their three perspectives are technological, cultural, and political ones (House & 
McQuillan, 1998).  House and McQuillan (1998) claim that educational change should 
embody an appreciation of all three aspects to achieve maximum organizational 
alignment and effectiveness.  They argue that an inadequate or partial understanding of 
these three dimensions results in reform failure or superficial changes that alter one 
dimension while leaving the others untouched (House & McQuillan, 1998).   
Identifying multiple change dimensions is also important when change involves a 
lumpy and uneven process in which one dimension may lag behind another (Campbell, 
2004). While LSRs can be encompassing, simultaneous, and expeditious in order to 
achieve coherent and consistent configurations rapidly, SICs proceed in incremental and 
sequential ways due to limited capacity, resources, and power (Huy, 2001; Pierson, 2004; 
Reay et al., 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). However, 
educational scholars often assume that educational change is far more integrated than is 
the case (Campbell, 2004; North, 1990; Scott, 2001). The incremental institutional 
change literature I introduced earlier in this chapter provides a useful analytical tool for 
tracing educational change and its dimensions that may be slower and more incremental 
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than observers believe (Campbell, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). In 
this study, I will deploy House and Mcquillan‘s (1998) three perspectives in combination 
with incremental change literature to identify and track multiple dimensions of a SIC that 
has unfolded over a decade. In the following, I will overview the three dimensions of 
change: technological, cultural, and political.   
1. The technological dimension 
The technological dimension consists of ―concepts like input-output, specification 
of goals and tasks, flow diagrams, incentives, and performance assessment‖ (House & 
McQuillan, 1998: 198).  The technological dimension emphasizes rationality, analysis, 
logic, facts, and data (Bolman & Deal., 2003, 2006; House & McQuillan, 1998). This 
dimension concerns more ―substantive‖ dimensions of change including organization 
structure, resource allocation, and actualized strategies (Denis et al., 2001). Within this 
dimension, a desirable change agent is ―knowledgeable, thinks clearly, makes right 
decisions, has good analytical skills, and can design clear structures and systems that get 
the job done‖ (Bolman & Deal, 2003: 21).   
The technological perspective may be the most extensively used for examining 
educational change (Datnow et al., 2002). The traditional top-down reform models have 
incorporated this technological perspective that assumes an ordered, linear sequence of 
activities which involve planning at the top, a division of labor, and passive actors who 
work at the local level of bureaucracies (Bolman & Deal, 2003; Datnow et al., 2002). 
More recently, large scale reform increasingly incorporates the assumptions of the 
technological reform models (Hargreaves, 2009).  In order to make sure of consistency 
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across the system, reformers have concentrated on evidence-based and data-driven 
curriculum development, instructional training, and intervention strategies to raise test 
scores and narrow achievement gaps in literacy and numeracy (Fullan, 2009; Hargreaves, 
2009; Park & Datnow, 2009).  These technical-rational and data-driven strategies can be 
used for various purposes, such as evaluating progress, monitoring student performance 
and improvement, and judging the efficacy of local, school-level curriculum and 
instruction (Park & Datnow, 2009).  However, while the technological and data-driven 
perspective can be useful for reformers to coordinate many schools across a system based 
on rigorous and accurate information, this perspective also comes with some risks.  The 
strategies based on the technological, data-driven perspective may also cause problems 
when reformers are preoccupied with hasty tests without developing creative ways of 
engaging the public and educators to promote the common good (Hargreaves & Shirley, 
2009).    
SIC can often be characterized by uncertainty, risk taking, politics and time 
pressure, and consequently much decision making deviates from such technological-
rationalistic models.  Instead, decisions are made in less linear and more unpredictable 
ways (Fullan, 2001).  Thus, while the technological perspective matters, if SIC change 
agents were solely focused upon the technological dimension, initiating and sustaining 
SIC might not be possible. We also need to consider other dimensions. Next, I turn to the 
cultural dimension of change.  
2. The cultural dimension  
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The cultural dimension concerns changes in the dominant meaning or interpretive 
scheme of organizations (House & McQuillan, 1997; Denis et al., 2001). The importance 
of skillful management of culture in the change process has been widely noted (Bolman 
& Deal, 2003, 2006; Denis et al., 1996; Gioia et al., 1994; Hargreaves, 1994; Huy & Zott, 
2007; Munir, 2005).  Scholars have suggested the crucial roles of vision, imagination, 
meaning and creativity (Bolman & Deal, 2003, 2006; Fullan, 2001, 2005; House & 
McQuillan, 2005).  Other empirical findings demonstrate that performing symbolic 
actions, in relation to the change agents‘ credibility, moral purpose, and claims of early 
symbols of achievement, can help acquire legitimacy and resources (Fullan, 2001, 2003; 
Huy & Zott, 2007).  
Gioia et al. (1991) suggest that symbolic actions may be deployed ―to disguise an 
intended second-order change by making it appear as a less threatening first-order change 
(p. 379).‖ This symbolic strategy may be especially relevant to SIC in the sense of 
altering the goals, structures, and roles of the existing institutional arrangements without 
abruptly dismantling them (Fullan, 2001; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). Moreover, when 
SIC is founded by a small group of like-minded people who share common beliefs, 
symbolic strategies are a good starting point particularly start-up organizations with 
limited resource and legitimacy (Armstrong, 2002; Chen, 2009; Fullan, 1998, 2001; 
Polletta, 2002).  Tolerance or even preference for symbolic displays of commitment and 
conformity may help things hold together during the early stages (Kraatz, 2009).   
Institutional theory has posited that organization manages the contradiction 
between technical and legitimacy demands by engaging in ceremonial conformity (Meyer 
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& Rowan, 1977). Especially during the early periods, this practice can be deployed by 
change agents to navigate their institutional constraints and possibilities (Armstrong, 
2002; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fullan, 2001), complementing weak substantive 
resources with strong symbolic activities. At the same time, excessive emphasis on 
symbolic activities may lead to micro-management, organizational hypocrisy and other 
detrimental side- effects, if the visions and goals promoted by symbolic activities are not 
matched by corresponding actions - delegitimizing the credibility of the change agents 
and of the change in general (Campbell, 2004; Denis et al., 2001; Kraatz, 2009; North, 
1990; Selznick, 1949, 1957).  
While the existing literature on the cultural dimension tends to emphasize the 
cognitive-based aspects of symbolic management or construction of meaning, a growing 
body of research is investigating the emotional aspects (Hargreaves, 1998, 2001, 2004; 
Huy, 2002; Huy & Zott, 2007). Bottom-up and grassroots change (SIC) can be highly 
exciting, joyful, and rewarding as it generates new leaning, commitments, 
accomplishments, and meaning (Fullan, 2001; Hargreaves, 2004). But it also involves 
anxiety, uncertainty, exhaustion, and loss of confidence, especially at the early stages 
(Fullan, 2001). Fullan suggests that creating and sustaining changes is similar to riding a 
rollercoaster because it arouses the ups and downs of strong emotions (Fullan, 2001). As 
a result, emotions play an important role in the context of bottom-up and grass-roots 
change including SIC. While a few studies of emotion and change have focused on how 
individuals with little discretionary power regulate their own emotional expressions in the 
face of imposed change (Hargreaves, 2000, 2004; Huy & Zott, 2007), there are also 
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emotional issues in SIC characterized by high risk and uncertainty (Hargreaves, 2004; 
Huy & Zott, 2007). Nascent organizations or changes can also weather the formidable 
challenges involved in the change processes through emotional assurance, affective-based 
trust building, and relationship building (Huy, 2002; Huy & Zott, 2007).  
To review, Bolman and Deal (2006) argue that change agents have the hardest 
time grasping the ―elusive and mysterious influences of symbols (p. 2).‖ They argue that 
the change agents often devalue culture as fuzzy and irrational (Bolman & Deal, 2006). 
As a result, we clearly need to pay attention to the cultural dimensions of change. 
However, while cultural practices or symbolism can evoke powerful meanings and 
provide changes or organizations with much needed legitimacy, the benefits may come 
with risks. Furthermore, cultural or symbolic practices may not be sufficient for creating 
and sustaining change over time (Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 2001; Kraatz, 2009; Selznick, 
1949; 1957). That is, even the cultural practices which are widely accepted and supported 
do not necessarily lead to substantive outcomes in action (Hallett, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Ambiguity and confusion surrounding symbolic practices may develop into fierce 
politicization in circumstances in which changes are concerned with challenging existing 
distributions of power or disrupting the status quo of the prevailing systems (Fullan, 2001; 
Hargreaves et al, 2001; Oakes and Lipton, 2002).  Thus, we also need to take the political 
dimensions of change into account. 
3. The political dimension 
  
34 
 
Educational reform is very much a political process (Oakes & Lipton, 2002; 
Sarason, 1990).  The political dimension involves ―power, authority, and competing 
interests (p. 198).‖ More specifically, the political dimension is concerned with, 
―How power is exercised over others or developed with them, the ways 
that groups and their interest influence the innovation and reform process, 
and how the ends of education address, comply with, or challenge the 
existing distributions of power in society‖ (Hargreaves et al., 2001: 12).  
At no time does the political dimension seem more important than during the 
period of change (Denis et al., 1996, 2001). Change ―not only generates the opportunity 
for new arenas of micropolitics, it also often awakens latent hostilities‖ (Datnow, 2000: 
134). In order to successfully bring about bottom-up change or SIC, it is thus crucial for 
change agents to be mindful of the micropolitics of change and build a power base of 
allies, network, and coalitions (Blasé & Anderson, 1995; Bolman & Deal, 2006).  
Within the contexts of the ambiguous authority, divergent interests, and unclear 
goals that surround the many bottom-up and grass-roots approaches, leadership plays a 
vital role in the change processes (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Kraatz, 2009; Selznick, 
1957). The key tasks of change leaders include: defining the meaning of change and 
goals; balancing integrity and legitimacy with conformity; and keeping an organization 
on the edge of order and chaos (Fullan, 2001; Huy & Mintzberg, 2003). However, 
leadership can also be characteristically vulnerable during the early stages of bottom-up 
changes in which the power structure tends to be collective or distributed (Denis et al., 
1996, 2001; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Selznick, 1957). Thus, researchers should have a 
keen awareness of the political effects in terms of the distribution of formal and informal 
power, competing interests among constituents and between short-term and long-term 
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goals, and the evolution of leadership in the process of change (Denis et al., 1996, 2001; 
Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Mehan & Chang, 2010; Spillane 
et al., 2001).  
Mehan and Chang (2010) claim that the political dimension is the least studied 
area among the three dimensions of change. Oakes and Lipton (2002) maintain that 
change literature falls short because it assumes that the change processes is neutral and 
therefore overlooks the importance of the power and politics. Bolman and Deal (2006) 
also argue that change agents are reluctant to address the political dimension because 
they see its dynamics as manipulative and because they cling to ―the illusion that if 
organizations were run right, they wouldn‘t be political‖ (Bolman & Deal, 2006: 2). Thus, 
it is important that change agents acknowledge the importance of the power embedded in 
change processes and adequately address the challenges related with the dimension 
(Blasé, 1998; Datnow, 2000).. At the same time, Bolman and Deal (2003) suggest that 
overemphasis of the political dimension may downplay the role of structural and cultural 
features in organizing everyday life, so all three dimensions are important. Researchers 
need to relate the external elements of school to internal political behaviors  
Change process 
The examination of process is concerned with understanding how things evolve 
over time and why they evolve in the manner they do.  Educational change moves 
through three distinctive stages of initiation, implementation, and institutionalization 
(Fullan, 2001; Hargreaves et al., 1998). Although often represented as linear stages, the 
process of change is often indeterminate, precarious, and reversible (Huy, 2001); process 
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data are messy; and the boundaries between the stages of changes are often hazy (Fullan, 
2001).  For these reasons, the task of identifying process issues is in no way easy.  For 
example, what happens at one stage of the change process strongly affects subsequent 
stages, but new factors also emerge. In turn, decisions at the initiation stage may be 
substantially modified during the implementation stage in a continuous interactive way 
(Fullan, 2001).  
The process of SIC can be less clear than that of implementing top down reform 
through discrete stages (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003; Denis et al., 1996, 2001).  It often 
involves messy processes and occurs in more chaotic and unpredictable ways behind the 
scenes (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003). SIC is more likely to occur accidentally, and may take 
the form of immediate calls for action without much preparation and specific 
corresponding strategies (Fullan, 2001; Plowmen et al., 2007). In other words, many SICs 
challenge existing institutional orders in unusual ways without clear plans and 
corresponding resource allocations (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003).  In SICs the actors have to 
attempt to change an organization while simultaneously running it (Muncey & McQuillan, 
1996; Honig, 2009).  
Furthermore, the change process often comprises a backward movement when 
actors recognize growing mismatches between the espoused goals and actual enactments 
and thus are encouraged to reexamine their initial beliefs and values driving change. 
Hence, the process of SIC can be non-linear, iterative, interactive, cyclical and regressive 
(Campbell, 2004; Denis et al., 1996, 2001; Fullan, 2001). This suggests that we need to 
pay attention to the temporal ordering, sequence, and pacing of change especially with 
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regard to changes that unfold and evolve over a long period of time (Huy, 2001; Langley, 
1999; Pierson, 2004). One common interpretation of the sequencing of the change 
process involves three stages of initiation, implementation, and institutionalization.  
1. Initiation  
Where does new educational change come from? Sarason (1972, 1997) lamented 
that the creation and initiation of educational change had not yet been studied adequately. 
He claimed that although there are ample studies of the implementation of educational 
change, very few studies have examined how educational change comes into being 
(Sarason, 1972; See also, Mehan & Chang, 2010).  Given the dauntingly contingent 
nature of the origin of change and the sheer number of factors that affect the initiation of 
change (Fullan, 2001; Lounsbury & Crumbley, 2007), it is understandable that 
educational change scholars have focused on the slightly more tractable and robust 
subject of implementation rather than initiation (Lounsbury & Schneiberg, 2008; Pierson, 
2004). However, an emerging body of scholarship provides an accumulation of case 
studies and theoretical insights regarding the processes and conditions that contribute to 
the initiation of change (Abrahamson, 2004; Campbell, 2004; Clemens, 2002; Fullan, 
2001; Hargreaves, 2004; Mehan & Chang, 2010; Sarason, 1972).   
Initiation consists of ―the process that leads up to and includes a decision to adopt 
or proceed with a change‖ (Fullan, 2001: 47).  The direction of change may be more or 
less defined at this early stage.  However, precise goals and needs are often not clear at 
the beginning. The more complex and ambitious the changes are, the greater the problem 
of clarity.  People often acquire clearer understandings about their needs and goals only 
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after they start taking actions during the implementation stage (Fullan, 2001). 
Furthermore, the potential problems of need, clarity, complexity, and competing interests 
cannot be resolved at this early stage. This lack of clarity and resolution is passed on to 
the implementation stage and becomes more discernible there (Fullan, 2001). For these 
reasons, the relationship between initiation and implementation is loosely coupled and 
closely intertwined (Fullan, 2001).  However, some policies and changes are deliberately 
stated in an ambiguous manner at the beginning in order to avoid conflict and promote 
broad-based acceptance (Fullan, 2001; Palier, 2005; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). The 
ambiguous and unclear goals and procedures underlying the change, meanwhile, may 
trigger great anxiety and frustration among those sincerely trying to implement them 
(Fullan, 2001).  
Since bottom-up or grass-root SIC, by definition, attempts to break up the status-
quo, its initiation often confronts resistance by institutional defenders trying to protect 
their vested interests and positions within the institutional arrangements. As challengers, 
or change agents, often do not have the power, resources, or legitimacy to produce SIC 
by themselves, they engage in a ―grassroots‖ form of activity to build their coalition with 
other stakeholders who share complementary interests and resources (Hargrave & Van de 
Ven, 2006). Responding to these challenges, institutional dominants react with direct and 
indirect forms of ―repression‖ or ―avoidance‖, material concessions that address 
challengers‘ grievances, and strategies to co-opt and accommodate the challengers‘ 
initiatives in ways that thwart the challenge (Piven & Cloward, 1977). Unless 
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institutional challengers outmaneuver institutional defenders‘ strategies, they may win a 
few battles, but they do not ultimately win any wars (Binder, 2002).   
In order to bypass the resistance of institutional incumbents and address 
competing interests among constituents, the aforementioned strategic ambiguity is 
deployed even by change agents of SIC by constructing the strategic goal differently 
according to the various constituents or accommodating wider organizational interests 
whilst also enabling collective organizational action (Jarzabkowski et al., 2011; Palier, 
2005). Thus, the profoundly political interaction between institutional challengers and 
defenders can generate ongoing tensions and compromises in initiating SIC (Greenwood 
et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1999). Existing literature has largely focused on the actions of 
leaders and change agents in creating and promulgating changes, drawing attention away 
from the emergent, multilevel nature of how a new change emerges (Lounsbury & 
Crumbley, 2007).  
2. Implementation  
Implementation consists of ―the process of putting into practice an idea, program, 
or set of activities and structures new to the people attempting or expecting change‖ 
(Fullan, 2001: 65).  It involves the first experiences of attempting to put an idea or reform 
into practice (Fullan, 2001). Transition from initiation to implementation is commonly 
understood as transformation of ―initial impulse into routinized practice‖ (Mehan & 
Chang, 2011: 66). However, the processes beyond initiation are often more intricate 
because they involve more people and real change is at stake (Fullan, 2001). Things may 
become worse and more vague than as people grapple with the real meaning and early 
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outcomes of change (Fullan, 2001). Fullan (2001) calls this the implementation dip.  The 
implementation process can be even more complicated because new policies and reform 
programs are frequently initiated without the follow-up or preparation time necessary to 
generate adequate outcomes (Fullan, 2001). These are essentially a matter of formal myth 
and ceremony, designed more to legitimate or obscure current practices than to achieve 
substantive change in how an institution operates (Campbell, 2004; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).   
With regard to SIC, lacking the authority to mandate or the resources to 
implement change (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006; Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 
2010), institutional challengers tend to rely on symbolic strategies in addition to 
incremental and subversive change strategies based on the belief that the symbolic 
change will ultimately induce substantive change in the long run (Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 
2001; North, 1990). Sometimes, this symbolic strategy can arise from the change agents‘ 
shifting interpretation of change over time in addressing emerging gaps between the goals 
and the acts of implementation rather than making a deliberate choice from the outset 
(Pierson, 2004). Thus, during this stage, a regressive or recursive change may also occur 
when the legitimacy of change is undermined due to unclear meanings, emergent internal 
contradictions, or mismatches between goals and enactments (Clemens & Cook, 1999). 
As a result, implementation is not a singular or straightforward process but rather a set of 
recurrent and cyclical processes that work in concert in a delicate balance of change and 
stability and ambiguity and clarity (Denis et al., 1996, 2001; Fullan, 2005). This view 
challenges research that suggests that change agents seek alignment during 
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implementation through clarification and tight-coupling about implementation (Denis et 
al., 2001; Fullan, 2001, 2005; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006, 2009).  
3. Institutionalization 
Institutionalization is the core concept within institutional theory and has been 
systematically studied by institutional scholars. According to institutional theory, once a 
new practice is institutionalized, it is taken-for-granted, experienced as objective reality, 
enduring and reliably reproduced (Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 
2006).  Consistent with this, educational change scholars who have been grappling with 
the problem of change initiatives that rarely last or spread tend to assume that once a 
certain change reaches the institutionalization stage it will be integrated effortlessly and 
spread widely (Datnow, 2006; Fullan, 2001).  
However, although sustainability generally has been associated with 
institutionalization, not all instances of sustaining change fit the dynamics associated with 
institutionalization. Many things persist without ever becoming institutionalized. 
Alternatively, there are many procedures and initiatives that are institutionalized in the 
sense of being upheld by law or popular norm, but are not widely used or sustained. 
Furthermore, the processes of institutionalization are often accompanied by displacement 
of formal goals. A critical wing of institutional scholars also challenges the taken- for-
granted understanding of institutionalization. These scholars argue that 
institutionalization has often been accompanied by goal displacement, diminished 
organizational willingness to be open to the members, co-optation of grassroots processes 
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and the concentration of power in favor of a small group of organization elites (Michels, 
2001; Selznick, 1949: 224).   
In reconciling this tension, while Selznick (1957, 1996) emphasizes the positive 
aspects of institutionalization, he similarly documents its pathologies. He portrays 
institutionalization as very much ―bad news / good news‖ for an organization (Selznick, 
1957, 1996). Thus, he concludes that the institutionalization should be seen as a 
―fundamentally neutral‖ process (Selznick, 1957, 1996). Similarly, Green et al. (2009) 
argue that institutionalization can be both a benefit and a curse at the same time. It is a 
benefit because ―taking successful practices for granted allows actors to interrogate and 
attend to new and more pressing problems‖ (Green et al., 2009: 30). It is a curse because 
―taking successful practices for granted reflects an actor‘s failure to consciously make 
sure that a practice is indeed effective‖ (Green et al., 2009: 30).  Green et al. (2009) claim,  
―Taking a practice for granted and failing to interrogate and attend to the 
reasons for its adoption may help the practice persist, but it also increases 
the probability that the belief in the practice‘s effectiveness may decouple 
from the practice‘s actual effectiveness and thus lead to the faddish 
adoption of spurious practices (p. 30).‖ 
Despite these widespread anomalies in practices, most studies of educational change have 
tended to equate institutionalization with sustainability, prompting a conflation of the two 
(Anderson, 2010; Coburn, 2003; Colyvass & Jonsson, 2011; Fink, 2000; Fullan, 2005; 
Hargreaves & Giles, 2006).  
There is a contradiction between the emphasis of non-linearity and complexity of 
the change process within the contemporary educational change literature and the 
uncritical embrace of the traditional definition of institutionalization.  The equation of 
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institutionalization with widespread diffusion and effortless continuation obscures the 
complicated nature of the process. As Barley and Tolbert (1997) have argued, scholars in 
institutional theory as well as educational change literature ―have pursued an empirical 
agenda that has largely ignored how institutions are created, altered, and reproduced, in 
part, because their models of institutionalization as a process are underdeveloped‖ (93).  
Zucker (1977) defined institutionalization as ―both a process and a property 
variable. It is the process by which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as 
real and, at the same time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be 
defined as more or less a taken-for-granted part of this social reality‖ (p. 728). As a 
process, institutionalization represents the manner of attaining an organizational order 
that, in turn, reproduces itself (Colyvas & Powell, 2006; Green et al., 2009). As an 
outcome, it represents ―the state of having realized this order, and is then reinforced 
through feedback mechanisms that shape and govern behavior (Colyvas 2007: 465).‖ 
However, there has been imbalance in subsequent research between process and property 
(outcomes) of institutionalization. Most of the literature of institutionalization has 
primarily focused on macro level outcomes over processes (Kallinikos & Hasselbladh, 
2010). This privileging of outcome or property characteristics of institutionalization over 
the process aspects assumes that when institutions gain taken-for-granted status, by 
definition, institutions become self-reproductive without requiring purposive maintaining 
efforts.  This also leads to the problems of equating institutionalization with widespread 
diffusion.  A growing body of scholarship claims that prevalence of change is a poor 
indicator of institutionalization (Anderson, 2010; Colyvass & Jonsson, 2011; Green et al., 
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2009). Sometimes, change is prevalent yet not legitimate.  Conversely, sometimes a 
practice is legitimate yet not prevalent. This conflation of institutionalization with 
prevalence may lead us to pursue widespread diffusion as fast as possible without taking 
the depth of the actual practice seriously (Anderson, 2010; Coburn, 2004; Hargreaves & 
Goodson, 2006). Given this situation, it is also perhaps not surprising that the process of 
institutionalization including the sustaining of change has been trivialized. Indeed, 
echoing Scott (2001), Lawrence and Suddaby (2007) argue that institutional research on 
how to maintain institutions remains an understudied phenomenon and that we need to 
pay more attention to the ways in which institutions maintain themselves. The point is 
that it is naïve to think that once institutionalized, change can be effortlessly sustained 
and widely reproduced. Rather, institutionalization is an ongoing process, and this 
process may be the trickiest thing of all (Zilber, 2002).   
Moreover, the overly positive and optimistic portrait of the institutionalization 
process within the traditional perspective masks its inherently political nature of it. 
Institutional theory has emphasized isomorphic change processes that reinforce 
continuity and reward conformity. Much less attention has been paid to change that is not 
isomorphic or is subversive in nature. The process of institutionalization is generally seen 
to give institutional structures a degree of stability and continuity based on the routinized 
reproduction of practices that are reinforced as a consequence of conformity to social 
controls and supported by taken for granted beliefs (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 
1984; Jepperson, 1991). Given the very definition of institutionalization as a form of 
social reproduction and normalization (Willmott, 2008), the incidents of change that are, 
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by nature, non-isomorphic or non-reproductive, or disruptive (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006), have posed a theoretical challenge. Munir and Phillips (2005) argue ―institutional 
theory has often come under fire for failing to provide robust explanations of non-
isomorphic change‖ (1666). Under this conceptual framework, explaining the 
institutionalization of the non-isomorphic changes is even more puzzling.  
Recent developments in institutional theory revise ―the isomorphic imagery‖ that 
focuses on diffusion of unitary practices or a singular institutional logic by 
reconceptualizing institutionalization as a political process fraught with ongoing struggle 
and contestation (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008; Raeburn, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 
2010). This reconceptualization provides a crucial ontological starting point for a new 
wave of studying (non-isomorphic) change. It also contributes to a fuller understanding 
of how the processes of ―disruptive‖ change unfold over time and how these unfolding 
processes are shaped by strategic and purposive actors rather than ones who habitually 
engage in the routines and rituals of reproduction (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).  
When it comes to the institutionalization of the SIC, this new approach is 
especially helpful for resolving the dilemma between institutionalization and radical 
change. For example, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) find that many grass-root movements 
faced a tension between the desire to accomplish their original goal of radical change and 
the need for institutionalization. As early as Robert Michels‘s (2001[1912]) famous 
analysis of ―the iron law of oligarchy‖, scholars have maintained that to the extent that 
formalization and bureaucratization of social movements reduce spontaneity and 
disruption, these organizations tend to regress to conventional and routine organizations. 
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Piven and Cloward (1977) claim that institutionalization is antithetical to effective 
movement and change. However, a growing body of literature on the varieties of social 
movement organization and participatory democracy turns the negative interpretations of 
institutionalization into questions (Voss & Sherman, 2000; Polletta, 2002; Clemens & 
Minkoff, 2004; Chen, 2009). For example, Staggenborg (1988) claims that social 
movement scholars tend to dismiss any forms of institutionalizing efforts by equating 
them all together as ―bureaucratic.‖  As a result, collectivist and movement organizations 
were frequently tyrannized by informal elites without the efforts for professionalization 
and formalization (Staggenborg, 1988). Warren (2001) examines the difficulties in 
balancing tensions between local participation and top-down authority in the Texas IAF. 
He argues that both participation and authority are needed, claiming that ―most advocates 
of participatory democracy have become uncomfortable with discussions of authority, but 
utopian preferences for pure egalitarian relationships are unrealistic for developing 
effective power for communities‖ (2001: 35). His work suggests that social movements 
will ultimately fail without institutionalization while the process of incorporating top-
down and bottom-up strategies is rife with dynamic tensions and is as much emergent as 
planned (Warren, 2001).  
In sum, there has been not much scholarship that examines the complicated 
processes and the dilemma of institutionalizing change while continuing to seek radical 
change. This study of SCE is an exploratory attempt to remedy this gap in the literature 
by detailing the change processes that have struggled to resolve the tensions involved 
over a decade.  
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Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter presented the theoretical framework of this study. In attempting to 
understand self-initiated change, this study deploys incremental institutional theory in 
combination with literature on social movement within institutions. These two bodies of 
literature provide useful analytical guidance to making sense of the change mechanisms 
involving layering, conversion, and recombination. These bodies of work also give 
analytical tools on which we could build to understand and theorize the temporal 
processes, such as timing, sequence, and pacing, and the multi-dimensional nature of SIC 
that often unfolds in more nuanced and unanticipated ways.  
The next chapter will first discuss the background information of the broader 
South Korean educational system and contextualize SCE within the institutional 
environment. Then, I will go into detail regarding the research design and methods I 
employed to investigate the research question of this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Methodologies 
Contextualizing SCE within the broader Korean education system:  
Many studies demonstrate that there have been dramatic changes in school and 
educational policies in South Korea since the mid-1990s. They argue that Korea has 
experienced an abrupt and comprehensive neoliberal educational reform initiated by the 
first civilian president, Kim Young Sam, after more than thirty years of successive 
military regimes. They also argue that these reforms have radically transformed the 
authoritarian and centralized Korean education system into a liberal and decentralized 
one. This transformative reform movement reflects a global trend in educational change 
dominated by the neoliberal principles of choice, creativity, excellence, and 
diversification in contrast to the emphasis on the uniformity, standardization, and equity 
of education under successive authoritarian military regimes. 
Far less studied- because of the prevailing tendency among scholars to assume 
global convergence on the Anglo-American model of standardized reform- is how the 
national, local, and institutional contexts of Korea mediate neoliberal reforms and global 
pressures and how much change has actually occurred and in what way.  
Institutional perspectives emphasizing path-dependent change processes 
―whereby institutions retain many of their important capacities even as they change‖ 
(Campbell, 2004: 127) should be skeptical about the idea that neoliberal reforms and the 
pressures of globalization are inexorably leading towards homogenization on the Anglo-
American educational reform model. Instead, institutionalism scholars seek to address the 
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question of how neoliberal reform is modified by existing institutional constraints and 
change mechanisms (Campbell, 2004).  
Korea has experienced an abrupt and swift neoliberal transformation because of 
the economic crisis triggered by the financial meltdown in East Asia in 1997. The Korean 
government carried out extensive neoliberal economic and structural reforms during the 
financial crisis under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank who demanded a 
complete restructuring of the old developmental state to emphasize the principles of 
transparency, accountability, and deregulation. Due to the painful experiences of 
widespread corruption, lack of accountability, and rigid regulations under military 
regimes for more than thirty years, the Korean public tended to embrace these reform 
initiatives with the expectation that those measures would be inevitable and good for 
establishing a more efficient economy and a better and more democratic society. These 
principles have provided the basis for restructuring the centralized and bureaucratic 
Korea educational system. The May 31
st
 educational reform initiated by President, Kim 
Young Sam, in 1995 emphasized the deregulation of education, the creation of more 
competition among schools, and more freedom of choice (Kang, 2007; Park, 2004, 2007).  
These neoliberal reforms occurred in South Korea during the democratic 
transition. The first civilian president Kim Young Sam and his successor president Kim 
Dae Jung, the longtime champion of the South Korean pro-democracy movement, 
pursued neoliberal reforms by representing them as instruments for democracy that 
would dismantle the old authoritarian and developmental state. The public believed that 
democracy meant a departure from the methods of the past regimes. In other words, 
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neoliberal educational reform has been portrayed as being responsible for the problems in 
Korean education (Kang, 2007; Park, 2004; Takayama, 2009). Framing it this way and 
capitalizing on the existing despair and frustration of the people, including progressive 
educational activists who had struggled against the bureaucratic and paternalistic military 
regimes for many years, the government mitigated the public‘s resistance to the reforms 
(Lim and Jang, 2007; Shin, 2007).  
In relation to the issues of self-initiated change, it should be noted that neoliberal 
reform ideas had already been introduced under military regimes prior to the critical and 
historical conjunctures of the IMF crisis and the new democratic presidency (Chung, 
2008; Song, 2004). However, only after the critical junctures did the ideas and reasoning 
become conspicuous and gradually gain momentum to become actual reforms.  In terms 
of institutional perspectives ―even apparently revolutionary periods during which changes 
seems to be radical and abrupt often turn out to be quite evolutionary upon further 
inspection‖ (North, 1998: 19-20; see also Campbell 2004: 33).  
While restructuring in the financial sectors was swift and successful, the 
neoliberal transformation of Korean education was not.  The May 31 educational reform 
initiative sparked heated debate on competing logics between choice and equity in 
educational policies. The thirty-year-long Educational Equalization policy that had 
prioritized equal opportunity at the sacrifice of school choice by prohibiting any kind of 
stratification of secondary schools has been seen as the most immovable obstacle to 
neoliberal reformers. The Korean public‘s egalitarian sentiments regarding government 
policies over market-driven sentiments have been important supporting factors for the 
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policy (Song, 2003; Campbell, 2004). Meanwhile, the bureaucrats and conservative 
educators (mostly school administrators) who wanted to maintain their vested interests 
and the status quo obstructed the implementation of neoliberal reforms by exhibiting their 
resistance and reluctance to cooperate and by abdicating their responsibilities to do so 
(Kim, 2005). Consequently, government decision makers were reluctant to make 
sweeping educational policy decisions that would radically transform educational polices 
(Campbell, 2004; Kang, 2007). Rather, they worked on options that led to marginal 
changes from the status quo without provoking strong resistance from opposition groups. 
They sought instead to establish many kinds of pilot innovative schools, such as pilot 
independent private schools that would give more choice particularly to middle and upper 
class families, alternative schools and founded by civil groups for at-risk students, public 
innovative schools (the Korean version of magnet schools) in mostly rural and 
disadvantaged areas.  Contrary to conventional wisdom, neoliberal educational reform in 
Korea has therefore not yet precipitated a radical transformation. The effects of neoliberal 
reform on Korean education have so far been modest and incremental.  In terms of 
incremental institutional change the expansion of diverse types of schools alongside the 
stable and resilient public school systems can be viewed as kinds of layering and 
conversion in the sense that liberalization of Korean education proceeded slowly and 
continuously while attempting a quite fundamental transformation (Thelen and Streek, 
2005).  
Neoliberal educational reforms in Korea have also been achieved through 
ambiguous rather than explicit ideological measures. They were based more on common 
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acknowledgement of the need to overcome the failures of the past authoritarian state than 
on explicit and coherent analyses of the problems and solutions to them. Although the 
neoliberal reforms have been introduced in the name of democracy and were perceived as 
such, the coexistence of contradictory logics of neo-liberalism became the main sources 
of confusion, anxiety, and bewilderment among constituents and even within the state 
(Park, 2004). While some people felt betrayed by the new pro-democracy governments 
that initiated neoliberal reforms resulting in intensified social polarization and inequality, 
others thought that democracy had been hijacked by the neo-liberal reforms, and still 
others were perplexed by the lack of enactment of reforms at the local school level.  
Although the government initiated and implemented neoliberal reforms, the 
relatively progressive governments under President Kim Dae Jung and Roh Mu Hyun 
were ambivalent towards them.  Their governments opposed the independent school 
initiatives because the initiatives undermined social cohesion and equality by stratifying 
schools (Kang, 2007).  This resulting confusion explains why the neoliberal 
transformation has been a slower and more incremental process than people believe. The 
same ambiguous and contradicting logics also made the government more susceptible to 
challenges from pragmatic educators and activists seeking more egalitarian and 
democratic education by adapting the existing policies to their ends rather than 
dismantling them.  In this way, the ambiguities and contradictions unwittingly promoted 
―boomerang effects‖ on neoliberal reforms themselves by providing an important 
political opening for alternative reform (Lim and Jang, 2007, 449). In other words, 
ambiguous neoliberal policies ―whose rules are opaque and contested, and whose 
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interpretation and implementation by front-line actors are highly variable‖ (Hacker 2005, 
46) may have allowed significant ‗street-level bureaucracy‘ (Lipsky, 1980; Shirley, 2006) 
and greatly increased the reforms‘ susceptibility to conversion (Hacker 2005).This in turn 
may have paved the way for the spawning of new forms of self-initiated school change 
(SIC)  like SCE‘s that are becoming more prevalent under the increasingly decentralized 
and deregulated arrangements.  
Research context 
South Castle Elementary School (SCE) is located inside South Castle National 
Park, a rural area on the outskirts of the South Korean capital city of Seoul. The castle 
was originally built two thousand years ago and was reconstructed in 1621. Situated in 
this historical and scenic area, the school is rich in historical resources and has a beautiful 
natural environment. Since 1991, the school saw its enrollment decrease as residents left 
the park area to pursue jobs and better education.  The local school district decided to 
close the school by 2001. From 1982 to 2006, more than five thousand small schools like 
SCE in rural areas were forced to close and merge with larger neighboring schools as a 
result of the government‘s school merge and closing policy.  Upset about the plan to 
close the historical and beautiful school, a group of people, including civil activists, 
progressive educators, and SCE‘s principal came up with a plan to save it.  
Within several months, more than ninety parents were mobilized and participated 
in the school saving plan. They decided to join this project, but for very different and 
often contradictory reasons (Palier, 2005). Based on a shared understanding of the 
inadequate way in which the former school had been operating, the alternative plan for 
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saving the school was directed more at opposing the past than at conceiving, or creating, 
new ways of schooling. Since 2001, SCE has evolved from a small, failing school facing 
imminent closure into a widely known exemplary innovative school that has established a 
new form of school change and that has exerted significant influence the debate about 
school reforms in South Korea.  
 
<Figure 1.> The change of student enrollment of SCE over time 
From 2004, more than twenty schools in rural areas voluntarily emulated SCE‘s 
innovative model. It was no accident that the innovation diffused mainly to small schools 
in rural areas that shared similar challenges. SCE‘s innovation ―opened the gate‖ (Tarrow, 
1991, p. 180) for these schools to initiate their own innovations by setting a precedent 
that demonstrated the legitimacy of innovation and signaled the potential vulnerability of 
school districts to this challenge (McAdam, 1995; Minkoff, 1997; Raeburn, 2004; Tarrow, 
1998). Initially, these schools developed a network (―The Small School Solidarity‖) to 
share knowledge and experiences.  This network gradually grew into a social movement 
seeking to spread their change models beyond rural schools to many other schools in 
urban and suburban areas. 
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In May 2009, the newly-elected progressive superintendent of Gyeonggi province, 
the largest school district in Korea with more than 2000 schools, declared that current 
educational policies designed to cater to the socially privileged should be eradicated and 
proposed a policy roadmap of building innovative schools mainly based on SCE‘s change 
model. The progressive superintendent‘s electoral victory was itself a landmark event 
under the entrenched bureaucratic and conservative educational system. He announced 
that he would launch 16 pilot innovative schools based on the model of SCE‘s innovation 
in 2009, 50 pilot schools in 2010, and more than 100 pilot schools by 2011 (Gyeonggi 
Province School District, 2009).  The Ministry of Education and Science under the 
current conservative government also launched a new innovative school initiative mainly 
serving rural areas based on SCE‘s change models and announced 55 pilot schools to 
implement this initiative. According the Ministry, the schools chosen to be converted 
under the rural innovative school initiative would receive $100,000 to $2,000,000 
depending on school initiatives to support successful implementation (The Ministry of 
Education and Science, 2009).    
This tale of relatively smooth and gradual development does not capture the 
complexity of SCE‘s change over time. This description cannot answer the questions of 
how the project of school change came into being at such a turbulent period of ―school 
collapse‖ and ―neoliberal reform‖ and how the centralized and authoritarian educational 
system shape the seemingly school-initiated change.  There are ambiguities and internal 
contradictions in the change processes, in the contested interactions between the 
education authorities and the school, and in the unintended consequences of change over 
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time.  The highly centralized bureaucracy of the Korean education system could have 
blocked SCE‘s change if SCE had pursued a highly visible change project. But SCE‘s 
change occurred at the margin, in a rural area where schools suffered from chronic 
problems of school failure and decreasing enrollment. In a sense, SCE was located in a 
loophole of the existing system. In addition, the emphasis on diversification and 
deregulation under the political contexts of neoliberal reforms provided the school with a 
favorable political opening for change.  
However, it was not inevitable that the school would change due to the 
institutional and political context, or that the change would be shaped by these contexts in 
a deterministic way. The actors played crucial roles in exploiting the institutional features 
and political opportunities in their favored direction and made SCE‘s change possible. 
The key actors who participated in the progressive educational movement for more than 
twenty years skillfully coordinated the change processes and framed change differently 
depending on ever-changing situations and based on their sophisticated analysis of the 
institutional and political contexts.  They forged alliances and coalitions with various 
kinds of people and unexpected alliances also emerged in the course of change struggles. 
SCE has used a variety of concepts to legitimize its change in continually 
evolving and highly contested contexts. In the beginning, it represented its change as a 
small school project mainly geared to schools in rural and disadvantaged areas in order 
not to provoke resistance from schools in other areas and from the school district 
administration. Then, the school defined the change as a public alternative school that 
would serve students at risk within the public school system, arguing that it was one 
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possible way to diversify public schools. The encounter between SCE and the alternative 
schools provided SCE with expanded tools for recombination and redeployment of the 
existing rules and policies in new ways that made SCE more innovative, rather than 
simply opposing the existing system. When the political winds became more receptive to 
SCE‘s change due to the unexpected victory of the progressive superintendent in the 
province, this shift was accompanied by a shift in how SC framed its change.  SCE 
moved more aggressively to pursue its goal of making Korean public schools more 
democratic and humanitarian.  However, at the same time, SCE was designated as one of 
55 rural public innovative schools by a Ministry of Education and Science initiative in 
2009 and so is operating working for the apparently in relation to the neoliberal school 
choice-friendly policy.  These ambiguities, internal contradictions, complexity of change 
processes, as well as the unintended developments foster an understanding of how school 
change can be small and incremental, yet also consequential, and it can elucidate the 
mechanisms by which self-initiated change occurs and operates over time.  
<Table 1.> Key events and activities of SCE  
Time  Key events / activities  
August 2000 Inaugural meeting of the organizing committee for saving  
SCE 
October 2000 Explanatory meetings at neighboring schools to attract   
students to SCE. 
November 2000 Explanatory meetings and information sessions for parents in  
adjacent cities 
 Recruiting teaching staff – Mr. Rhyu decided to join the  
Project 
December 2000 
 
 
Mr. Yoon, Mr. Kang, and other teachers joined SCE. 
 
The founding teachers and parents garnered written  
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endorsement from key community members, local  
politicians, as well as from the deputy provincial  
superintendent of Gyeonggi province 
February 2001 
 
March 2
nd
, 2002 
           Intensive efforts to fix the school facilities  
           and maintenance system.  
           School began a new school year with  six                    
           classes of 103 students and 11 teachers. 
November 2004 
December 2004 
 
December 2006 
 
February 2007 
 
 
 
February 2008 
 
March 2008 
 
 
 
 
March 2009  
May 2009 
 
 
August 2009 
 
November 2009 
SCE won the most beautiful school of the year award 
National televised media outlets  broadcast SCE‘s innovative efforts 
SCE was awarded as  ―most innovative school in the  
school district.‖ 
Mr. Kang (one of the founding activist teachers) transferred  
to the neighboring school; Mr. Rhyu was formally appointed  
as an ―invited teacher‖ by the principal for an extended term of  
four years.   
SCE was designated as an autonomous public school by  
Gyeonggi provincial school district.   
Incumbent principal Lee left SCE for a new position  
in a larger school (about 2,000 students) in a neighboring  
city after eight years of serving at the SCE; The new principal  
Choi had served as assistant principal at SCE before he was  
appointed as successor to the outgoing principal  
Mr. Yoon (a new lead teacher) arrived at the SCE  
Mr. Rhyu (one of the longstanding founding activist teachers)  
finally left SCE to assume a senior advisor position to the  
Gyeonggi provincial superintendent   
SCE was designated as a rural innovative school  
by the Korean Ministry of Education, which brought  a $1  
million grant to the school for three years 
Korean version of 60 Minutes broadcast a two week program about 
SCE, which had major repercussions around the country.  
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Research questions 
My dissertation will explore three questions 
 What mechanisms do the change agents of SIC employ, how do they implement 
these mechanisms and why do they employ these mechanisms?  
 What are the characteristics of the processes of SIC? What is the pacing and 
sequencing of the change?  
 How does SIC unfold over time, and why?  
 
In answering these three initial questions a fourth research question emerged that 
summates the other three: 
 What implications does an investigation of self-initiated change in one school 
have for understanding existing theories of self-initiated and imposed educational 
change? 
Data collection  
The case study 
I conducted data collection over thirteen months from May 2009 to June 2010 in 
South Korea. In this study, the approach to data collection is a single, exploratory case 
study (Yin, 2003). Single case study is a common research method for testing and 
building theory (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) and has been widely used to study 
organizational change in which a deep, interpretative and holistic understanding is 
required (Eisenhardt, 1989; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005; Zilber, 2002). Many scholars 
recognize that case study research is useful for providing rich detail and examining 
strategic decision-making within organizations and social movements (Minkoff and 
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McCarthy, 2005; Snow and Trom, 2002; Taylor 2007).  This case study involves a 
mixture of induction and deduction. Although the findings and arguments developed are 
essentially grounded in the data, I drew on concepts from the literature on educational 
change, institutional change, and social movements within institutions at various stages in 
the research to enrich and refine understanding (Denis et al., 1996, 2001).  
Gaining access 
My relationship with SCE began when I attended SCE as a student from 1979-
1981 when my father was a faculty member.  Later I learned of SCE‘s transformation in 
the South Korean news media.  As a graduate student, I returned to SCE to conduct a 
background study from June to August 2007.  I first contacted the school in May 2007 to 
gain access. The decision to give me access to study the school was made collectively by 
all of the school‘s educators at a regular staff meeting. Two weeks after I first contacted 
the school, the school‘s lead teacher informed me that I had permission to conduct my 
research. He said that my commitment to come back to my alma mater from the United 
States helped me to gain access to the school. In addition, the educators sought to learn 
from my study about school change, valuing my study as an objective third-party 
perspective (Datnow et al., 2002). During the background study, I met and spoke with 
SCE teachers, principals, and parents; observed various school activities; and attended 
staff meetings, monthly parents-teachers joint conferences, and annual workshops with 
allied schools. This gave me a real sense about the school change and helped me to build 
trust and relationships with SCE teachers, which was necessary in order to conduct more 
intensive fieldwork.  
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Interviewee samples  
I deployed strategies of purposeful sampling and snowball sampling to select 
interview participants (Datnow, 2005; Merriam, 1998; Rossman & Rallies, 2003; Stake, 
2002). I tried to include all the relevant educators who are currently teaching and have 
been at SCE for at least one year since SCE is a small school with less than eleven staff 
members. The sample included eight teachers and two administrators
2
.  I interviewed the 
key educators (Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang who I call the old guard and Mr. Yoon and Mr. 
Han who I call the new guard) more than five times each. I also conducted interviews 
with SCE parents who were active in a range of school activities in order to gain a well-
rounded perspective of the school change.  I identified parent interviewees as I developed 
relationships with school members. Teachers played a significant role in identifying 
individuals and setting up interviews and generating a snowball sample of parent 
members (Evans, 2009). Furthermore, to understand the dynamics between SCE and the 
school district, I also conducted interviews with school district administrators. In sum, I 
conducted a series of 36 interviews. The interviews were semi-structured. Since I am 
native Korean, I conducted the interviews without an interpreter (Rossman & Rallies, 
2003).   Most interviews took place in informants‘ offices or cafes and lasted between 30 
minutes and two hours. I did not tape-record the interviews because of the sensitivity of 
some subjects and because I was more interested in my interviewees‘ honest accounts 
than the school‘s official representation (Tilcsik, 2010). In addition, because of issues of 
language and translation, it would have been challenging for me to fully translate all the 
                                                 
2
 I provide profiles and life-histories of these educators in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
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accounts spoken in Korean into English (Rossman & Rallies, 2003).  Thus, I took notes 
during each interview, closely paraphrasing interviewee‘s accounts, often abbreviating 
words to keep up, and carefully selecting segments for translation (Tilcsik, 
2010).Whenever possible, I recorded direct quotes verbatim and tried to capture the 
subtle meaning of the original language (Rossman & Rallies, 2003). Table 2 lists the 
participants and their roles at SCE. 
<Table 2.> Participants and their roles at SCE 
Actor Years at SCE Role at SCE 
Mr. Rhyu 2001 – 2009 
2009-present  
Lead teacher 
School district-  
administrator 
Mr. Kang 2001 -2006 
2009-present  
Lead teacher 
Principal 
Mr. Lee 2000 – 2008 Principal 
Mr. Han 2003 – 2005 
2007 – present 
Teacher 
Lead teacher 
Mr. Yoon 2001 - 2004 
2008 – present 
Teacher 
Lead teacher 
Mr. Woo 2004 – 2010 Teacher 
Mr. Choi 
 
Ms. Song 
Ms. Moon 
Mr. Park  
Ms. Jeong 
 
Mr. Shin 
 
2002 - 2004 
2008 – present 
2004 - present 
2006 - present 
2009 – 2010 
2004 – present 
 
2008 - present 
Assistant principal 
Principal 
Teacher 
Teacher 
Teacher 
Parent/ vice president of  
the school council 
Active parent member 
 
Observation  
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I sought to gather extensive field data by participating in school activities, and by 
observing school staff meetings, parent-teacher meetings, attending ―South Castle 
Academy‖ conferences, and nationwide ―Small School Network‖ workshops. Throughout 
the course of research, I spent a substantial amount of time observing the various 
activities and events of the school. During the background study from June 2007 to 
August 2007, I spent two months as a participant observer, present at the school from 8 
am to late night almost every day. I tried to gain an insider‘s views of their lives – the 
emic view- and build rapport with the members of the school (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). 
Then, when I returned to SCE to conduct field work in June 2009, I visited SCE one or 
two days a week until the end of the academic year except summer and winter vacations 
to observe staff meetings and school activities. I also observed special occasions at the 
school.  While observing these activities and events, I took systemic notes to record my 
impressions, insights, and emerging themes (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Most field notes 
were written in Korean, and then significant segments were translated into English to 
preserve the original meaning for in depth analysis. My field notes amount to about 350 
single-spaced pages. 
Documents  
I supplement my interview-derived data with two other sources of data: primary 
documents and media articles available on the KINDS service (Korean Information 
Network Database System: http://www.kinds.or.kr).   These archival data will be useful 
for discovering background information and historical data, and for interrogating 
evidence from other sources more systemically (Merriam, 1998; Raeburn, 2004; 
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Rossman & Rallies, 2003). To collect primary documents, I consulted internal artifacts 
and the official documents. These included meetings agendas, meeting minutes, websites, 
brochures and other materials. I collected more than 153 news articles and several video 
materials related with the school through the KINDS from 2004-2010 and analyzed them.  
Data analysis 
Data analysis  
The data analysis comprises two stages. In an early analysis, I reviewed all of the 
data and created a longitudinal record of the data that chronicles the school change 
between 2001-2010.  During this stage, I assessed the characteristics and properties of the 
institutional contexts surrounding SCE‘s change by systematically analyzing archival 
data and interview transcripts. Then, I identified key actors who initiated and the 
processes of change. By systematically analyzing all interview data and documents, I 
identified different ways they theorized and justified their change.  I sought to distinguish 
actors‘ short-term strategies from their long-term ones and to determine the relationship 
between them.  Furthermore, I sought to uncover the unexpected development resulting 
from unintended by-products in the course of change processes by focusing on significant 
divergence, gaps, and mismatches that emerged over time between the preference of key 
actors‘ and the actual development of change processes. Lastly, I assessed the nature and 
degree of subsequent change within the existing system as a result of SCE‘s change. I 
sought to analyze whether significant changes have occurred at SCE, in other schools, in 
other educators, and other school systems over the course of SCE‘s change process by 
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tracing shifting interpretations of SCE in school reforms and school policies and by 
examining the increasing number of schools emulating SCE‘s change model. 
Next, I developed a coding scheme rooted in existing theory and then elaborated and 
extended it in dialogue with the data using the constant comparative method, following 
steps outlined by Bodgan and Biklen (1998, pp. 67–68). After coding all data, I reduced 
the coding to a concise group of generalizations and then analyzed the findings in light of 
relevant research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). All the stages of analysis involved an 
ongoing and reiterative procedure that move between theory, categories, and data (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2003).  
Validity and reliability  
In order to enhance this study‘s internal validity and reliability, I engaged in ongoing 
and reiterative member checking from early stages of my data collection. Instead of 
presenting the research findings and interpretations in the final stage at one time, I 
constantly engaged in conversations with the school‘s educators of the school about the 
meaning of change and activities. Since I had established trust between the educators and 
myself, I could probe them for explanation of their assumptions and raise critical 
questions while maintaining collaborative relationships (Tilcsik, 2010). Sometimes, we 
had disagreements regarding the meaning of events and we learned from each other‘s 
perspectives to gain a more holistic understanding (Merriam, 1998). In the spring of 2011, 
I shared findings with key participants to ensure more precise understandings. Since the 
study was written in English, I needed to interpret my findings and interpretations in 
Korean. It sometimes took more than four or five hours at a restaurant or at a 
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participant‘s house. Since I constantly engaged in conversations with educators and 
shared my findings with them, they were not surprised by my findings. This ongoing and 
reiterative process of participant validation led to greater understanding and enhanced 
knowledge for both the researcher and the participants (Emerson & Pollner, 1988).  
Ethical consideration  
This study required the participation of human subjects – teachers and 
administrators. Ethical considerations must remain at the forefront throughout the 
duration of the study. Throughout the study, I have ensured that the data collected for this 
study were gained in an ethical manner by following the steps laid out by the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) rules and regulations. I obtained Boston College IRB approval as 
well as approval from the school. All participants were provided with and were asked to 
sign informed consent forms in which they indicated that their participation is voluntary 
and that they are able to withdraw from this study at any point during the study if they 
chose to. The informed consent outlines any obligations and potential risks related to 
their participation in the study. The school and all participants were given pseudonyms to 
enhance confidentiality. Results of the investigation were made available to all 
participants. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INITIATING CHANGE  
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the emergence of SCE‘s innovation. The chapter proceeds 
in five steps. The first section traces how the idea of transforming SCE into an innovative 
school was conceived amid a school closing crisis. The second section highlights the role 
that actors (change agents) played in bringing about the school change. I focus 
particularly on the two activist teachers who actively cultivated and catalyzed change 
from within the context of existing opportunities and constraints, and also on the hands-
off principal. The following section examines how SCE struggled to implement the goals 
of the school‘s original mission in ways to be consistent with its desired ideals and 
principles while also addressing the internal conflicts and external pressures that 
challenged the abilities of the school to sustain its day to day operations of change. The 
fourth section then considers the strategy of cultivating meaning, relationship, and 
positive emotion. The chapter concludes by identifying the particular ways that SCE‘s 
innovation worked within the existing system (e.g. adding new initiatives and realigning 
old ideas to harness and utilize them in novel ways) and by considering the implications 
of this particular type of change and its arrangements for the subsequent development of 
the school‘s innovation and its long-term sustainability.  
The Self-initiated change occurred accidentally 
South Castle Elementary School (SCE) is the oldest school in its school district 
and was originally founded in 1902. Until a few decades ago, more than 100 students 
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attended SCE. However, since 1991, the school has seen its enrollment decrease as 
people left the park area to pursue jobs and better education. Therefore, the school district 
decided to close the school by 2001 (Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Kang & Cho, 2010)
3
.  
On a summer day in 2000, a book club for adults who were interested in 
children‘s books and literature had a two-day gathering at SCE. They chose SCE as the 
venue for its historical background and beautiful landscape. During the meeting, they 
accidentally heard about the school‘s imminent closing from its principal. Saddened by 
the plan to close such a beautiful and historical school, the leader of the group, who had 
also had been involved in civil activism in the region for many years
4
, suggested working 
to save the school to the members of the book club and to the principal and the idea took 
hold.  
The parents of SCE students and community members felt sorry for the destiny of 
their beloved school, but did not think that there was anything they could do to prevent 
the imminent closure (Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Kang & Cho, 2010). However, even though 
they agreed to work to save SCE, they did not yet have a clear vision or knowledge of 
how to put their plan into practice. Thus, to secure help, the group leader approached a 
teacher, Mr. Kang - then a full-time director of the regional chapter of the Korean 
Teachers & Education Workers‘ Union (KTU-Jeon-gyo-jo) - whom she had met during 
local campaigns for better education and living (Kang, 2008; Rhyu, 2003, 2008: Lee & 
                                                 
3
 From 1982 to 2006, the Korean government forced 5,305 small rural schools like SCE to close 
or merge with neighboring schools (Korean Ministry of Education and Human Resources, 2006). 
4 The leader was later elected city council member in the neighboring city.    
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Chon, 2010). She asked him to participate in the project to save the school. The two 
agreed to pursue the idea of saving SCE. Mr. Kang invited another teacher, Mr. Rhyu, 
who was then the head of the committee for ―Authentic Teaching (Cham-gyo-yuk)‖ in the 
regional chapter of KTU. The book club leader‘s initiative, the arrival of the activist 
teachers, and the presence of a principal who wanted to save his school represented the 
first steps in an attempt to change SCE. The source of SIC was therefore a serendipitous 
opportunity seized by the change agents (the two activist teachers) along with unexpected 
allies. As Reay et al. (2006) poignantly put it, once the change agents recognized the 
momentum for change, they ―turned an institutional wrinkle into a significant tear in the 
institutional fabric‖ (Reay et al., 2006: 994). Such an opening was not sufficient to 
generate SIC, however. The school change agents still needed to capitalize on the 
opportunities (Binder, 2002; Grossman, 2009). The change agents used their strong 
working knowledge of their organizational and institutional contexts to determine what 
actions to take, as well as the appropriate time and place to take action (Reay et al., 2006). 
In the next section, I provide more detailed accounts of the key change agents, the activist 
teachers and the founding principal, and their strategies during the early stage.  
The old guard: two activist teachers 
SCE‘s innovation was initially triggered by the school closing crisis. But the crisis 
alone might have not guaranteed school innovation. SCE might have been closed like 
many other schools. It might have survived a little longer as a conventional school. The 
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key to SCE‘s innovation was two seasoned activist teachers5 (Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang6), 
whom I call the old guard, who led the change process from the beginning.  
The old guard overcame the formidable challenge of accomplishing grassroots 
SIC into through their persistence; temporal intelligence of good timing, sequence, and 
pacing; deep understanding of the school system in South Korea; and distinct leadership 
skills for mobilizing constituents (Kang, 2009; Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009; 
Seo, 2004; See also Huy, 2001; Meyer & Kretschmer, 2007; Reay et al., 2006).  
The old guard had acquired their identities and skills through their prior 
experience of engaging in the educational movement for democratic education in South 
Korea for more than twenty years. Since the 1980s, many progressive Korean teachers 
struggled to dismantle the authoritarian, bureaucratic and militaristic culture of control in 
the Korean educational system. These characteristics of Korean education were the 
lingering legacy of Japanese colonialism and a series of military dictatorships (Kim, 2005; 
KTU, 2006). These reform efforts produced powerful and significant social movements 
in Korea during the 1980s and 1990s (Kang, 2002; Synott, 2001). In 1989, the movement 
declared itself a Union- Chunkyojo, the Korean Teachers and Educational Workers Union 
(KTU). The authoritarian government repressed this movement, resulting in the 
imprisonment of several teacher activists, the dismissal of about 1,700 teachers, mass 
                                                 
5
 An activist is defined as ―someone who tries to advance a substantive political or social goal or 
outcome. Activism is always an attempt to exercise power, yet some activists‘ motivations are 
highly altruistic. They try to develop and employ power for ethical ends‖ (Levine, 2007: 1; See 
also, Sachs, 2002). Hargreaves and Fink define activist teachers as ―change agents committed to 
social and educational missions that unite them in confronting bureaucratic and political obstacles 
to socially just and educationally justifiable improvement and reform‖ (2005: 132).  
6
 They were regarded as the ―founding parents‖ of SCE‘s innovation.  
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rallies and intense public debates (Synott, 2001). As committed members of the KTU and 
dedicated teachers activists, both teachers had therefore fought against the authoritarian 
and bureaucratic Korean school system (Kang & Cho, 2010). 
In spite of significant democratic progress, for the most part South Korean society 
still remained an unfriendly environment for teacher activism (Kang, 2002; Kim, 200?; 
Synott, 2001). While many teacher activists tended to avoid identifying themselves as 
such due to the fear of repression or any possibility of disadvantage, the two teachers 
were eager to identify themselves as activists. Mr. Rhyu was such a dedicated teacher 
activist that he even held his wedding ceremony on his school‘s playground with students 
and teachers in attendance (Kang & Cho, 2010). During the interview, Mr. Rhyu recalled 
his activism, 
―When I was a novice teacher, I was such a radical, even reckless, teacher 
activist that I conducted one-man sit-down strikes against undemocratic 
school policies at the school district office… I was even elected as one of 
the youngest chairpersons of a local chapter of the KTU when I was in my 
only twenties thanks to my unyielding radicalism. When many teacher 
activists in the local chapter of the KTU had to leave their schools due to 
the government‘s repression in the late 1980‘s, I, together with other 
teachers who managed to maintain our jobs, gave all our salaries to those 
teachers who lost their jobs to help them weather the difficult time 
together for many years.‖   
Before he joined SCE in 2000, Mr. Rhyu served as a chairperson of the Gyeonggi 
regional KTU committee of genuine-education practices. Teachers worked together in 
this committee to develop extra-curricular and instructional materials that sought to 
enhance ―authentic learning‖ or critical consciousness and democratic learning (Kang & 
Cho, 2010; Small School Network, 2009).  
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The other activist teacher, Mr. Kang, had also been involved in the KTU for more 
than twenty years. During the interview he recalled the reason why he joined the KTU 
and engaged in educational movements,  
―One day when I was a novice teacher in my twenties, I stood up in 
opposition to the principal‘s embezzlement from the school. Under the 
authoritarian school atmosphere in late 1970s, my action was regarded as 
so defiant that it might have risked my job. After this event, I was 
stigmatized as a hard core activist teacher in the school district. As a result, 
I was repeatedly placed in the most disadvantaged school in the district
7‖ 
(Mr. Kang, teacher)  
Mr. Kang said that the bitter experience of unfairness in the education system led him to 
become involved in educational movements by joining the KTU. He was a committed 
member of the KTU. When he was a chairperson of a local branch of the KTU in the 
early 1990s, he used his own house as a venue for union activities and bore the 
operational costs out of his own pay.  A teacher founding member of SCE Mr. Han said,  
―I was deeply impressed by Mr. Kang‘s sincerity and devotion. It was the 
positive experience of working with Mr. Kang that caused me to decide to 
join SCE.‖  
Mr. Kang always emphasized the importance of teacher‘s work ethic and attitude 
over teaching skills or knowledge. Mr. Han vividly remembered Mr. Kang‘s motto when 
they worked together for educational movement in a local chapter: ―The most important 
thing for a teacher to do is to arrive at school as early as possible, no matter whether they 
have good teaching skills or not.‖  According to Mr. Han,  
                                                 
7
 In South Korea, public school teachers are regularly transferred to other schools within the 
school district every four years due to a policy of teacher rotation. In recent years, principals in 
regular schools are granted discretion to invite up to the 20 percent of teaching staff (50% in 
publicly innovative schools and public autonomous schools) 
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―Mr. Kang was always the first one to arrive at school. His diligence 
inspired many colleague teachers and even compensated for his 
moderately poor classroom management and instructional skills.‖   
On July 1, 1999, after a decade of struggles, KTU finally became a legalized 
union with 62,000 members (KTU, 2006). In recent years, however, the public ceased to 
view KTU as a social movement of teachers devoted to the ideals of democratic 
education with a passion for genuine education. Instead, it now viewed KTU as an 
―interest group‖ which confined its efforts primarily to enforcing contracts and protecting 
member interests (KTU, 2006; Voss & Sherman, 2000). On the other hand, its dogmatic 
adherence to radical strategies including rebellious and illegitimate actions had estranged 
KTU from many teachers. Even Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang, KTU‘s longstanding loyal 
members, grew increasingly disenfranchised by the conservative transformation of the 
KTU and its dogmatic strategies. Mr. Rhyu said,  
―I grew frustrated with the KTU and became tired of fighting alone against 
the seemingly never-changing authoritarian bureaucratic schools without 
any realistic support from the KTU... Disillusioned, I intentionally 
distanced myself from KTU and began to wander around small schools in 
rural areas.‖   
 ―I did this because of a somewhat romantic and nostalgic feeling that I 
cherished since I was a novice teacher. I always longed for becoming a 
teacher of a small school in an islet. I always longed for a somewhat 
utopian school community in which I could devote myself solely to 
children‘s education with a small group of like-minded colleagues and 
parents.‖   
But Mr. Rhyu found that rural schools were more bureaucratic than large urban 
schools. He felt as if ―he were a floating weed that never felt belonged and settled 
without roots, precariously wandering from one school to another‖ (Kang & Chon, 2010: 
20).  In 1999, he said that he felt so tired that he finally decided to quit his job altogether 
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and was preparing to leave for the United Kingdom to study alternative education (Kang 
& Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2009).  Meanwhile, around that time, Mr. Kang was a managing 
director of educational policy at KTU Gyeonggi regional office. He said that he was 
trying to find a way to revitalize the moribund KTU.  
Traditionally, educational movement and activism has been pursued in schools 
and educational fields through unions. In SCE, however, the old guard attempted change 
without the guidance and safety net of a union (Scully & Segal, 2002). Instead, the 
activist teachers tried to keep a distance from the union to pursue an alternative way of 
change. This attitude helped them exploit an opening in an unexpected way. In 2000, 
both teachers encountered the possibility of transforming schools at SCE. Mr. Rhyu 
recalled the moment he heard about the plan to save the school. He said,  
―My heart almost stopped when I heard the principal‘s plan to save SCE. 
The plan provided a glimpse into the possibility of building a democratic 
community-like school that I had been dreaming of. It was a sort of a 
sense of déjà vu. I felt as if I had already experienced the situation, even 
though I was only imagining it in my mind.‖  
Central to grasping the opportunity to innovate the school was the teachers‘ experience 
and knowledge of assessing the timing for action (Huy, 2001; Pierson, 2004; Reay et al., 
2006). The teachers‘ political awareness, social skills, organizing experience, and 
temporal intelligence enabled them to advance their change initiative once they 
encountered a window of opportunity (Huy, 2001; Reay et al., 2006).  
In promoting SCE‘s change, to a certain extent Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu were 
opposites.  While Mr. Kang was tenacious and determined, Mr. Rhyu was more cautious, 
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soft and subtle
8
. Mr. Kang was a rather typical activist. He was eager to challenge those 
who opposed the espoused goals and purposes of the school change. He emphasized the 
importance of building a power base by forging allies, networks, solidarity and coalitions 
(Bolman & Deal, 2006; Morris & Staggenborg, 2004).  For example, he always 
confronted assistant principals who tended to block change in an aggressive manner and 
sometimes challenged the founding principal when he hesitated to refuse unreasonable 
paperwork and ceremonial events (e.g. sporting events and art competitions) that were 
imposed by the school districts. During the interview, he elaborated his view on good 
leadership.  
―I think a leader‘s job is to mobilize the power and resources needed to 
advocate and fight for the organization‘s mission. If necessary, a leader 
should welcome a battle rather than avoiding it‖ (Mr. Kang, teacher).  
His relentless leadership enabled SCE to surmount direct and indirect resistance to 
change and other constraints and to carve out space for the school innovation. In other 
words, he was the driving force for SCE‘s change during the early stage. Conversely, 
although Mr. Rhyu also held activist dispositions, he was more equipped with the skills 
of motivating and inspiring allies and followers. He cared deeply about the feelings of 
parents and teachers and paid personalized attention to their needs (Kang & Cho, 2010; 
Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Seo, 2004). Thus, he was a ―principled‖ or ―tempered‖ activist9 
                                                 
8
 Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang were nicknamed by parents a ―prudent housewife (살림꾼; sal-lim-
ggun‖ and a ―warrior commander (돌격대장: dol-gyeok-dae-jang)‖.  
9
 A reporter of a Korean educational journal characterized Mr. Rhyu‘s distinct activist style as a 
―revolutionary with serenely translucent eyes (눈 맑은 혁명가: Nun-Mal-geun-Hyeok-Myeong-
Ga) (Lee, 2007).‖ 
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(Bolman & Deal, 2006; Meyerson & Scully, 1995). Mr. Rhyu got along with parents and 
teachers and even with the principal and assistant principals. He went out to restaurants, 
bars, and karaoke, and played cards together with parents and teachers. While Mr. Kang 
was straightforward and did not socialize, Mr. Rhyu was everyone‘s buddy. He had great 
people skills. His social skills and relationship with SCE‘s members allowed him to 
acquire trust and influence.  
Although their strategies and styles were substantially different, Mr. Kang and Mr. 
Rhyu still shared an unshakeable faith in their activist worldviews and moral purpose for 
social justice. Mr. Rhyu said,  
 ―Even though Mr. Kang and I had several disagreements in terms of 
disposition and strategy, overall, we were a good team. We both knew 
each other‘s weakness and strengths well. We need each other. For 
example, Mr. Kang always complemented my shortcomings of avoiding 
confrontations and irresoluteness. Of course, we did clash quite a few 
times over the course of the school change, but we knew how to avoid 
crossing the line…‖  
However, while Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu‘s co-leadership offered complementary benefits 
to SCE, it remains to be seen how their collective leadership evolved over time (Denis et 
al., 1996, 2001; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006).  
The founding principal 
During the interviews, many people stated that it was Principal Lee‘s leadership 
that enabled SCE‘s innovation to happen. Principal Lee was a beginning principal at the 
initiation of the school change. SCE was his first school as principal. He said that he was 
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a ―laid-back‖ principal with moderate qualifications (Hallett, 2006; See also, Gouldner, 
1954; O‘Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). He stated that,  
―I was the second-to-last candidate in my principal training program. Thus, 
it was ―fair‖ that I was assigned to a school like SCE in an isolated 
mountainous rural area which was scheduled to be closed soon.‖  
Schools like SCE were the least desirable places for principals to expect to be 
assigned. Principal Lee said,  
―When I arrived at SCE, I was frustrated. I saw the dilapidated school. I 
thought to myself that I will leave this school as soon as I can in two years. 
However, since SCE was my first school to run as a principal, I gradually 
became attached to it.‖  
As he became attached to the school, Mr. Lee began to feel sorry about its closure. 
However, despite his regrets, Principal Lee could not imagine any alternative.  Until the 
idea of saving the school arose during the book club meeting in 2000, he did not realize 
the possibility of keeping the school open. Once he recognized this possibility, he became 
so committed that he toured the neighboring schools to attract parents and students (Kang 
& Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009) - an unconventional move considering the bureaucratic 
atmosphere of the South Korean school system. Furthermore, Mr. Lee was eager to 
distribute his power to the activist teachers because he believed that it would help save 
the school (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009). Considering that many other 
principals in South Korea behave as if they  are ―little emperors‖ in their schools, 
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Principal Lee‘s decision to release his power to the teachers was difficult and unusual 
(See also Walker, 2004; Cheng, 2008)
10
.  
The principal and the old guard were an unlikely coalition.  Before they began to 
work together to save SCE, the activist teachers and the principal discussed the daunting 
tasks associated with the plan that Principal Lee had to undertake. The activist teacher 
recalled,  
―I was concerned about the principal. So, I asked him ―would it be really 
okay with you to choose this unconventional direction for SCE?‖ Principal 
Lee answered to me, by quoting Deng Xiaoping‘s famous words, ―It 
doesn‘t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice.‖‖ (Mr. 
Rhyu, teacher; See also, Kang & Cho, 2010).  
During an interview, Principal Lee told me about his thoughts on leadership.  
Paul Chung: Would you please talk about your leadership with regard to 
the SCE‘s innovation? 
Principal Lee: Thanks to the stimulation of the book club‘s leader, I came 
up with the idea of saving SCE from the beginning. I invited the activist 
teachers to SCE in the first place. After conducting interviews with them, 
we agreed to work together to save SCE.  
Paul Chung: I encountered some accounts that said that it was the other 
way around. 
Principal Lee: I knew that some people regarded me as a ‗robot‘ principal. 
That perception is both correct and incorrect. Yes, I deliberately tried to 
appear passive and often remained in the back seat in order to provide the 
teachers with opportunities to develop their leadership skills by allowing 
them to actually run the school
11
. Metaphorically speaking, this perception 
was wrong because the activist teachers were like fish swimming in the 
                                                 
10
 Due to the historical legacy of Confucianism, principals who are regarded as the flowers of 
teachers tend to be highly respected in South Korean society and therefore most South Korean 
teachers aspire to become principals (Kim & Kim, 2004).  
11
 Principal Lee often portrayed himself as 멍게 (Mong-Gye: the acronym of “멍(stupid)‖ and 
―게(idle)‖). By doing so, he conveyed a two-fold meaning: (1) Descriptively, he was an 
―incomplete‖ (Ancona, et al., 2007) and humble leader; (2) Normatively, he deliberately 
delegated his authority to the teachers (although he was not incompetent) so that he could provide 
them opportunities to build their leadership capacity.  
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net that I had thrown down. When they became too radical and extreme, as 
you can imagine, I tried to moderate their demands. When they struggled 
with tough issues, such as resolving conflicts between teachers and parents, 
I stepped in to resolve them. This doesn‘t mean that I underestimate these 
teachers‘ knowledge and experience at all, I don‘t. I respect the teachers 
with all my heart. Without them, nothing would have been possible here. 
What I‘m saying is that we trusted each other and worked together.  
Although it is not yet possible to clearly identify what factors made Principal Lee 
exercise such unconventional leadership, many teachers and parents repeatedly stated that 
it was the Principal Lee‘s sacrifice that made it easier to carve out space for innovation 
and sustain it over time despite considerable pressures and constraints (See also, Rhyu, 
2009; Kang, 2009; Kang & Cho, 2010).  
While appreciating Principal Lee‘s virtues of ―releasing‖12 leadership (Gouldner, 
1955; Hallett, 2006; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009), Mr. Rhyu also viewed Principal Lee as 
someone who was not particularly prepared to run an innovative school like SCE. He 
viewed Principal Lee as a vulnerable or fragile leader (Ackerman & Maslin-Ostrowski, 
2004).  
―Principal Lee is someone who has never belonged to the ―major league‖ 
of principals. Principal Lee‘s ill feelings against the mainstream principal 
clique allowed him to take the unconventional action of allowing SCE‘s 
innovation to occur…Do you know what Principal Lee is most afraid of? 
He is afraid of being ignored by teachers and parents‖ (Mr. Rhyu, teacher; 
See also, Battilana et al., 2010; Seo & Creed, 2002) 
Accordingly, Mr. Rhyu tried to provide the principal with emotional assurance that he 
was the formal authority of SCE. In order to assure him, Mr. Rhyu said that he always 
tried to address to the principal with a respectful attitude. He said that he tried to let 
                                                 
12
 I received this insight from a dialogue with Professor G.W. Seo who also conducted qualitative 
study about SCE from 2000-2003.  
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Principal Lee have the final say concerning most decisions and to ―give‖ face‖ to the 
principal, allowing him to salvage a favorable representation of self in front of 
subordinate teachers and parents (Hallett, 2007). Mr. Rhyu said that,  
―When there were disagreements between the principal and teachers, I 
used subtle and soft approaches. Instead of confronting the principal like 
Mr. Kang, I always retreated from the conflicting scenes and yielded to 
achieve a compromise.‖ 
 In addition, he said that he tried to convince the principal that his democratic leadership 
style was really necessary to a school like innovative SCE (Fullan, 2001; Kang & Cho, 
2010; Rhyu, 2009).  This way, Mr. Rhyu could safeguard his mutual trust and 
cooperation with Principal Lee.  With regard to this emotional management, Mr. Rhyu 
stated that,  
―I think that I have built in antennae. Whenever a conflict arises, my 
feelers automatically detect it so that I can approach the sufferers and 
resolve the tension. That‘s pretty much what I do at this school with 
Principal Lee, other teachers and parents.  
Mr. Rhyu stated that he saw himself as a kind of ―mutant‖ activist in the sense that he 
cared a lot about emotions, feelings and relationships rather than just focusing on ―cool‖ 
rational causes. Mr. Rhyu said that,  
―I think that my disposition was somewhat heretical in the world of 
activists in which rationality and logic are highly valued while trivializing 
emotion (See also, Hochschild, 1983; Hargreaves, 2000, 2001, 2003). 
In this sense, Mr. Rhyu was what Meyerson and Scully (1995) called a tempered radical 
who understands that it is pointless to view supporters of the status quo as enemies and 
that it is essential to gain the support of those who maintain the majority perspective. 
Furthermore, given the importance SCE placed on delimiting bureaucratic arrangements 
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and positional authority, Principal Lee‘s ―hands-off‖ leadership was regarded as an 
invaluable asset in the early years. However, it remains to be seen if this distinct form of 
leadership can surmount the more daunting challenges of implementing and sustaining 
SIC over time (Collins, 2001; Huerta, 2002; Harris et al., 2007). Furthermore, it remains 
to be seen whether collective leadership becomes more fragile due to divergent interests 
of the founding principal and the activist teachers, or whether it becomes more firmly 
solidified over time thanks to their complementary effects (Denis et al., 1996, 2001; 
Fullan, 2001; Thelen & Streeck, 2005).   
Lingering tensions between the old guard and the assistant principals  
During the early stage of SCE‘s innovation, although Principal Lee voluntarily 
relinquished his leadership to the activist teachers and the parents, the founding teachers 
still had to deal with conflicts with resistant assistant principals.  While the activist 
teachers sought to weaken bureaucratic arrangements, the assistant principals tried to be 
gatekeepers of the status quo (Kang & Cho, 2010; Seo, 2004). Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang 
said that they did not even try to negotiate with the assistant principals in the beginning. 
Instead, the activist teachers recalled that they sometimes ignored the hierarchical 
authority of the assistant principals or confronted them as if they had engaged in protests 
and campaigns against the school district authority. However, as the new innovative 
arrangement of SCE became more settled, the activist teachers and the newly assigned 
assistant principals learned to avoid confrontation and live together despite their 
differences.   
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In addition, the founding teachers also had to address conflicts with other teachers 
who did not agree with them.  They had conflicts with teachers who transferred to SCE in 
order to advance their careers
13
.  According to Mr. Rhyu, the relationship between the 
activist teachers and these teachers who sought career advancement was like ―oil and 
water.‖ The activist teachers said that they tried to maintain working relation with these 
teachers and treated them with respect as colleagues. But conflicts inevitably arose 
between these conservative teachers and the founding parents who did not appreciate 
their teaching styles and methods. In order to address this issue, the activist teachers and 
the principal persuaded these teachers to opt for early transfers. In the early stage, SCE 
had suffered a negative reputation of being a nest of KTU activist teachers among 
educators and schools in the neighboring area who had an uneasy relationship with the 
assistant principals and these promotion aspiring teachers.   
Pulling together a guiding team of teachers and parents 
Once the goal of saving SCE was set by the core members, then the next task was 
to pull together a guiding team of teachers and parents with the needed skills, credibility, 
connections, and authority to move things along.   
Teachers  
                                                 
13
 The South Korean school authority gives incentives for promotion to teachers who work in 
rural areas to encourage teachers to work in disadvantaged areas. Since the competition to 
become principals is so fierce among aspiring applicants in South Korea, teachers are eager to put 
up with working in rural schools in order to obtain an advantage. However,  like bad money 
driving out good, many small rural schools are staffed with teachers seeking a promotion, which 
contributes to an even more bureaucratic culture in the rural schools.    
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At the start, the recruitment of teachers was based on social networks. Mr. Rhyu 
used his established relationships to recruit other teacher members. He recruited other 
teachers based on his acquaintance with them while he worked as the head of the 
―authentic teaching‖ committee in Gyeonggi province. Those teachers were mostly 
friends of Mr. Rhyu‘s. They were not typical activist teachers like Mr. Kang and Mr. 
Rhyu. Rather, they were ―purist‖ or ―authentic‖ teachers who were dedicated to teaching 
above anything else. Unlike their activist counterparts, they had engaged in teachers‘ 
networks for professional development or curriculum studies outside their own schools 
instead of confronting their principals and unsupportive school systems. During the 
interviews, these teachers stated that they joined the SCE‘s innovative project because of 
negative experiences with bureaucratic principals and teachers in the conventional large 
schools who were more interested in their own promotion at the expense of children and 
because of dissatisfaction with the current public school systems.  
Mr. Rhyu had a somewhat ambivalent opinion about the teachers. On the one 
hand, he thought that they were ―conscientious‖ teachers genuinely committed to 
teaching/learning and their students. On the other hand, he viewed them as somewhat 
politically naïve in terms of experience and knowledge about educational systems and 
educational organizing .  
―I think they are ―conscientious‖ or ―authentic‖ teachers. However, since 
they had little experience of seriously engaging in educational movements, 
they have an insufficient understanding about the complexities of 
changing schools. Although the morality and authenticity of individuals 
matter, the work of creating and sustaining school change is way beyond 
the capacity of individual‘s morality and authenticity.‖    
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Even though the activist teachers and the other teachers had been drawn to SCE 
because of the shared mission of transforming the schools, they agreed on the plan to 
save the school for different, even contradictory, reasons. For example, while the activist 
teachers emphasized the moral purpose of building a democratic and community-like 
school to infiltrate the entrenched bureaucratic school system, the ―authentic‖ teachers 
were more interested in cultivating a school in which teachers could fully devote 
themselves to teaching without any distractions not intrinsically related to instructional 
needs. Moreover, while the activist teachers attempted to make ambitious and 
comprehensive change projects to achieve larger successes, the ―authentic‖ teachers 
wanted to pursue narrower projects, such as curriculum development and instructional 
innovation, which were within the scope of their abilities to carry them out.  
The multifaceted interpretation of SCE‘s innovation contributed to the mobilizing 
of teachers because it made them choose to participate in the school innovation project 
without clearly recognizing what specific changes might be involved (Pierson, 2004; 
Sarason & Doris, 1979). However, this lack of clarity about the goals and directions of 
the change also grew more visible over time and sowed seeds for ongoing disputes over 
the meaning of and strategies for change (Rhyu, 2009). 
Parents 
 Many parents chose to move their families from adjacent cities to SCE‘s 
mountainous neighborhood, causing student enrollment to rise from 26 to more than 120 
students.
14
 Frustrated with bureaucratic and impersonal large schools in cities where they 
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felt that their children had been trapped and treated unfairly, these parents desperately 
wanted to find a more nurturing and attentive learning environment in which students 
would be well cared for and have their individual needs met (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 
2009; The Small School Network, 2009). According to Mr. Rhyu, the founding parents of 
SCE could be divided into three groups. Some parents (mostly college educated) from 
nearby cities who were concerned that their children would not fit into traditional 
bureaucratic schools,  withdrew their children and transferred them to this somewhat 
progressive school (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Seo, 2004). Other parents 
with somewhat bohemian dispositions, such as artists and writers, were interested in 
child-centered education and community. A third group of parents with experiences of 
engaging in democratic and civil movements were attracted by a dislike of all forms of 
hierarchy (Kang & Cho, 2010)
15
.  
The beautiful natural landscape of SCE‘s neighborhood served as an additional 
attraction to parents who wanted to escape the dreary city life and let their children play 
                                                                                                                                                 
14
 In the Korean context, although no official policy of school choice exists at the elementary 
school level, parents do choose, either by sending their children to private schools or by moving 
to the neighborhood of their desired schools. (See also, Agnes Van Zanten, 2001)  
15
 However, according to the interviews with the founding members, some of these parents who 
did not actually live in the castle area used fake addresses to get accepted to SCE with tacit 
consent of the principal and the headman of the castle village during the particularly early stage 
(Mr. Rhyu, teacher). This was possible on a provisional basis in the early stage because of a lack 
of effective regulation and of tolerance of some forms of bypassing legal restrictions on the part 
of school district and local district authorities (See also, Van Zanten, 2001). Although this 
strategy was a successful strategy to quickly increase student enrollment, it subsequently became 
a source of many troubles, conflicts, and dilemma among the parents (Ball et al, 2007). I will 
return to this issue in detail in chapter 5.  
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in the bosom of Mother Nature
16
 (Kang & Cho, 2010: Rhyu, 2003, 2009). These parents 
believed that self-development, freedom, and morality were much more important than 
higher test scores or the mastery of subject matter.  However, it was a never easy decision 
for parents to move to this isolated mountainous SCE area just for their children‘s 
education, leaving behind the convenient life of the city. They had to endure terrible 
living conditions and poorly maintained homes without heating systems, running water, 
or electricity. In addition, some parents had to commute more than three to four hours 
every day and other families had to live apart due to the long commutes. Above all else, it 
took courage for parents to make the decision to experiment with their children‘s future 
in a start-up experimental school. A mother of a student said that,  
―When I told my neighbors that I was sending my son to SCE, they 
asked me ―Are you crazy? Why do you want to make your child a 
guinea pig at an unproven school? If you do that, you are a wicked 
Mom who would make your son an offering to the school!‖ (Eunarae‘s 
mother) 
Another mother said that when she told her husband that she wanted to send their 
children to SCE, her husband said to her:  
                                                 
16
 The environment of a school like SCE in which there were no nearby private institutions was 
mostly likely regarded as a fatal shortcoming by most parents. In South Korea, more than seventy 
percent of elementary and secondary school students in cities engage in diverse forms of private 
tutoring (e.g. cram schools, private language institutes, and one-on-one tutoring (Kim, 2004; Lee, 
2003; See also Bray, 1999). Indeed, the lack of (private) educational resources is one of the major 
reasons that rural residents leave their hometowns; Many residents in these areas move to 
adjacent cities in search of private institutes for their children. In SCE, however, this ―fatal‖ 
defect became an asset to the founding members who had the conviction that nature plays an 
important role in children‘s character building and who recognized the detrimental effects of 
private tutoring. 
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―If you really want to send our children to that school, you‘d better 
divorce me first. Then, you can go wherever you want!‖ (A-Reum‘s 
mother).   
Parents were willing to take the risk of moving to SCE‘s neighborhood despite the 
inconvenience because they so desired a good school for their children
17
. While the 
SCE‘s innovation invoked new hope and possibilities, it also involved uncertainty, high 
risks and costs, especially in the early stages (Fullan, 2001). As House (1974) suggests,   
―The personal cost of trying new innovation is often high and seldom there 
is any indication that innovations are worth the investment. Innovations 
are act of faith. They require that one believe that they will ultimately bear 
fruit and be worth the personal investment, often without the hope of 
immediate return. Costs are high.‖ (p. 74; cited from Fullan, 2001).  
As a result, if the founders were to successfully launch the SIC, it was particularly 
important to reassure the nervous participants while convincing them of the meaning of 
the change in the early stage (Fullan, 2001; Hargreaves, 2004). In other words, in the 
ambiguous and uncertain setting of school innovation under risk, the change agents can 
have more chance of successful initiation when they explicitly take meaning and emotion 
into account together.  
Cultivating the meaning of change: Invoking the imagery of a small-scale social 
movement (micro mobilization) 
Ultimately the transformation of subjective realities and meanings is the essence 
of change (Fullan, 2001).  However, these meanings are rarely clear at the outset (Fullan, 
                                                 
17
 The traditional Chinese four-character idiom 孟母三遷 (맹모삼천; Maeng Mo Sam Cheon; 
literal translation: Mencius' mother, three moves) refers to the legend that Mencius' mother 
moved their house three times—first she moved their house next to a cemetery, next she moved 
them next to a market and finally she moved them next to a school-before finding a location that 
she felt was suitable for his upbringing.  This idiom refers to the importance of a proper 
environment for the  upbringing of children. 
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2001). During the early stage, after many meetings, the organizing committee consisting 
of the founding teachers, principal and parents concluded that they could save the school 
only by transforming it into an innovative school with a new vision, new curriculum, and 
a new way of schooling (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2009). However, although the 
founding teacher activists had been involved in educational movements for many years, 
they had no prior experience and knowledge of actually transforming a reform at a school 
level. As a consequence, they struggled to design a new innovative school model and 
come up with a common set of clear principles or guidelines for change (Rhyu, 2009; 
Fullan, 2001; McQuillan, 2009; Zbaracki, 1998). The old guard envisioned a new form of 
more principled professionalism where teachers engage with parents in relationships of 
reciprocal learning that are more open, interactive and inclusive in character (Hargreaves, 
2000). Mr. Rhyu said that,  
―At the beginning, these new relationships were conceived in contrast to 
the bureaucratic features of conventional large schools and were directed 
more at reversing or altering old bureaucratic practices than pursuing 
clearly articulated relationships.‖  
As a remedy or solution to the problems of bureaucratic schooling, the founding members 
sought a school innovation aimed at making SCE more democratic and responsive to 
school community members‘ expectations and demands by enhancing their genuine 
participation in school decision making. The idea of enhancing participation in school 
governance in South Korea was hardly new. In fact, it has been one of the recurring 
themes in administrative reform as well as in more general reform efforts. The Korean 
national government implemented parent participation in school board policy in 1990 
(Kim, 2004). But many teachers and parents regarded the implementation of those 
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policies as just ―cosmetic committees‖ (Fullan & Hargreaves, 1998), limiting parents‘ 
roles to the sidelines. The founding parents and teachers worked hard to correct this 
superficial form of participation. In carrying out these goals, the activist teachers said,  
―We tried to avoid any form of power differences between teachers and 
parents or between principal and teachers, otherwise, even here at our 
school, we might end up reproducing alienating and inhumane 
bureaucratic relationships‖ (Mr. Kang, teacher).  
During the interviews, a parent stated  
―The hallmark of SCE was the fact that, here, almost all the decisions 
were sought to be reached by consensus‖ (Chong-Hyun‘s mother). 
Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang stated that they sought to build a truly democratic and 
community-like school through adopting the practices of direct democracy and self 
governance. They also wished to practice participatory democracy as a model of 
interaction between teachers and parents. They were unwilling to formalize many aspects 
of the relationship between teachers and parents because, they believed, doing so would 
seem at odds with the determinedly informal, voluntary, and personal character of SCE‖ 
(Mr. Kang & Mr. Rhyu, teachers; See also, Polletta, 2002). Thus, they said that they 
relied more on ad-hoc or informal (person-to-person) ways of decision making rather 
than rigid and formal bureaucratic procedures. In this way, in cultivating the meaning of 
school change, the old guard invoked the imagery of social movements. They frequently 
referred to the ―grass-roots‖ nature of their initiatives. They tended to conceptualize their 
endeavors of transforming the school into a more democratic and communal one as a part 
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of a grass-roots or localized form of collective action or ―cultural movement‖18 that 
directly and indirectly challenged the existing bases of hierarchical and bureaucratic 
school authority (Armstrong, 2002; Huerta, 2002; Chen & O‘Mahony, 2009).  
The old guard emphasized that the grassroots was the necessary and legitimate 
source of change efforts. The image of social movements enabled the old guard and the 
founding parents to make sense of their situation in new terms and see greater 
possibilities for change that connected them to more inspiring and inclusive visions of 
social justice that bring people together in a spirit of equity and solidarity. This shift from 
individual to systemic attributions is characteristic of small-scale social movements or 
micro-mobilization, which draw on passion and moral purpose to initiate and sustain their 
commitment through enduring activism (Scully & Segal, 2002). This resonates with the 
Hargreaves‘ (2000) claim,  
―It is now vital that the teaching profession works in partnership with the 
public, to become a vigorous social movement (Touraine, 1995) of acting 
subjects who work together to improve the quality and the professionalism 
of teaching, rather than a set of fragmented individuals who act as clients 
only in their families‘ private interests‖ (p. 227).  
This vision of building a democratic and caring school community was very 
appealing to the parents and apparently worked well in the earlier stage (Kang & Cho, 
2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Seo, 2004). It was relatively easy for a small self-selected group 
who wanted a democratic and caring school to pursue goals that fit their interests even in 
the absence of substantive structural change during the early stage (Armstrong, 2002; 
                                                 
18
 Emphasizing the important role of culture in transforming schools, Mr. Rhyu claimed that what 
he was doing at SCE was a form of ―cultural movement.‖ This will be discussed in more detail at 
the later section of this chapter (See also Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008).  
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Hargreaves & Fullan, 2006; Huerta, 2002). In other words, the like-minded participants 
found it relatively easy to pursue the task of reculturing that was required to achieve SIC. 
Furthermore, parent participation made it possible for SCE to endure challenging times.  
The parents were committed to the transformation of SCE along lines that they desired 
and were thus actively involved in all sorts of school activities. They made a real effort to 
provide support any way they could.  
When the founding parents and teachers arrived at SCE in the Spring of 2001, they found 
that SCE‘s building and facilities looked much like a ―haunted house19.‖ The school had 
been poorly maintained because it was going to be closed.  In the early years of school 
innovation, the founding parents and teachers voluntarily fixed the run-down school 
buildings and facilities, painted the walls, repaired the faucets in bathrooms, and polished 
the wooden classroom floors to help rebuild the school facilities. I also heard many 
parents say that they regarded SCE as their own school. Their investment and efforts 
were such that their ownership of the school was dramatically different from that of their 
counterparts in conventional schools. Polletta (2002) argues,  
―It might be almost impossible to transform an organization where routes 
to success are uncertain, where there are scant means for ensuring 
members‘ compliance, and where members had few resources into a new 
innovative one without garnering the support of the constituents‖ (p. 14). 
In addition, since the parents perceived that SCE was a fragile organization that 
could easily be destroyed by external pressure from the school district (Wicks, 2001), 
they recognized that they had to remain actively involved so that the school could survive 
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 The founding Parents and teachers figuratively depicted the dilapidated condition of the SCE as 
a ―haunted house on the mountain (귀곡산장; Gwui-Gok-San-Jang)‖ 
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and succeed (Huerta, 2002). This recognition of SCE‘s vulnerability and ―sense of 
urgency‖ (Kotter, 2008) reinforced their participation and support (Huy & Zott, in press).  
Cultivating positive emotions for change  
In addition to cultivating the meaning of change by engaging with the parents, the 
activist teachers were also keenly aware of the crucial roles of emotions in creating 
change. As Fullan (2001) suggests, change agents must provide their members with a 
sense of stability and security while still heightening the sense of urgency (Kotter, 2008). 
The members must have a sense that the organization and its leadership are stable and 
capable before they are willing to enlist in the battle for change (Hargreaves & Fink, 
2006; Huy and Zott, 2007). Two types of emotional strategies helped launch the young 
innovative school: (1) emphasizing the integrity of SCE; (2) emphasizing the moral 
purpose and capacity of the founding teachers.  
Founding teachers could influence parents and teachers‘ emotions about SCE in 
ways that suggest integrity in several ways. The founding teachers sought to develop 
passion and enthusiasm for the change among parents and teachers. For example, Mr. 
Rhyu tried to promote these feelings by engaging in group meetings with parents and 
posting articles on the school‘s web-site, newspapers, and education magazines. Mr. 
Rhyu‘s enthusiasm was contagious. His deliberate publicity was vital to securing parents‘ 
participation and support. Mr. Yoon confirmed that Mr. Rhyu had been regarded as ―a 
master at igniting a burning flame for change‖ through his eloquence and inspirational 
writing skill among many KTU educators. The activist teachers also influenced parents‘ 
and teachers‘ feelings by emphasizing the vulnerability of SCE, thus heightening the 
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sense of urgency (Kotter, 2008). These activist teachers did not give stakeholders a 
feeling of false security by portraying the school as a robust or unshakeable organization, 
as is often the case with organizations in a vulnerable stage (Fullan, 2001, 2007, 2009; 
Huy, 2001; Huy & Zott, in press), but they emphasized the fragility of their new 
organization.  
―SCE is a very fragile school. It is so vulnerable that a single blow would 
shatter it to pieces.‖ (Mr. Rhyu, teacher) 
 ―In the early days, Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang always said to the parents that 
―SCE will certainly die without your support!‖‖ (Chong-Hyun‘s mother).   
These recognitions of the vulnerability of their organization fueled and sustained 
parents‘ and teachers‘ commitment to SCE, enhancing the integrity of the school. 
As Mr. Woo said,   
―The more we felt intimidated by the school district and other schools, the 
greater we felt that we‘re doing the right thing.‖  
Another way of enhancing the parents‘ and teachers‘ positive emotions was 
through stressing the integrity of the founder teachers (the activist teachers in particular), 
and their moral purpose underpinning the SCE‘s change (Fullan, 2005).  For example, Mr. 
Rhyu repeatedly emphasized the moral purpose and social justice activism of his 
involvement in SCE.  He rhetorically said that,  
―A farmer who sows an apple seed should not expect to enjoy the fruit. If 
he does, his good intention will quickly disappear; people will even be 
suspicious of his good intentions. All of his efforts will end in vain.‖  
Mr. Rhyu convinced the parents and teachers (and probably himself as well) that he 
would not get any rewards from his efforts and from the successful innovation at SCE. 
Mr. Kang also conveyed his altruism and benevolence. He stated that he would not seek 
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to stay at SCE after his assigned years so that he could spread the innovative model 
elsewhere (Seo, 2004; Kang, 2005). One day he asked me,  
―Have you read Gilles Deleuze‘s (2004) Thousand Plateaus? I‘m studying 
it now with my teacher network members. It‘s a really fascinating and 
insightful book. You should read it! As the book suggests, I would prefer 
to live like a nomad who travels from place to place rather than staying in 
one place all the time. In this fast changing, neo-liberalism driven world, 
we need to be nomads who are always on the move rather than settlers 
who are content with the status quo!‖ (Mr. Kang, teacher).  
In sum, the two activist teachers‘ emotional management strategies calmed 
nervous and worried parents, teachers, and the principal and reinvigorated much-needed 
support for the young and fragile organization.  
Cultivating collaborative relationship  
The activist teachers, particularly Mr. Rhyu, were also keenly aware of the crucial 
roles of relationships in initiating and leading change in challenging circumstances 
(Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Harris, 2006). In order to promote supportive relationships 
with parents, they tried to make themselves available to them and worked relentlessly. 
The old guard knew how to get parents and communities on their side and fight the 
inflexible bureaucracies that held them back (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Harris, 2006). 
For example, the two activist teachers literally lived at SCE (Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Kang & 
Cho, 2010). They worked twelve to sixteen hours a day and stayed at the school many 
nights (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2003, 2009; Seo, 2004, 2009). 
Since they regarded themselves as the key architects who elaborated the 
directions and procedures of the school change from the very beginning, they were 
willing to shoulder the heavy burden of staying on top of everything all the time. They 
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worked hard to compensate for insufficient resources and under-organized routines and 
structures. During the interviews, many teachers and parents acknowledged that through 
the two teachers‘ relentless commitment, blood, sweat and tears, SCE could weather the 
formidable challenges and survive the uncertainty. For example, a parent told me,  
―Whenever I passed by the school after work late at night, I could see that 
the school building‘s lights were on and that Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang were 
busy working. Although I didn‘t even know what they were actually doing, 
I felt deep appreciation to them for the fact that they were still there. It 
spurred me to make even greater efforts for them and for SCE‖ (Chae-
Rin‘s dad).   
Similarly, Mr. Han, a teacher, confirmed that since they literally did all the work the 
other teachers had a lot of time on their hands during the beginning stage.  The activist 
teachers‘ hard work provided the other teachers and parents with a unifying vision and 
sense of relational trust.  This also bred feelings of obligation toward the teachers and 
developed strong loyalties to them and SCE (Klatch, 2004; Lalich, 2004; Rothschild & 
Leach, 2006).  To review, SCE was escorted by cultivating the meaning of change, 
positive trustful emotions, and collaborative relationships.  
Fitting the SCE’s innovation into prevailing systems 
SCE‘s innovation was not produced in a vacuum.  It occurred under the noses of 
the Korean school system‘s hierarchical bureaucracy (Falletti, 2009).  It was still subject 
to normative definitions of conventional schooling and institutional pressures (Huerta, 
2002).  How could it fit into the existing system?   
SCE‘s innovation was a self-initiated change (Hargreaves, 2004). It occurred in 
the absence of external or top-down intervention. Although the school closing crisis 
opened up new opportunities, there were no guarantees that SCE‘s innovation would take 
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hold (Campbell, 2004).  Change agents might have accepted the school closing or they 
might have disagreed about how to solve the crisis or about whether anything could be 
done about it.   
In choosing the strategic direction to transform SCE into an innovative school, the 
founding teachers had to come up with a new way of schooling that was neither too 
similar to nor radically different from what was acceptable to institutional incumbents 
(Clemens, 1997). Accordingly, while the change agents initially chose a grassroots 
bottom-up strategy by which they deliberately attempted to disrupt the status quo of 
conventional bureaucratic schooling and carve a specific niche for a specialized human-
size and caring school, they had to drop their confrontational strategies in order to avoid 
potential conflicts with the sponsoring school district.  
―If we had carried out overly oppositional practices and pursued an 
adversarial stance, we might have faced concentrated repression from the 
school district and difficulty obtaining legitimacy and resources. These 
pressures and repressions would have eroded SCE‘s capacity to survive, 
resulting in hastening SCE‘s early closure.‖  (Mr. Kang, teacher)  
Thus, instead of challenging the existing school system head-on, the founding 
teachers worked within the existing system by adding new initiatives and realigning old 
ideas on top of the existing system (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Huy & Mintzberg, 2003; 
Thelen, 2003; Thelen & Mahoney, 2009).  The old guard also preserved desirable 
elements of current institutional arrangements during the process of changing the school 
(Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2009: 130).  Preserving the attractive elements of existing 
institutions makes new institutions more recognizable and makes institutional change less 
abrupt and less painful (Abrahamson, 2004).  This way, the activist teachers could also 
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balance their burning sense of justice and moral purpose for wholesale change with the 
need to minimize risks to their careers and secure Principal Lee‘s and school district 
officials‘ support in enacting their goals. They had to garner management support to 
ensure SCE‘s survival and to achieve their goals. At the same time, this strategy explains 
the limits of their activism, indicating how they could not afford to seem too radical or 
extreme (Reay et al., 2006; Scully & Segal, 2002). For example, according to the activist 
teachers, they deliberately represented their somewhat radical, grassroots-like, change 
initiative as a ―small school initiative‖, which can be seen as more socially legitimate and 
more receptive to both political left and right (Klongsky & Ayers, 2006; McQuillan, 
2008). Mr. Kang said, with hindsight, that  
―From the very beginning, given the stakes involved in the change 
initiative and the unfavorable school district bureaucrats, we were 
extremely careful in devising ways to convey the meaning of SCE‘s 
change to outsiders in order not to provoke the school district. We 
portrayed our change as an experiment seeking a solution to the endemic 
problems of large bureaucratic schools within the sphere and the constraint 
of public schooling. By portraying the SCE as a small and beautiful school 
at the periphery, we could carve our niche for pursuing our goal that 
directly and indirectly challenged the existing bases of hierarchical and 
bureaucratic school authority.‖  
As they depicted their change as a part of small-school initiatives, it was much 
easier for them to borrow familiar concepts such as ―individual freedom,‖ ―choice,‖ ―self-
actualization,‖ and ―participation‖ from within the existing neo-liberal discourses about 
educational reform and use them for their own purposes to enhance their legitimacy in the 
eyes of school bureaucrats.  In the prevalent neo-liberal discourses of educational reform 
in South Korea, conventional bureaucracies are viewed as major impediments to good 
schooling and the principles of choice, individual freedom, and self-actualization have 
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unwittingly entered the school system. This makes these bureaucracies more permeable 
to bottom-up and grass-roots change initiatives that are pursued under the guise of small 
school initiatives enhancing parental participation and choice. In other words, the rise of 
neoliberalism in education in South Korea may inadvertently provide a more favorable 
environment for the radical change agents of SIC equipped with the skills of creative 
recombination, heightened political awareness, and temporal intelligence to infiltrate and 
alter the existing educational system without unnecessary pain (Abrahamson, 2004; 
Campbell, 2004; Falletti, 2009).   
In addition, SCE‘s innovation could avoid the scrutiny of the bureaucratic system 
because of its spatial and geographical character at the territorial and functional periphery 
(Foote & Baker, 2006; Hargreaves, 2003; Hamel, 2000; Raeburn, 2004; Rao et al., 2000) 
or ―free space‖ (Polletta, 1999). The activist teacher, Mr. Kang, characterized SCE‘s as a 
―change at the margin.‖  
―Since SCE was a small school located in an isolated rural area, school 
bureaucrats did not perceive its innovation to be a serious threat at all. As 
a matter of fact, this kind of ignorance and indifference inadvertently 
allowed the innovation to occur with less hardship than I had anticipated.‖ 
(Mr. Kang, teacher) 
In sum, SCE‘s change can be conceptualized as an incremental and endogenous 
change rather than an abrupt one because the founding actors drew on the pre-given 
arrangements and practices around them and engaged in creative recombination rather 
than wholesale change or complete replacement (Abrahamson, 2004; Campbell, 2004; 
Hargreaves, 2004; Schneiberg, 2007; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010).  In other words, SCE 
operated in the ―grey‖ areas ―between the movement and the establishment‖ 
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(McLaughlin et al., 2009), creating a distinct form of organizational structure that 
enhanced its survival and ability to extend innovation further (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1994; Herness, 2005; Palier, 2005; Contu, 
2008; Kraatz & Block, 2009; Fotaki, 2009).   
However, there were limitations to this form of school innovation. The precarious 
and ambivalent nature of SCE‘s innovation put it at particular risk of being subjected to 
increasing complexity, confusion, and suspicion in its organizational life over time
20
 
(Cuban et al., 2010).  This might have planted the seeds of contradictions and dilemmas 
that could have made SCE susceptible to later internal conflicts or to cooptation by 
external entities, unless SCE engaged in continuous and careful working out and 
renegotiation in the evolving contexts (Levy & Scully, 2007; Jackson, 2005; Wallace, 
1998).  In the next chapter, I will examine how the change agents addressed the challenge 
of sustaining change over time. Then, beyond its survival, I will show how the change 
agents amplified change and generated system-level change in the broader organizational 
field.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the remarkable transformation of SCE - from a failing 
school facing imminent school closing to a household name as an innovative elementary 
                                                 
20
 This confusion and suspicion was reflected in a remark by a frustrated parent: ―SCE always 
remains neither too hot nor too cold!‖ SCE‘s hybrid innovation of bureaucracy and activism often 
aroused suspicion and critiques that its stance was too conformist and insufficiently 
confrontational. Contu (2008) critically conceptualize this form of resistance as ―a softer (or 
decaffeinated) resistance a resistance without the acid that can destroy the machine of power (p. 
375)‖ or  as ―a sweetened resistance that we can still practice without too much damage, without 
paying the price of what destroying the machine of power may bring (p. 375).‖  
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school in South Korea. This change occurred endogenously in the absence of an external 
intervention or top down reform mandate by relying on incremental but subversive 
change strategies including creative recombination of participatory democracy and small 
school approaches and reorienting them towards the bureaucratic school system to 
infiltrate it under the neoliberal guise of strengthening parent participation and individual 
freedom. I also highlighted how the distinctive activists could be characterized as 
tempered radicals or institutional activists and detailed how their dual commitments 
stimulated them to challenge the bureaucratic status quo while conforming to the 
bureaucratic rules and procedures. SCE‘s innovation demonstrates that it is possible to 
break away, in an incremental and endogenous manner, from bureaucratic institutions 
and reveals a possible process through which apparently small endogenous change can 
gradually yield transformative and widespread change in broader contexts.  
However, while participatory democratic innovation can provide an alternative to 
hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of schooling, it is well noted that sustaining 
organizations that adopt participatory and communal forms of organizational change is 
very difficult and may lead to many struggles that challenge organizations and their 
ability to sustain themselves (Freeman, 1973; Peters, 2001; Polletta, 2002; O‘Mahony & 
Ferraro, 2007; Chen, 2009; Henig & Stone, 2009; Olsen, 2009). In the next chapter, I turn 
to the issue of how an innovative school dedicated to the principles of participatory 
democracy and community sustained its innovation without the benefit of having 
standard bureaucratic procedures and routines as it matured. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 SUSTAINING CHANGE  
Introduction  
SICs are neither easy to establish nor to sustain once they are set in motion (Stone, 
2001).  From the outset, SCE confronted many challenges in sustaining change. 
Internally, SCE found it difficult to coordinate its efforts and manage its interdependence. 
Externally, SCE challenged the school district‘s structural and cultural regularities. 
Therefore, since its inception, survival and sustainability had always been the most 
immediate and crucial issue for SCE. Without concerted sustaining efforts, SCE would 
have not survived its infancy.   
This chapter focuses on how SCE sustained its change over time. First, I discuss 
the strategy of building relationships and enhancing relational power.  Then, I highlight 
the strategies of coordinating participation. Third, I examine the role of leadership. 
Fourth, I investigate how SCE navigated the daunting challenge of maintaining 
contradictory relationships (cooperative and adversarial relationships at the same time) 
between SCE and the school district. Fifth, I discuss the dilemma of amplifying change 
into a broader organizational field while maintaining the original mission. I close the 
chapter by examining the puzzling lag between the successful symbolic/political 
innovation and technical/instructional development.  
Enhancing participation 
From the beginning, the old guard emphasized that all members were active 
participants and avoided patterns of hierarchical dominance (Freeman, 1972-1973; Reger, 
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1354)
21
.  Since Principal Lee decided to relinquish his formal authority, SCE‘s goal of 
building a genuinely participatory democratic and collectivist school appeared favorable 
in the beginning stage.  The founding members sought to redistribute authority by using 
participatory democracy as the model of teacher-parent interaction rather than relying on 
conventional decision making and governing procedures which they thought would 
contradict their foundational beliefs in participation and authenticity. The old guard was 
especially concerned about the side-effect of formalization. They were keenly aware that 
formalization is often accompanied by goal displacement, diminished organizational 
willingness to be open to members, co-optation of grassroots processes and the 
concentration of power in favor of a small group of organization elites through their long 
experience of movements (Michels, 2001; Piven & Cloward, 1977; Selznick, 1949: 224).  
Given the negative perception of formalization, the old guard and the founding 
members sought to resist formalization through the deliberate use of participation-
oriented organizational structures and processes (e.g. relational approaches, ad-hoc 
problem solving, and collective leadership) while still working toward organizational 
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 The teaching profession in South Korea has been traditionally regarded as an honorable job due 
to the influence of Confucianism, which is a foundation for Korean cultural values (Sorensen, 
1994; Kang & Hong, 2008). There is a famous Confucian saying ―Kings, teachers, and parents 
are equal,‖ which means that kings, teachers, and parents should be respected equally. This 
Confucian respect for teachers is well embodied in an old Korean admonition: ―Don‘t even step 
on the shadow of a teacher.‖ Although the trust of the teaching profession has been radically 
undermined in recent decades due to the influence of modernization, globalization and 
consumerism, traditional respect for teachers is still evident in Korean society (Sorensen, 1994; 
Kang & Hong, 2008).The intensified demand for parent participation at SCE sometimes clashed 
with the traditional norms of the ―asymmetrical‖ teacher-parent relationship. On top of this, 
inevitably there are built-in tensions between participatory democracy and professional expertise. 
Participatory democracy and parent engagement had to find ways of reconciling the lay role of 
parents with the expertise of professionals. These contradictory expectations and logics generated 
ongoing tensions between SCE teachers and parents.    
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persistence and growth.  Thus, they purposively avoided formalized routines and rules 
and instead tried to make sure the enactment of change operated in ways that best met the 
members‘ individual and collective needs (Polletta, 2002). They pursued the idea of a 
community-like school grounded in ―intimate relationships, networks of quasi-kinship, 
friendship, and faith‖ (Clemens & Minkoff, 2004: 160). This emphasis on 
―structurelessness‖ characterized by looseness, informality, and intimacy resonated well 
with the sensibilities of the founding members.  It was endorsed by the members as an 
effective alternative to over-structured bureaucracy. This approach provided the early 
members with a sense of belonging, autonomy, independence and voice (Kang & Cho, 
2010; Rhyu, 2009). Accordingly, the founding members valued personal and intimate 
relationships.  They did not view each other in instrumental terms, and made decisions in 
a face to face manner. The intimate and informal relationships among the members were 
particularly strong in the early stage in which parents and teachers spent many evenings 
and weekends working together to develop school sites, curriculum and extracurricular 
activities together. Through these experiences, as a parent explained, parents and teachers 
became ―not just active partners but good friends with one another‖ (Chong-Hyun‘s 
mother). They frequently got together for collaborative work and for fun as well. One 
founding parent recalled,  
―The good old days. We worked hard till late night and went out to the 
bars for drinks. We had many laughs together. It was really fun! I felt as if 
I went back to my youthful college days. After spending almost ten 
tedious years as a housewife and stay at home mom, it was a great ―social‖ 
opportunity for an average mom like me.‖ (Ji-Young‘s mother) 
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The parents collectively made lifestyle choices ―that attend to all 
children‘s good, not just their own; that are made as if their child is everyone‘s 
child and everyone‘s child is their own‖ (Hargreaves, 2000: 230). The climate of 
the school was made more familial and secure because of the frequency with 
which parents attended (Huerta: 2002:97).  
Coordinating participation: A tyranny of structurelessness 
However, in the absence of a shared basis of authority, many conflicts and 
inbuilt tensions inevitably arose. Participatory democracy and parent engagement 
had to reconcile the lay role of parents with the expertise of professionals (Henig 
& Stone, 2009). Debate continued among teachers and parents over just what kind 
of role parents should assume at SCE, which led to ongoing conflicts. Since some 
parents invested a lot of their efforts in SCE, they expected that they could exert 
more say in school decision making than they could in conventional schools. 
Some parents were too aggressive as a result of their experiences in the civil 
rights movement.  At other times, parents were simply inexperienced in engaging 
in this kind direct participation and decision making. As a parent explained, the 
founding parents‘ expectations for participation were very high.  
―As we (parents) put a lot of our efforts in launching SCE from the 
beginning, it was natural that they expected to exert more say in school 
decision making than we did in other conventional schools.‖ (Chong-
Hyun‘s mother) 
Meanwhile, meeting these parents‘ sometimes excessive expectations and 
competing ideas on how things should get done proved taxing to the teachers. A 
teacher explained that,  
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―It became increasingly difficult to deal with parents who were so radical 
and aggressive in the decision making processes that they ignored teachers‘ 
professional authority while working with other parents who were simply 
inexperienced (and indifferent to) in participating in this kind of 
democratic decision makings and school activities‖ (Mr. Han, teacher).    
Thus, the founding members experienced growing pains in their attempts 
to implement a genuinely participatory and collectivist process of school decision 
making, as they often held different ideas of how things should get done at SCE, 
which tended to create fragmentation within the organization (Polletta, 2002). 
This aspiring organizational form did not provide formal channels through which 
members could arrive at the binding decisions necessary to plan political action in 
a timely manner.  Attempts to decide among incompatible perspectives often led 
to organizational paralysis and personal hostility.  This reflects the well-
established finding that one reason community forms of organization have not 
received as much attention as traditional bureaucratic forms is the former‘s 
inability to resolve problems of power, authority, and governance (Rothschild & 
Russell, 1986; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, 1986; O‘Mahony & Ferraro, 2007).   
The founding members had to continually faced coordination problems - 
what Freeman (1972) famously calls ―a tyranny of structurelessness‖ (cited in 
Polletta, 2002) - which were posed by a commitment to the open, participatory 
organizational form.  In her classic critique of consensus-based and relationship-
oriented organizations, Freeman (1972) argues that when devotion to 
structurelessness reaches the level of dogma, it ceases being a progressive force. 
She argues that within the power void of structurelessness, informal and 
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oligarchical elites and cliques may arise that ironically generate pseudo anti-
participatory power structures. Similarly, Polletta (2002) explained how the 
pursuit of participatory democracy and collective activism sometimes generates 
unanticipated alienation.  For example, the decision making process at SCE was 
supposed to be democratic, but it tended to be increasingly dominated by those 
who had been there longest. Since SCE‘s organizational innovation was brought 
about by the unsparing efforts of its founding members, their feelings of 
ownership differed substantially from newer parents. The longstanding founding 
parents felt that their voices should carry more weight, whereas newcomers 
wondered whether SCE was truly democratic. In so doing, the longstanding 
parents intentionally or inadvertently excluded and sought to tame the newcomers. 
As the following interview segment with a newcomer parent states:   
―Before I came to SCE, I expected SCE to be a truly democratic 
community, but that‘s not the case at all! There is a strong invisible 
hierarchy among the parents. Whenever I tried to initiate a new program 
or event, the longstanding parents intruded and ridiculed my efforts by 
saying ―After we have worked for years to prepare a banquet at SCE, you 
have appeared at the table ready for a free meal!‖  I responded, ―No, we 
didn‘t. We are bringing just as much to the table as you have!‖ But they 
just turned up their noses. They like they were the real owners of SCE. It‘s 
so frustrating. I just dropped what I had planned to do and am trying to do 
what I am supposed do as a newcomer.‖ (Jun-Ho‘s mother, 2nd year parent 
at SCE) 
The longstanding parents tended to view the newcomer parents as ―free-riders‖ and 
attributed the dilution of SCE‘s original goals to the influx of underprepared new-
members. 
  
107 
 
In addition, there were also recurring tensions between the native resident parent 
group and the newly moved parent group from the very beginning. The local resident 
parents were mostly small restaurant owners who were not college-educated. Sometimes 
they said that they felt intimidated by parents from neighboring cities who were college 
educated and seemed to be increasingly dominant at SCE. They sometimes felt that their 
beloved community and school were being occupied and exploited by intruders who left 
town once their children graduated. A native resident parent noted that,  
―Sometimes I felt intimidated by the newly moved parents from cities who 
were mostly college-educated and middle class. They seemed to be 
increasingly dominant at SCE with their eloquence and knowledge. We 
sometimes felt that we had our school taken away by visitors who would 
leave this community immediately after their children graduated from 
SCE once and for all‖ (Hyung-Seo‘s father, a native castle resident parent).  
These practices of informal and intimate structure operating on the basis of friendship 
contradicted the espoused beliefs. This kind of cognitive dissonance and the experience 
of alienation at SCE which some members had believed to be truly democratic and 
inclusive created many difficulties.  
Fire fighting: Ad-hoc problem solving strategy  
Conflicts are inevitable parts of the change process (Fullan, 1998). What matters 
is how the inevitable conflicts resulting from ambiguity are managed. In order to address 
the internal conflicts and contradictions, the old guard engaged in ad-hoc fire fighting. 
Initially, the founding teachers deployed an ad hoc approach to foster organic and 
spontaneous governance instead of relying on formalized or bureaucratized routines or 
procedures.  Ad hoc strategy was a ―loose, flexible, self-renewing organic form tied 
together mostly through lateral means‖ (Bolman & Deal, 2006: 79; See also Mintzberg, 
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1985).  Similarly, Winter (2003) defined ad-hoc problem solving as ―non-routine and 
non-repetitive problem solving activities, typically appearing as a response to relatively 
unpredictable events (p. 993).‖  
However, adhering to ad-hoc and organic problem solving proved difficult 
because conflicts and troubles occurred in many areas. The old guard clung to a 
romanticized view of participatory democracy and community in which everyone 
hungers for collaboration and participation (Bolman & Deal, 2003). They could be 
―overly optimistic about integrating individual and organization needs while neglecting 
structure and the stubborn realities of conflict‖ (Bolman & Deal, 2003: 417). As the old 
guard upheld an idealistic notion of a community free of conflict for the goal of change 
and viewed SCE as a very fragile organization, they tended to act defensively. They 
regarded conflicts as dangerous and tried to take care of them in an urgent and immediate 
manner (Fullan, 2001; Repenning, 2001)
22
. Mr. Woo asked,  
―Do you know why SCE survived despite so many problems and 
contradictions? That‘s because Mr. Rhyu and I had been ―putting out fires‖ 
night and day whenever issues broke out. We met the parties concerned in 
person and soothed angry persons. I don‘t know how much ―Soju‖ and 
beer I had to drink to accomplish that. Mr. Rhyu and I were a good team.‖  
Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Woo mostly relied on the relational approach in resolving issues and 
problems. Instead of depending on cold routines or inflexible rules, they aspired to 
resolve problems in as humane a manner as they could.  If problems were too 
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 Similarly, institutional scholars, Hirsch and Bermiss (2009), conceptualize fire-fighting as 
institutional ‗dirty‘ work that is aimed at preserving institutions through backstage work of skilled 
actors (pp. 22-23).  
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complicated to address, then they delayed solving them or covered them up in the hopes 
of avoiding confrontation and preserving harmony.  
The old guard did not rush to solve every problem. Rather, they took a long-term 
gradual approach, with sequential coupling and decoupling strategies occurring over time 
as part of different change strategies (structural, cultural, and political) (Denis et al, 2001; 
Hallett, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Weick, 1976). While Mr. Rhyu was often regarded 
as an ideologically radical and idealistic activist by others, this view may obscure his 
nuanced, creative, and pragmatic ability to understand and exploit contradictions in 
accomplishing the work of school change. Mr. Rhyu elaborated his pragmatic strategies 
this way:  
―I don‘t agree with members who advocate a utopian version of 
participatory democracy and its accompanying strategies of relationship 
building. It is an unrealistic myth and impossible to implement in the 
public school context...‖ 
They achieved this reconciliation of idealism and pragmatism by employing a tempered 
view of participatory democracy suggested by Polletta (2002):  
‗‗No one believes any longer that decisions can be made by strict 
consensus. Activists are more comfortable with rules, less hostile to power, 
and more attuned to inequalities concealed in informal relations‘‘ (p. 202). 
To effectively enact SCE‘s change involving divergent interests and values, Mr. Rhyu 
had to be comfortable with paradoxes in ideals and practice, be able to give meaning to 
these apparent contradictions to the members, and be able to coordinate the members 
(Fullan, 2001; Huy, 2001).  These considerations and his pragmatic approach to 
participatory-democratic school change were embodied in his distinct symbolic change 
strategy that will be discussed later in this chapter.  Though these efforts, Mr. Rhyu gave 
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people involved the impression that ―the needs being addressed are significant and that 
they are making at least some progress toward meeting them‖ (Fullan, 2001: 69).  
However, Mr. Rhyu‘s approach inadvertently caused several problems. To begin 
with, it allowed SCE to enjoy a smooth start, but unacknowledged conflicts and tensions 
turned into more aggressive outbursts later (Fullan, 1998). Moreover, since this approach 
addressed issues reactively on a case by case basis without thoroughly considering their 
intricate nature, the demands for firefighting escalated. Indeed, firefighting became a self-
reinforcing and counterproductive phenomenon (Repenning, 2001).  
―When the problems came up, Mr. Rhyu and his prodigy, Mr. Woo, 
sought to resolve them with band-aid solutions without really dealing with 
the issues. This strategy appeared to work for a while, but not for long, as 
parents and teachers raised issues repeatedly. By the way, Mr. Woo 
learned many tricks, like backstage politics, from Mr. Rhyu. I think that 
they just ―sutured‖ wounds without actually remedying them. Indeed, it 
was a polite way of just masking problems.‖ (Mr. Han, teacher)  
 The fire fighting strategy relying on the relational approach for conflict resolution 
had another limitation. Much like the old adage, ―if the only tool you own is a hammer, 
all your problems look like nails,‖ all problems were viewed as interpersonal ones. 
Problems were attributed to personal defects or relationship issues, thus overlooking 
problems underlying organizational realignments or structural adjustments (Hoffman, 
2001; Polletta, 2002; Chen, 2009).  
―The people at SCE are always quick to attribute any problems to other 
peoples‘ faults. They engaged in endless meetings to discuss the problems 
they were facing and how to solve them as a community at the beginning 
but always ended up only hurting each other by focusing on who was 
responsible for the problems, rather than coming up with a more 
constructive or tangible solution. They always complain ―the principal is a 
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problem, the teachers are problem, or the parents are the problem without 
reflecting on one‘s own conduct.‖ (Mr. Yoon, teacher)  
It was a particularly pathological situation ―where attempts to resolve the tensions 
and contradictions actually aggravated them rather than easing them‖ (Hernes, 2005:11). 
Although the relentless firefighting seemed to control the flames, under the surface, the 
embers continued to burn. ―The danger is not the contradiction, but pretending that it 
doesn‘t exist‖ (Leach, 2009: 1049). Without specified problem solving strategies, SCE 
had to continuously consume its energy covering up problems and repressing members 
rather than focusing on fulfilling organizational goals.  
The real strengths of ad-hoc approaches, a flowering of creativity and autonomy, 
became liabilities when the school needed timely and coordinated change to move 
forward (Bolman & Deal, 2003). While the ad hoc problem solving approach might work 
in volatile circumstances for a limited time (Winter, 2003), this mode of acting does not 
provide a sustainable advantage (Repenning, 2001; Currie et el., 2009). 
Inclusive community or exclusive community  
To the extent that all inclusion is simultaneously exclusion, the deepening of 
SCE‘s community had the potential to fuel conflicts at the boundaries of belonging 
(Fullan & Hargreaves, 1998; Clemens, 2005). Over time, SCE has experienced rapid 
growth in terms of reputation and student enrollment. However, not everyone appreciated 
this because it could erode the original configuration of SCE as a small self-selected 
community.  The rapid increase in enrollment also led to less care for individual students 
and problems of integrating new students and increased number of parents not prepared 
for SCE (O‘Mahony & Chen, 2009) brought unrealistic illusions that SCE would be a 
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safe haven after experiencing many failures in large schools, and pressures on altering 
structures and curriculum designed for a small school setting.  Mr. Han said that,  
―Due to the increased enrollment, we had to reduce interaction with 
parents and teachers. Student behaviors got worse than before. There were 
more discipline issues. Moreover, some of the innovative intensive 
programs which were the symbols of SCE, such as the Spring/Autumn 
extracurricular camps and the art festivals, had to be cancelled or at least 
curtailed.‖  
However, as a public school in which neighborhood school policy was applied, 
there was no overt way of controlling the influx of students from outside.  Real estate 
values in the area skyrocketed. Considering the inconvenience and the poor quality of 
housing in the area, the prices were unreasonably expensive. The housing price and 
inconvenience were unlikely gatekeepers that SCE could rely on to control student 
enrollment. However, occasionally, some parents made their way to SCE by using false 
addresses or by changing their address without actually residing in the area. SCE parents 
who paid extremely high costs in terms of finance and inconvenience were extremely 
sensitive about the issue of entering SCE illegitimately and were hostile to the illegal 
intruders.  
For example, in the spring of 2008, a family moved to the area to send their only 
daughter, Mi-Ra (3
rd
 grade), to enroll in SCE. Several months later, parents began to be 
suspicious about the newcomers because the house lights were rarely turned on and the 
parking garage was always empty even at night. After observing this for several weeks in 
a row, a group of parents raised this issue at a PTA meeting. Later, they asked the family 
to tell the truth regarding their residence. Mi-Ra‘s father, who had been actively involved 
in school activities and developed relationships with other fathers and Mr. Rhyu, claimed 
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that they had been residing there ever since they moved in.  There were heated debates 
among the parents about the situation. Some of the parents felt bewildered by the 
contradiction between the emphasis given by SCE on ―inclusive community‖ and the 
actual exclusive behavior and ―panoptic surveillance‖ (Foucault, 1975; See also, Chen, 
2009) that betrayed their claim. During an interview, one parent noted,   
―You don‘t know how callous and cold-hearted the parents of this school 
are. Look what happened with poor Mi-Ra‘s family. I think that they were 
scapegoats of our masked violence and selfishness. That‘s the naked 
nature of this school. The other day, I attended a PTA meeting and raised 
this issue of our hypocrisy with Mi-Ra‘s family only to be fiercely 
attacked by angry parents. They told me to ―Shut up, you free-rider! What 
have you done yourself for SCE except sending your son here? How dare 
you say such an absurd thing!‖ (Jong-Seo‘s dad) 
At the beginning, SCE faculty members were reluctant to engage in this 
controversial issue since they believed that it should be handled by the parent body. 
When the issue continuously surfaced and parents became grew increasingly emotional, 
the old guard was drawn into the dispute.  A couple of years later, the new leader, 
Principal Choi, finally stepped forward to settle the issue. When the principal was 
repeatedly asked to expel the family from SCE by angry mothers, he refused their request,   
―As an educator myself, I will not remove any students in the middle of 
the semester even when the family has made a mistake. If Mi-Ra has to 
leave, it will be next spring when the new semester begins.‖ 
Principal Choi approached Mi-Ra‘s father and had an honest talk with him. Since he 
trusted the family, he asked his family to stay at SCE after clearing out the needless 
suspicions. But the family admitted that their actions may have caused unnecessary 
misunderstandings and decided to leave SCE.   
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Ironically, SCE made inclusivity a defining feature of its innovation since 
its inception. Indeed, while its inclusiveness and communal life attracted a variety 
of people searching for a ―safe haven‖ school, this also generated the possibility 
of having its actual and inevitable exclusions pointed out as evidence of hypocrisy 
(Armstrong, 2002). SCE was initially imagined as a utopian community 
contrasting with the bureaucratic system in the neighborhood (Polletta, 2002). By 
interpreting SCE‘s slogan of ―a small and beautiful community cultivating 
authentic learning and genuine life‖ more broadly, those who leveled accusations 
of exclusion and hypocrisy had a legitimate grievance (Armstrong, 2002; See also 
Brunsson, 2002).  
Due to the continued growth and success of SCE‘s innovation, combined with 
changes in the political environment, the recurring issue of inclusion/ exclusion and the 
mismatch between behavior and stated beliefs ―reached a critical point‖ (Chong-Hyun‘s 
mother) as a longstanding parent mother noted.  Some members began to question 
whether the relational approach and the vision of community were only pipe dreams and 
searched for a more pragmatic alternative.  With few systems or procedures to facilitate 
the governing of the school, coupled with on-going school politics, the intensified need to 
coordinate interdependent member activities and integrate member contributions in the 
school context ironically generated strong leadership and charismatic leaders (Seo, 2004).  
Without a decisive leader, the fragile SCE could have got bogged down by process, 
politics, and cynicism about distressing uncertainty and ambiguity (Huerta, 2002; 
O‘Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Harris et al., 2007). Thus, the reality was that certain 
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individuals had to play leadership roles whether they wanted to or not (Polletta, 2005; 
O‘Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). In the following section, I highlight the leadership of the 
old guard and its creative strategies of sustaining change in the face of challenges over 
time. 
The leadership of the old guard 
The founding activist teachers assumed the key roles of coordinating the 
participatory governance structure.  In general, the key tasks of leaders include: the 
definition of organizational mission and role; the organizational embodiment of moral 
purpose; the defense of organizational integrity; and the ordering of internal conflict 
(Kraatz, 2009). However, not wanting to reproduce conventional hierarchical structures 
at SCE, teacher activists said that they struggled to establish a balance between both 
being decisive leaders and skillful coordinators. To do this, they encouraged parent 
participation while exercising the subtle leadership necessary to sustain participatory 
democracy that would not violate their cherished belief in non-hierarchical governance.   
The two activist teachers were savvy leaders who understood the organizational 
and political complexities of the change processes and acted accordingly (Fullan, 1998, 
2001; Kraatz, 2009). They were realists who understood the informal power structure, 
built-in limitations and contradictions of their organization. They were also effective 
organizational politicians who were adept at building coalitions, using rhetoric and 
symbols (Bolman & Deal, 2006). They needed to be able to talk about their organization 
―as if it were an integrated whole even when it was not (and perhaps especially when it is 
not)‖ (Kraatz, 2009: 79). At the same time, it was also considerably important for them to 
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win trust and collaboration in the context of a young innovative organization where risks 
were high and its legitimacy might be taken-for-granted and risks were high (Fullan,2001; 
Huy & Zott, in press; Kraatz, 2009).  
The two activist teachers often faced competing or conjoint imperatives: the 
organizational imperative for implementation and organizational maintenance; and the 
moral imperative for self-consistency and integrity (Fullan, 1998, 2001, 2003; Kraatz, 
2009). Under this situation, when a leader leads a young and innovative organization 
characterized by lack of precise needs and ambiguous power structure, the integrity of 
leadership is vulnerable to criticism (Selznick, 1957; Kraatz, 2009). Sometimes, leaders 
may paradoxically lose support and trust from their constituents ―when their strategic 
efforts to cater to their constituencies send negative signals about their own character, 
commitment, and trustworthiness‖ (Kraatz, 2009: 78).  
The two activist teachers worked hard and took care of everything to sustain 
SCE‘s innovation. As a parent said, ―they worked eight days a week!‖ They tried to be all 
things to all people. They were willing to shoulder the heavy burden of staying on top of 
everything all the time to incubate their precious baby from any internal or external 
threats. They worked heroically to compensate for insufficient resources and under-
organized routines and structures. With regard to this, during the interview, Mr. Rhyu 
noted: 
―Mr. Kang and I deliberately tried to accomplish all work related to the 
school ourselves so that the other teachers could devote most of their time 
and energy to their classrooms. We knew that they were already 
experiencing various setbacks. They were struggling with overwhelming 
workloads and relationship fatigue with parents. As senior colleagues and 
also as teacher leaders, we wanted to give them much needed rest.‖  
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Other teachers and parents acknowledged that the activist teachers had acquired 
their influences not only by rhetoric or strategies, but also by their extremely hard work, 
moral purpose, and authenticity.  Their lives had been ones of incessant effort (Kang & 
Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2009; Seo, 2004).  Other teachers confirmed that the two teachers had 
been tenacious, persistent, and indefatigable activists, which would be extremely difficult 
for anyone to succeed in imitating (Kang & Cho, 2010; Michels, 2001[1912]; Seo, 2004).  
However, as Fullan (2001) suggests, the good intentions of the old guard could 
have easily backfired.  Although the activist teachers did not intend to become 
domineering figures, as they became more committed and invested in change, they 
became less effective in getting others to implement (Espeland & Sauder, 2008; Fullan, 
2001).  When the activist teachers were doing all the work to exploit the openings for 
change while protecting the fragile organization in a timely manner, they inadvertently 
excluded others and ended up dominating the decision-making process (Fullan, 2001; 
(Michels, 2001 [1912]; Rothschild & Leach, 2006).  It was difficult for the old guard to 
command others and build warm trusting relationships with people at the same time (Huy, 
2001). They also demonstrated the innovator‘s tendency of being impatient and 
unyielding and unable to alter their realities of change and while being open to the others‘ 
realities (Fullan, 2001).  Mr. Han, a teacher, called the activist teachers ―front-wheel 
teachers‖ and the other teachers, including himself, ―rear-wheel teachers.‖  
―While the front wheel teachers mostly led, the other rear wheels teachers 
had to follow or to be dragged along by the front-wheels. The rear wheel 
teachers felt that they were constantly being pressured into decision 
making with which they did not always agree or that they were being held 
hostage to the front wheel teachers‘ preference. When the rear wheel 
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teachers voiced concerns, they tended to regard this as criticism or an 
attempt to diminish their importance.‖  
For this reason, these ‗rear-wheel‘ teachers wondered whether SCE was truly democratic.  
―Has SCE ever been a true democracy? I don‘t think so. SCE has never 
been a true democracy, not even once! (Mr. Woo, teacher)‖ 
 ―There is a lot of lip service and rhetoric that SCE is a democratic and 
humane school, but there are very few genuine efforts to really involve us.‖ 
(Mr. Han, teacher) 
The rear wheel teachers perceived that even when they were accepted within the SCE 
decision making process, they were required to subordinate their agenda to those of the 
activist teachers. This often meant lowering the importance of instructional development 
in favor of more visible events or governance issues. 
The rear-wheel teachers found that participating in democratic decision making 
processes that were dominated by front-wheel teachers generated ―a feeling of 
schizophrenia‖ (Mr. Yoon, teacher; see also, Polletta, 2002: 148). They experienced 
emotional labor as draining and exhausting – leading to feelings of alienation and loss of 
the self (Hargreaves & Bascia, 2000: 12). They felt that the activists‘ commitment to 
democracy was inauthentic and hypocritical (Armstrong, 2002; Brunsson, 2002; 
Christensen, 2003; Hernes, 2003). Some parents also complained about the old guard‘s 
leadership style by saying that,   
―He is a fake. He is condescending. He always double-talks.‖ 
(Anonymous Father) 
―I don‘t believe him because he is sly like a viper. He always pretends to 
try to please everybody, but I don‘t know what he is really up to beneath 
his smile.‖ (Anonymous Father)  
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One teacher even noted that the old guard‘s hard work and devotion was power-driven:  
―Do you want me to tell you one secret of gaining power at SCE? It‘s 
work! The more Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu worked, the more powerful they 
became. After many years of working at SCE, I eventually realized this. 
When there was no more work to do, Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang would 
create new work and a new agenda. Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang always 
worked late at night and created new issues one after another! This way, 
they maintained their power. However, with the two doing literally all the 
work, we had a lot of time on our hands without much to do.‖ (Mr. Han, 
teacher) 
The rear wheels found that attempting to find a place for themselves within SCE was 
difficult. As a result, Mr. Yoon, one of the founding teachers, decided to leave SCE 
altogether in 2004. Unclear decision making policies and the lack of bureaucratic safety 
nets unwittingly made it easier for the activist teachers to exercise control (Leach, 2005; 
Rothschild & Leach, 2006; Chen, 2009). This echoes Hargreaves and Fink‘s (2006) claim 
that the link between anarchy (lack of formal authority and procedures) and autocracy is a 
thin one. As this development demonstrated, participatory democratic organizations may 
succumb quickly to authoritarian ones, increasing the opportunities for arbitrary power 
(Fullan, 2001; Woods & Gronn, 2009). The rear-wheel teachers said that they 
experienced more stress from Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang and internalized pressure than they 
would have in a conventional bureaucratic school where only principals supervised their 
practices (Barker, 1993, 1999; Fullan, 2001). They cynically called SCE ―the Republic of 
teachers (the two activist teachers‘ school)!‖ Contrary to the conventional belief, this 
finding suggests that the replacement of positional leaders with teacher leaders does not 
guarantee the advent of a more democratic school (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Harris et al., 
2007).  
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Meanwhile, the old guard suffered another setback: burnout. Extremely hard 
workers though they might be, the old guard could not do everything by themselves and 
ended up leaving many things incomplete. They became moral martyrs who tried to fix 
everything themselves.  They worked to the point of exhaustion (Hargreaves & Shirley, 
2009: 74). Mr. Rhyu confirmed this by saying that while he had to convince parents and 
teachers of the values of the change endeavor, he also felt as if he rode an emotional 
rollercoaster,  
―I think SCE is a blessing and a curse at the same time for me. I think that 
I constantly oscillate between these two emotional extremes: Sometimes, I 
feel heavenly joy; other times, I feel as if I underwent infernal agony.‖ 
(Mr. Rhyu, teacher)  
Mr. Yoon, another SCE teacher, metaphorically described the leadership of the old guard 
in an article posted on the school website: 
―A defeated soccer team in which star-players showed off all their ―super 
human‖ skills and monopolized the ball all during the game, thus making 
all the other players idle spectators: much adoration and enthusiasm and 
no winning.‖ (Mr. Yoon, teacher) 
To review, pursuing integrity and effectiveness of leadership at the same time can 
be extremely difficult when it concerns ambitious change in the context of uncertainty 
and complexity (Fullan, 1998; Kraatz, 2009). As Fullan (2003) suggests, moral purpose 
may be by no means straightforward; the integrity of leadership is characteristically 
vulnerable. The old guard‘s unwittingly domineering leadership continued to surface in 
ways that delegitimized their integrity and moral purpose and thus the meaning and the 
long-term sustainability of SCE. They could not achieve moral purpose and integrity of 
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leadership without developing mutual empathy and relationships across diverse groups of 
parents and teachers, and this was no easy task (Fullan, 1998: 2).   
Fragility of collective-leadership  
Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang had complementary leadership skills. While Mr. Kang 
was a confrontational and rational leader, Mr. Rhyu was more subtle and overtly 
emotional. Their distinct approach to co-leadership was extremely helpful to initiate the 
grass-roots style SIC and stabilize the fragile young organization in the context of 
uncertainty and complexity. However, these benefits came with risks. The differences 
between the two teachers inevitably caused many disagreements. They tried to contain 
their differences because they were well aware that the internal power struggles between 
them would have been devastating and threatened the survival of SCE. However, as SCE 
became settled beyond the initiation of the change, Mr. Kang‘s space for influence 
narrowed.  While Mr. Kang‘s forceful and confrontational approach was effective in 
resisting bureaucratic authority and providing vision during the early stage, his aggressive 
style made him constantly struggle with parents, teachers, and  principals.  
Moreover, while he was a superb activist, he was incompetent in his own 
classroom. Mr. Han and Mr. Rhyu confirmed that his weak teaching skills could have 
been devastating in a small innovative school which operated like a fishbowl in which 
every activity inside the classroom was transparent to onlookers. When his assigned term 
at SCE drew to close in 2006, Mr. Kang decided to move to a neighboring school to 
spread innovation (Kang & Cho, 2010; Rhyu, 2009). Instead of settling down or being 
complacent with the partial success achieved at SCE, he pursued broader goals and 
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commitment to the common good (Tarrow, 1998; Leach, 2006) by initiating a teacher 
network, ―School Design 21‖, for pursuing further SIC.  In contrast, Mr. Rhyu was an 
excellent classroom teacher and an outstanding organizer with effective people skills 
(Fliegstein, 2001; Hallett, 2007; Spillane et al., 2003).  Mr. Han said that parents always 
wanted Mr. Rhyu to be their children‘s homeroom teacher. Mr. Rhyu could induce 
compliance and consensus even when Mr. Kang had failed.  While Mr. Kang left SCE in 
2006, Mr. Rhyu extended his term for another four years at SCE since he acquired trust 
and relational power with the principal, teachers, and parents.  They preferred Mr. Rhyu 
over Mr. Kang.  Though the two activist teachers promoted change together, constituents 
evaluated the viability of their leadership separately (Denis et al., 2001). Collective 
leadership may be susceptible to organizational rivalry (Denis et al., 1996, 2001). 
Selznick (1957) argues in his classic work on leadership that organizational rivalry is 
perhaps the most important problem in organizational life (see also Kraatz, 2009). 
Despite the apparent importance of collectiveness and collaboration, collective leadership 
is fragile (Denis et al., 2001).  
Collective leadership can be problematic due to personal factors such as distinct 
dispositions or to diverging conceptions of the relative importance of change strategies 
(Denis et al., 2001; Fullan, 2001). Collective leadership can lead to possible leadership 
turnover in a subsequent stage. Conversely, collective leadership can also become 
vulnerable to leadership succession imposed from outside or instigated by internal actors 
(Denis et al., 2001). This clearly occurred at SCE when founding Principal Lee 
announced his sudden departure in the winter of 2007.  
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Leadership succession turmoil
23
  
The issue of leadership succession was never openly discussed at SCE. It had 
been an elephant in the room in the organization with unclear goals and fluid formal 
authority (Denis et al., 1996; Hargreaves, 2005; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006). The founding 
teachers said that they avoided discussing leadership succession because they feared that 
their principal would interpret it as a threat since Principal Lee repeatedly said that he 
wanted to stay at SCE until retirement. The founding teachers and parents stayed with 
Principal Lee because they felt ―we do not see our way to find an adequate substitute for 
Principal Lee‖ (Mr. Rhyu, teacher). They were concerned that like the proverbial 
expression ―Better the known devil than the unknown Beelzebub‖ (Lipman-Blumen, 
2005), either imposed leadership succession by the school district or voluntary internal 
succession might end up only inviting an autocratic and iron-fisted principal whose 
leadership would wipe out all school innovation efforts (Hargreaves & Fink, 2005). 
Therefore, Principal Lee‘s real source of power that allowed him to significantly prolong 
his term at SCE over eight years despite his apparently weak and mediocre leadership 
skills lay in his indispensability (Michels, 2001; Hargreaves & Fink, 2005).  
Besides, the two activist teachers did not want break the fragile power equilibrium 
of collective leadership among the trio (i.e. the principal Lee, Mr. Rhyu, and Mr. Kang) 
(Denis et al., 1996, 2001; Hargreaves & Fink, 2005).  Mr. Rhyu said,   
                                                 
23
  During my fieldwork, I had a serendipitous opportunity to observe the leadership succession at 
SCE. The leadership succession provides a special opportunity to observe the leaders‘ 
interactions and its implications for power and order (See also, Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Hallett, 
2007). 
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―Considering our divergent interests, we both knew that if we had 
competed with each other for leadership it might mean that either of us 
had to leave SCE.‖  
Tensions about veiled hegemony, rivalry between the two teacher activists, and Principal 
Lee‘s insecurity culminated in turmoil concerning leadership succession in the winter of 
2007.  
In the fall of 2007, the longstanding principal Lee suddenly announced that he 
would resign from SCE and pursue a new position in another city where he was 
originally from. It was devastating news to everybody because Principal Lee had openly 
reaffirmed his intention to stay at SCE only one month before.  By coincidence, at that 
time, the Ministry of Education in South Korea announced a new pilot policy that 
allowed a teacher with over ten years of teaching experience and excellent leadership 
skills to become a principal without acquiring a principal certificate
24
.  
Mr. Kang was especially interested in this new principal policy because he 
believed that ―this policy had strong potential to break the traditional route to for 
becoming a principal for the first time in South Korea and thus dismantle the deep-rooted 
principal- centered power structure of public schools and bureaucratic schooling.‖   
In order to exploit this policy opening together with activist teachers, Mr. Kang 
had initiated a new teacher network, “School Design 21,‖ one year before in 2006 and 
had succeeded in helping several activist teachers become principals. Thus, when a new 
                                                 
24
  The open recruitment system for principals has been implemented on a trial basis since 2007 to 
employ principals who are younger and have the leadership skills necessary to meet the needs of 
individual schools and communities (Park, 2010). Under this policy, principals would be selected 
by the school council members of each pilot school and then formally appointed by the 
superintendent of the region.  
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opening suddenly occurred at SCE, it was natural for Mr. Kang to seek the opportunity.  
He argued that his proposed occupancy of the principal position was ―not just a matter of 
personal promotion but a matter of structural and political catalytic advancement that 
could cumulatively give rise to a threshold effect.‖   
However, Principal Lee opposed Mr. Kang‘s move. He said that he would only 
endorse a candidate with a principal credential. Otherwise, he said that he would veto the 
application of the new principal policy altogether. He provided two reasons underlying 
his opposition to Mr. Kang‘s application for the principalship.  For one thing, he said,  
―If I allow either Mr. Kang or Mr. Rhyu to become the principal of SCE, I 
will be further ostracized by the principal association. I saw one of my 
friends who is a principal suffer greatly after allowing this to happen at his 
school.‖  
In addition, he expressed his concern that,   
―Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu (46 and 49 years old each at that time) were still 
too young to be principal of SCE. In my opinion, they are still too 
inexperienced to be principal. Even worse, their promotion might raise 
unnecessary suspicions about their real intentions and could backfire.‖ 
(Principal Lee) 
Despite the principal‘s opposition, however, Mr. Kang nevertheless pushed ahead 
with his plan. But there was ―friendly fire.‖  A group of people was distressed about Mr. 
Kang‘s decision to apply for the principal position at SCE without gaining their support 
or going through the proper procedures. This group preferred Mr. Rhyu over Mr. Kang 
for the new principal. As a result, Mr. Rhyu was also drawn into the vortex of leadership 
succession. Even though the two teachers were determined not to compete against each 
other for power or privilege at SCE and were vigilant about the potentially devastating 
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effects of internal division between them, they were not immune to the temptation to gain 
power and control (Kets de Vries, 1991; Selznick, 1957). 
 It was an irony that the ―hands-off‖ or ―robot‖ principal‘s departure had such an 
impact on the SCE community. After going through this painful event, Mr. Han, a teacher, 
told me that he realized the reality surrounding SCE‘s leadership, 
―In hindsight, I realized that Principal Lee might have been hiding 
Excalibur and drew it at the critical moment of leadership succession 
because he had all of us fooled and got what he wanted at last. Most of all, 
he could stay at SCE as principal for eight years, which should have been 
quite unlikely considering his rather mediocre leadership skills (Mr. Han, 
teacher)  
As the succession process reached an impasse, the activist teachers and other 
teachers picked an unexpected third-person who had previously been assistant principal 
at SCE. This analysis suggests that the succession crisis was not just about succession 
(Hargreaves et al., 2010). Leadership had been a recurring issue and the turmoil 
surrounding succession was indeed a symptom of a larger and more systemic issue: the 
ambiguous structures of authority, goals, and less clarified means to achieve the goals 
(Denis et al., 1996; Hargreaves et al., 2010; Huerta, 2002). The succession crisis revealed 
the fragility of collective leadership and internal contradictions surrounding participatory 
governance without clear routines and procedures.   
However, the succession crisis was not fatal.  While it caused painful cognitive 
and emotional dissonance, it also opened up opportunities for mindful reflection and 
candid dialogue that led to a search for solutions to the problem that were a catalyst for 
new change (Barker, 2006; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006, 2009; Hargreaves & Fink, 
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2006; Seo & Creed, 2002). More specifically, this paved the way for the rise of the ―new 
guard‖ who had been silenced under the leadership of the old guard.   
Relay succession planning  
In the aftermath of the succession crisis, the old guard was gradually losing 
ground since their representation for unadulterated altruism had been shaken. However, 
Mr. .Rhyu persisted in the face of this setback. His resilience and strong sense of purpose 
helped him get beyond the setbacks by redefining them as challenges to be overcome 
(Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009).  In retrospect, Mr. Woo noted that ―Mr. Rhyu was once 
SCE‘s most valuable asset, but now he became SCE‘s liability.‖  SCE‘s faculty members 
became increasingly aware that the old guard‘s reluctance to make alterations to their 
original change ideas was one of the biggest obstacles for SCE‘s further development 
(Collins, 2003; Miller, 1991).  Mr. Rhyu became more sensitive to the possibility that the 
original vision of change was not entirely correct and that he needed to be more open to 
the ideas of the other teachers that were necessary for implementing change effectively 
(Fullan, 2001). For example, although Mr. Rhyu had been somewhat dismissive of the 
insistence of some teachers (Mr. Yoon and Mr. Han in particular) on prioritizing the 
development of a new curriculum and new instructional guidelines, after the succession 
crisis, he became more appreciative of their ideas.  
In early 2009, after experiencing the problem of lack of succession planning, Mr. 
Rhyu began discussing succession planning openly with other teachers. He suggested two 
options for the succession planning. The first was for him to leave SCE in March in 2009 
by handing over his position lead teacher to Mr. Yoon, who was one of SCE‘s founding 
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staff members but had to leave SCE due to conflicting interests with the old guard. The 
second option was to implement a ―relay succession‖, where the incumbent leader 
worked with the successor to pass the baton to him. Mr. Rhyu and other teachers agreed 
to turn to its founding teacher, Mr. Yoon, who had much experience and knowledge in 
curriculum development to keep SCE on track and pursue further improvement (Huerta, 
2002).  
Thus, the incumbent teacher leader, Mr. Rhyu, and his successor, Mr. Yoon, 
planned to work together for one year from 2009 to 2010 until Mr. Rhyu was 
unexpectedly recruited to serve as a senior advisor to the newly elected superintendent of 
the region in May 2009. Mr. Rhyu‘s decision to engage his colleagues in these candid 
debates during the crisis helped them overcome the negative outcomes that resulted from 
the leadership succession and helped him maintain credibility (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; 
Huy, 2001), as well as plant seeds for further change.  In the ensuing process, SCE‘s 
change emphasis shifted gradually from the old guard‘s change strategy of symbolic 
governance to the new guard‘s way of more substantive instructional development. 
However, to constitute a credible alternative, these contending actors, the new guard, had 
to accumulate power, experience, and other capacities (Farjoun, 2001). 
The old guard’s departure 
In 2009, Mr. Rhyu was suddenly hired as a key senior advisor to the newly 
elected progressive superintendent. This was consistent with Hargreaves‘ (2005) finding 
that ―successful leaders are lifted suddenly and prematurely out of the saddle of the 
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school they are improving in order to mount a rescue act in a school system facing crisis 
or challenge elsewhere (p. 70).‖  
The newly elected superintendent, Sang-Gon Kim, was the first elected non-
traditional superintendent in charge of education of a region in South Korea. He had been 
a university professor in management and had been involved in the civil rights movement 
and the human rights movement for more than twenty years. He also was the founding 
president of the first Korean Union for university professors. During his election 
campaign, he told the voters that he would pursue policies emphasizing freedom, 
creativity, and autonomy in opposition to test-driven standardization and market-oriented 
neoliberal educational reform under the slogan of ―the Anti-MB25 education.‖ After 
winning a sweeping victory, he began to implement these confrontational policies. When 
it came to school policies, he was deeply inspired by SCE‘s innovation and its success 
and decided to adopt SCE‘s model and spread it to the regional schools.  
Certainly, the progressive superintendent‘s polices continued to face resistance 
from the government. He and the MB government have engaged in continuous conflicts. 
In accordance with Rojas (2007), Gyeonggi province and the progressive superintendent 
could be viewed as a ―counter-centers‖ or ―activist governments‖ (Hargreaves & Shirley, 
                                                 
25 “MB‖ is the acronym of the incumbent president Lee Myeong-Bak who was a former CEO of 
Hyundai Construction. He was a legendary self-made and steadfast businessman (his nickname 
was ―bulldozer‖) who made it to the apex of success from an extremely poor background. Amidst 
the economic crisis in South Korea and the world in 2008, he was elected president by promising 
that he would rescue this country in crisis. As his career and nickname hinted, he is a market 
fundamentalist who believes in competition, choice, and testing. With regard to education, once 
he assumed office, he relentlessly enforced many controversial neoliberal educational polices, 
such as parent evaluations of teachers, standardized testing for all students and making the results 
open to the public, and privately-funded high schools, which had been held back by the resistance 
of  progressive educators and parents.   
  
130 
 
2009), within the bureaucratic educational system. Under challenging circumstances and 
in response to new political openings, Mr. Rhyu said that he rescued the new progressive 
superintendent who lacked insider knowledge and embedded experience about public 
schooling as a leader.  Mr. Rhyu was able to seize this opportunity thanks to his 
preparedness and temporal intelligence.  Mr. Rhyu represented his departure as ―altruistic‖ 
by rhetorically claiming that he ―would be willing to die like a brave soldier in a new 
battleground.‖  In addition, with the support of Mr. Rhyu, Mr. Kang persistently aimed to 
spread SCE‘s innovation to other schools and settings (such as urban mainstream schools 
and medium to large size schools) and was invited to become principal in an 
experimental school at a large school designated by the new superintendent of Gyeonggi 
province.  They claimed that by occupying these positions, they could infiltrate the 
bureaucratic system by exercising discretion and exploiting the room to maneuver. In 
other words, they claimed that, they would seek to promote ―bottom-up reforms, albeit 
paradoxically, from the top‖ (Rojas, 2007; Falletti, 2009).  
However, the members of SCE had bittersweet feelings about the departures of 
their leaders and their assumption of new positions of power. On the one hand, many 
members believed that the old guard‘s promotion was indeed an appropriate response to a 
successful innovation. They anticipated that the old guard‘s elevated positions within the 
system would make it easier to make the bureaucratic system more permeable and easier 
to adapt to SCE‘s innovation. They regarded their advancement as a part of an ongoing 
activism that reflected activists‘ dispositions that seldom settle on any one movement or 
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organization and instead frequently move from one venue to another to bring about 
broader influence (Tarrow, 1998; Leach, 2006; Meyer & Kretschmer, 2007).  
On the other hand, other members became disillusioned with the old guard. They 
viewed their positions of power within the mainstream bureaucratic system as self-
serving choices dressed in activism. They viewed the old guard as leaders who were more 
interested in their careers and glories in their achievement and were always seeking to get 
ahead.  George (2007) describes the characteristics of the shooting star leaders as,  
―Shooting stars move up so rapidly in their careers that they never have 
time to learn from their mistakes. A year or two into any job, they are 
ready to move on, before they have had to confront the results of their 
decisions. When they see problems of their making coming back to haunt 
them, their anxiety rises and so does the urgency to move to a new 
position. If their employer doesn‘t promote them, they are off to another 
organization. One day they find themselves at the top, overwhelmed by an 
intractable set of problems. At this point, they are prone to impulsive or 
even irrational decisions, and have no grounding in their lives that enables 
them to cope in a rational manner. Eventually, shooting stars flame out (p. 
8).‖  
Even one of the closest teachers of Mr. Rhyu, Mr. Woo, was frustrated by Mr. Rhyu‘s 
sudden departure to the regional office to assume a prestigious position. Mr. Woo said 
with disappointment that,  
―I thought at least Mr. Rhyu would be different from many other senior 
activists who eventually succumb to the temptation of power. But, I think 
that he also followed their footsteps.‖   
To review, leaders in a process of change that is fraught with complexities, 
uncertainty, and limitations may face apparently irreconcilable dilemmas and 
contradictions in terms of countervailing pressures for organizational implementation and 
moral purpose. Leader as change agents cope with these tasks differently and with 
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varying degrees of grace and effectiveness (Kraatz, 2009). It is generally difficult for 
change agents to be commanding and build warm trusting relationships with people at the 
same time (Huy, 2000).   
Despite these challenges, the strength of the old guard was their resilience.  They 
remained optimistic and persistent (Huy & Mintzberg, 2003: 7). The old guard was able 
to improve their temporal capabilities by broadening and deepening their understanding 
of distinct change (SIC), conceptions of timing, and the organization's rhythm under 
stability and change; by mindfully incorporating plural interests and goals into their 
change practice; and by developing self-confidence in living and acting in a world of 
paradoxes. Indeed, organizing and changing inherently require the juxtaposition of 
contradictions (Lewis, 2000).  
Maintaining relationships with the school district  
Although addressing the internal contradictions and tensions presented daunting 
obstacles, SCE had to address the challenge of maintaining a working relationship with 
the school district over time. Even though the founding members viewed the sponsoring 
school district as hierarchical and authoritarian, SCE had to conform to the school 
district‘s bureaucratic procedures and policies to secure necessary resources and 
legitimacy and avoid unnecessary demands and conflicts (Chen & O‘Mahony, 2009; 
Cuban et al., 2010; Selznick, 1949). The founding members were willing to conform to 
the school district as long as this did not compromise the integrity of their innovation.  
However, dependence on the school district for vital resources could have made 
SCE vulnerable to a range of institutional pressures and demands. The old guard was 
  
133 
 
aware that the more bureaucratically dependent an organization was, the more likely it 
was to succumb to institutional isomorphic pressures by adopting conventional practices 
that would dilute their mission (Chen & O‘Mahony, 2007; Fink, 1999, 2001; Hargreaves 
& Goodson, 2006; Huerta, 2002, 2009a, 2009b; Selznick, 1949, 1957; Tyack & Cuban, 
1994).  The old guard tried to define a proper boundary in its relationship with the school 
district.  
Mr. Rhyu: Do you know what issue I have been struggling with recently? 
Researcher (Paul Chung; PC afterwards):  No. What is that?  
Mr. Rhyu: Maintaining a proper balance between SCE and the sponsoring 
school district. Have you heard of Han Min-Bok‘s poem, ―Flowers bloom 
on every border?‖26  
PC: No. But, the title sounds very revealing! 
Mr. Rhyu: Absolutely. This poem captures the issue that I have been 
captivated with for a long time! In recent years, I have been trying to 
maintain the proper distance from the school district so that our school can 
preserve its integrity and distinct innovation from conventional schooling 
while meeting the school district‘s demands. If the boundaries between 
our school and the school district are not adequately maintained, SCE will 
either be co-opted by the school district or risk becoming alienated or 
repressed by the school district. It‘s all about maintaining boundaries! 
Mr. Rhyu claimed that only by reinforcing boundaries rather than merging or collapsing 
them, could SCE make the borders between the school and the district more permeable 
and easier to infiltrate (O‘Mahony & Bechkey, 2008) 27.  Yet, establishing boundaries 
                                                 
26
 Han Min-Bok(2001). ―Flowers bloom on every border (모든 경계에는 꽃이 핀다: Mo-Deun 
Gyeong-Gye-E-Nun KKot-i Pin-Da‖).   
27
  Seo (2003) reported that SCE was viewed as a political ―hot potato school‖ by the sponsoring 
school district bureaucrats because ―it was too radical an innovation to swallow; but too wasteful 
to discard it all together. In fact, it is difficult to determine who co-opts whom. In other words, it 
is never easy to judge the extent to which the school district bureaucrats or the activist teachers 
recognized the ongoing process of infiltration and either tried to exploit or cared to accommodate 
each other (Falletti, 2009). However, scholars increasingly argue that the assumptions that draw a 
sharp dichotomy between the interests of challenging and defending parties, and that these 
interests are presumed to be fixed, should be reconsidered (O‘Mahony & Bechky, 2008). 
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required constant and contingent acts of definition.  During the initial stage, SCE‘s 
change occurred at the territorial and functional periphery of the school system in which 
activist teachers could operate under the radar of the bureaucratic system, where their 
innovations did not pose a serious threat (Rao et al, 2000; Chen, 2009; Falletti, 2009). 
However, as SCE‘s innovation grew more visible and gained in reputation, the challenge 
of maintaining the proper boundary between the two became more complicated. SCE 
could not remain in its insulated space any longer. Rather, it faced pressures to adopt 
conventional forms and practices (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Some of these pressures 
were coercive in the sense that the school district attempted to enforce institutional norms 
and practices by using its sovereign power and control of resources (Levy & Scully, 
2007).  Some of the pressures were seductive in that conforming to convention allowed 
SCE to acquire needed legitimacy and resources (Sauder, 2008).  
One way to navigate the coercive challenge was to pursue autonomy at the 
expense of resources. This pursuit of autonomy proved costly, leaving SCE with few 
district funds. One telling episode involved recruiting a school librarian. In 2005, the 
school district informed SCE that it could not place a librarian at SCE because of budget 
cuts even though other neighboring schools still kept their librarians. SCE‘s founding 
members perceived this to be unfair.  Instead of negotiating with the school district for 
regaining funds for the placement of a librarian, the founding teachers and parents opted 
                                                                                                                                                 
Similarly, Clemens (1997) argues "... [political processes] with multiple challengers, diverse 
tactics, and poorly understood links between action and outcomes (p. 13)," create difficulties for 
answering the question of who ultimately co-opts whom. 
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to chip in $10 to $1,000 each to maintain their librarian. This way, SCE could have their 
librarian for two consecutive years. This demonstrated SCEs collective power to the 
district and provided SCE with short-term financial stability and a feeling of 
accomplishment, but at the cost of long-term solvency (Huerta, 2002).  
SCE also needed to resist more subtle pressures. In 2004, as SCE gained wide 
media attention as one of South Korea‘s most successful public school change models, 
the school district was motivated to use the emerging innovative school for its own 
benefit, giving SCE some leverage. The school district offered SCE magnet school status 
with which it could secure leadership stability, discretionary staffing, and financial and 
material resources. It was very tempting for SCE to accept this offer. After a long 
discussion, the founding teachers decided to decline the district‘s offer. Mr. Rhyu 
recalled that,   
―We had to decline the district offer because any concession like this 
would leave SCE more vulnerable to subsequent disputes and compromise 
its hard-earned accomplishments.‖ 
In sum, SCE constantly walked a political tightrope in dealing with the 
relationship with the school district. SCE had to pursue its goal of changing schools from 
within while meeting the school district‘s demands. Otherwise, SCE was subject to the 
risk of becoming marginalized or domesticated and co-opted by the school district 
(McLaughlin, 2008; Sawyers and Meyer, 1999; Taylor, 2007). While this symbolic 
strategy of maintaining the relationship with the school district helped SCE to disguise its 
intended second-order change by making it appear less threatening than first-order 
change (Fullan, 2001), the ambiguity and confusion that surrounded the symbolic 
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practices developed into a more complicated political issue later on (Fullan, 2001; 
Hargreaves et al, 2001; Oakes & Lipton, 2002).   
Advancing legitimacy through visibility  
In the beginning, the activist teachers and founding parents modestly wanted a 
democratic and caring school where children‘s individual needs were respected and 
where parents and teachers felt empowered to assume active roles in running the school. 
They were not far-sighted enough to think of advancing a lighthouse innovative school 
model and change guidelines (Armstrong, 2002; Fullan, 2001; Huerta, 2002; Huy & 
Mintzberg, 2003; Pierson, 2004). Indeed, just running the school day to day was a 
daunting challenge; they were uncertain how long their school innovation project would 
stay afloat.  
In this context of uncertainty, the old guard initially sought to gain media 
coverage because they reasoned that they could attract new members and a ―protective 
shell‖ (Huerta, 2002: 149) that would ward off the school district‘s possible interruption 
to SCE‘s innovative schooling practices (Chen, 2009; Glynn & Lounsbury, 2005; 
Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Raeburn, 2004). They wanted to 
gain legitimacy for their change through media. Regarding this, Mr. Kang said ―we 
pursued publicity in order to establish our innovation rather than merely survive on a 
daily basis‖ (Mr. Kang, teacher). Even though SCE was increasingly granted legitimacy 
by the sponsoring district by being given the award for being the most innovative school 
in the district multiple times, this was perceived as insufficient by and even a source of 
disgrace to the teachers. As Mr. Han said that  
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―This kind of event is a waste of time and energy! Even if we won this 
contest by chance, it was a shame rather than an honor for a school like 
SCE!‖  
The founding teachers were skeptical about the value of gaining legitimacy from a 
district which they regarded as flawed (Suchman, 1995; Armstrong, 2002). Mr. Rhyu was 
adept at exploiting the media. He was a seasoned ―media-savvy‖ activist who recognized 
the political importance of the mass media (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Deephouse, 2000; 
Raeburn, 2004; King and Soule 2008; King, 2009; Rodgers, 2009). When he was 
involved in the education movement, he had become acquainted with many reporters and 
journalists of the politically left press by using his social skills. He worked with them to 
present prominent and positive coverage of educational movements on many occasions. 
Using his years of experience and knowledge, he pursued the media to boost SCE‘s 
reputation and secure free advertising.  As a result, the leading political Left newspaper, 
Han-Gye-Rae newspaper (한겨레 신문: One and the same people’s newspaper) 
introduced SCE‘s innovation with a cover story in its education section in 2004. In this 
article, the newspaper represented SCE‘s innovation as a ―miraculous success‖ within the 
ailing South Korean public education system, and detailed the concerted efforts of the 
founding teachers and parents of SCE in making this school innovation possible against 
all odds (The Small School Network, 2009). This media appearance caught the eye of 
other mainstream media outlets including political left and right media.  In the context of 
a public school crisis characterized by pervasive expressions of ―school collapse‖ and 
―classroom crisis‖ in Korean educational discourse at that time (Kim, 2004), major 
newspapers and television networks suddenly began focusing on SCE‘s innovation - 
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creating ripple effects that resulted in further visibility (Suchman, 1995; Raeburn, 2004)
28
 
and the possibility of achieving more ambitious change. SCE became a ―beacon‖ for 
educators and parents who sought alternatives to Korea‘s bureaucratic public schools 
(Kang & Cho, 2010; Raeburn, 2004; Rhyu, 2009)
 29
.  
The visibility allowed SCE to gain legitimacy, reputation, stability in student 
enrollment, and a more favorable bargaining position with the school district. The media 
appearance also provided the teachers and parents involved with evidence of the 
significance of their change, with early rewards, and with much-needed energy for 
sustaining change over time beyond the initiation stage (Huy, 2001; Reay et al., 2006). 
 However, the media coverage that provided SCE with durability and visibility 
ironically brought about potential risks and introduced new challenges to SCE‘s 
development (Corbett & Wilson, 1990). A growing number of parents made pilgrimages 
to SCE every day and willingly waited over a year for a chance to enroll their children in 
SCE. Whenever SCE appeared in the media, the school‘s daily business was interrupted 
due to incessant inquiries from visitors in person and by telephone.  The media limelight 
attracted too many parents who were unfamiliar with SCE‘s philosophy. The founding 
members were concerned that such a sudden influx of newcomers who were unprepared 
for SCE‘s participatory innovations would dilute SCE‘s community-building efforts and 
                                                 
28
 Suchman (1995) notes that organizations sometimes gain legitimacy by manipulating and 
challenging, rather than conforming to, existing institutions. 
29
 According to the KINDS (Korean Information Network Database System: 
http://www.kinds.or.kr), from 2004-2010, SCE appeared in local and national newspapers at least 
153 times.  
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hard-earned innovation and dampen the members‘ commitment. More pragmatically, 
housing values skyrocketed and the small school was deluged with students
30
.  Members 
therefore started to reject many media requests to report about SCE.  
Some parents and teachers criticized Mr. Rhyu for manipulating the perception of 
SCE. They argued that Mr. Rhyu presented an exaggerated image of SCE that was 
saturated with positive and normative values and covered up many problems (Christensen, 
2003; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 
1995). In light of this, some teachers said that ―SCE‘s innovation is all about fantasy!‖ 
(Mr. Yoon); ―SCE is a bubble and a mirage‖ (Mr. Woo); and ―some of SCE‘s programs 
are the height of hypocrisy!‖ (Mr. Han)31.  In reaction to these criticisms, Mr. Rhyu, as a 
seasoned media-savvy activist, elaborated his distinctive view of the media as a key 
vehicle for constructing symbols and transmitting them to the masses.   
―The media is meant to be sensational. The media is a more suitable 
instrument for setting off a detonator than for delivering the truth. If we 
expect the media to deliver truths as they really are, it‘s too much; the 
media simply can‘t do that! How could a one page article or a two minute 
news clip convey the complicated truth to us in the living room? Instead, 
once media alert otherwise disinterested people to both the urgent 
problems and possibility of change, then it‘s time for us to take action! 
Purist teachers and idealist parents don‘t understand media mechanisms. 
They are preoccupied with the match between symbols and actions and 
                                                 
30
 The student enrollment increased from 110 in 2002 to 157 in 2008. In addition, the deposit for 
the lease of a poorly equipped two-bed room apartment increased almost two hundred percent 
from 50,000,000 won (approximately $50,000) to 100,000,000 won (approximately $100,000). 
Considering that the average deposit to lease a decent two -bed room in nearby cities was 
approximately 100,000,000 won (around $100,000), the price was unreasonably expensive.  
31
 While the old guards knew the power of symbolism, the other teachers (the new guard) tended 
to ignore the power of symbolism.  
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how to turn symbols into practices, which are good, I acknowledge, but 
their approach is too naïve to understand the tricky business of 
maintaining balance between symbols and practices in the real world‖  
(Mr. Rhyu, teacher) 
Mr. Rhyu‘s distinctive perspective regarding the media and the tension this created 
between him and other teachers echoed Christensen‘s (2003) analysis of the role of 
symbols in innovation: 
―Innovators may be seen as having ambiguous plans and as trying to 
compensate for this by using symbols. They may be accused of promising 
more action and implementation than they can deliver or they may 
encounter problems with subordinates who cannot distinguish between 
talk and action and take the symbols as their face value.‖ (p. 8)  
Overall, while the use of symbols did have the potential to arouse enthusiasm and provide 
legitimacy and  support for SCE‘s innovation (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1995; Zilber, 2009), over time this could have generated anxiety, conflicts, and 
subsequent contradictions (Contu, 2008; Fotaki, 2009; Hargreaves, 1994). A wide gap 
between symbols and the practices could have led SCE to paralysis.  The overselling of 
SCE‘s outer-shell (or ―protective shell‖ (Huerta, 2002)) to the external world while 
SCE‘s inner-core was decoupled from it laid too much burden on the shoulder of SCE‘s 
founding members, resulting in compartmentalization of their lives and further 
jeopardizing the stability of SCE (Armstrong, 2002; Farjoun, 2002; Huerta, 2002; Seo & 
Creed, 2002)
32
.  Furthermore, it was unlikely that this symbolic approach in which 
appearance was everything and substance was nothing could uphold strict decoupling 
                                                 
32
 Mr. Rhyu once cynically and penetratingly confessed that ―Sometimes I felt that all my effort 
to change SCE was much like masturbating. If I viewed SCE as a substantive gain or solid 
success, it‘s an either simply a misunderstanding or a  ―delusion of grandeur.‖ This resonated 
with the self-indulgent nature of SCE‘s innovation (Kets De Vries, 2005; Kraatz, 2009).   
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between symbols and practices over an extended period time (Hernes, 2005; Hirsch & 
Bermiss, 2009; Tilcsik, 2010; Maclean, 2010). 
Theorizing change: success beyond expectation?  
In this section, I examine the way in which the old guard conceptualized its 
change and linked it to a broader change initiative. In the initiation stage, the founding 
teachers and parents modestly wanted a democratic and caring school where children‘s 
individual needs were respected and they felt empowered to assume active roles in 
running the school. They neither wanted to advance a lighthouse innovative school model 
and change guidelines nor did they aspire to be interpreted as doing such (Armstrong, 
2002; Fullan, 2001; Huerta, 2002; Huy & Mintzberg, 2003; Pierson, 2004). Indeed, the 
day-to-day running of the school was a daunting challenge at the beginning. They were 
uncertain how long their school innovation project would stay afloat, and were not 
particularly interested in promoting an innovative school model. However, with the 
concerted efforts of the founding members, SCE survived many challenges and 
metamorphosed into a very successful innovative school model that received a lot of 
attention from newspapers and television. Many media represented SCE‘s innovation as 
an ―almost miraculous success‖ within the South Korean public education system (The 
Small School Network, 2009).  
SCE‘s successful innovation was particularly inspiring for those teachers and 
parents who had worked hard to transform their own schools only to see their efforts fail. 
One activist teacher who benchmarked SCE‘s innovation to improve his own school said  
―when I heard the story of SCE‘s innovation, it was so exciting that my spine tingled!‖ It 
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is no wonder that the innovation spread to small schools in rural areas that had faced 
similar situations. In 2004, nine of these schools dispersed all around the nation launched 
a  network (―the Small School Solidarity‖) to share knowledge and experiences and 
enhance their chances of survival by working together (Kang & Cho, 2010; The Small 
School Network, 2009). This network gradually grew into a bigger network of schools 
including more than forty urban schools and two hundred individual educators seeking to 
learn the alternative school change model and apply it to their own schools. SCE‘s 
innovation ―opened the gate‖ (Tarrow, 1991, p. 180) for other schools to initiate their 
own innovations by setting a precedent that demonstrated the legitimacy of innovation 
and by signaling the potential vulnerability of school districts to this kind of challenge 
(Falletti, 2009; McAdam, 1995; Minkoff, 1997; Raeburn, 2004; Tarrow, 1998). In 
institutional terms, a school change that breaks ground in one organization can spread 
across an organizational field as other similar organizations feel pressure to imitate the 
changes that the original organization adopted (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Raeburn 
2004). SCE‘s case shows that a local change that occurs within a school system due to 
the persistence of the activist teachers can eventually spread to a large number of schools 
through processes of isomorphism.  
As the old guard recognized the potential of SCE‘s change for a broader and 
system-wide change, and given the internal contradictions that existed even at the height 
of the school‘s acceptance (Onoma, 2010), they became more committed to the symbolic 
approach to advance their change to a wider audience while containing the contradictions. 
The original goal of SCE‘s change substantially shifted from innovation of a single 
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school to an innovative effort to change whole systems (Fullan, 2001; Selznick, 1949; 
Zbaracki, 1998; Zilber, 2002). This was consistent with Fullan‘s (2001) finding that 
―successful implementation consists of some transformation or continual development of 
initial ideas‖ (p. 105). In order for the change to become more widely adopted, the old 
guard sought to theorize the change. According to Greenwood et al., (2002),  
―Theorization is the development and specification of abstract categories 
and the elaboration of chains of cause and effect. Such theoretical 
accounts simplify and distill the properties of new practices and explain 
the outcomes they produce. In effect, theorization is the process whereby 
localized deviations from prevailing conventions become abstracted 
(Abbott, 1988) and thus made available in simplified form for wider 
adoption (p. 60)‖. 
The old guard re-conceptualized SCE‘s innovation as ―symbolic innovation‖ by 
emphasizing the constitutive power of symbols (Armstrong, 2002; Armstrong & 
Bernstein, 2008; Campbell, 2004; Espeland & Sauder, 2009).  As Mr. Rhyu noted: 
―I‘m doing kind of a cultural (symbolic) movement here. By changing the 
culture of school, I believe that we can transform the bureaucratic and test-
driven practices of schools even when the structures and arrangements of 
the schools remain intact. What SCE‘s change has demonstrated is the 
message that it is possible to transform schools this way… Although SCE 
may not yet be perfect, it is still meaningful and valuable because SCE 
became a powerful symbol of the possibility of change.‖  
This symbolic strategy was based on the old guard‘s belief that it would ultimately induce 
substantive change in the long run (Campbell, 2004; Fullan, 2001; North, 1990). In this 
way, the old guard justified SCE‘s limited substantive change as a symbolic innovation. 
As SCE matured, Mr. Rhyu became more inclined to use the power of symbols
33
.  He 
                                                 
33
 Invoking the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda who explained that a metaphor is the best vehicle to 
seduce a woman, Mr. Rhyu said that he always longed for a metaphor of his own that could 
epitomize his life and activism in a succinct way.  
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wove meaning into what SCE needed to get by.  He understood the role of symbols in the 
affective and relational domains and used them to sustain SCE and neutralize resistance. 
He interpreted the relationship between symbols and actions in a complementary way; 
transcending conventional standards of consistency between what is said and what is 
done (Brunsson, 2002; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1995).  By using the proverbial words 
―little drops of water make the mighty ocean‖ the old guard added a time dimension to 
create more tolerance for the inconsistencies between symbols and practices (Kraatz, 
2009) and to generate faith that symbols would turn into corresponding practices over 
time (Brunsson, 2002; Hallett, 2010).   
However, this emphasis on the symbolic value of SCE‘s change inadvertently 
supplanted its technical value (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). As institutional theorists, 
notably Selznick (1957), argue, this process may become the process of (symbolic) 
institutionalization whereby a practice or change becomes institutionalized or ―infused 
with value beyond its technical requirements of the task at hand‖ (p. 17).  If and when the 
visions and goals promoted by symbolic activities are not met with corresponding actions 
and substantive practices, this may delegitimize the credibility of the change agents and 
of the change (Campbell, 2004; Denis et al., 2001; Kraatz, 2009; North, 1990; Selznick, 
1945, 1957; Tilcsik, 2010; Zbaracki, 1998). However, the more profound problem of 
symbolic change is not that symbolic innovation may be manipulative, because the 
people involved are quick to see through such manipulation or contrivances (Hargreaves, 
1994: 90). Rather, symbolic change may become a taken-for-granted way of doing things 
possessing its own self-sustaining importance and legitimacy over time (DiMaggio & 
  
145 
 
Powell, 1991; Hargreaves, 1994; Hallett, 2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zbaracki, 1998). 
Not much is known about how innovation evolves from a clear technical intervention into 
a mere symbol of change (Fullan, 2001; Hargreaves, 1994). Treating symbolic change as 
a process, rather than an outcome, and exploring how it unfolds over time might help 
change agents make more informed decisions about how much inconsistency between 
symbolic goals and substantive practices they should encourage and tolerate. 
Lack of instructional innovation and cohesive curriculum development  
Like many other change initiatives, the SCE case highlights disparities between 
espoused symbolic change and enacted practices of implementation.  This section 
addresses the phenomenon of a lag between organizational innovation and instructional 
development. The foundational assumption of SCE‘s participatory democratic innovation 
was that if teachers, parents, and students were empowered with the ability to  run a 
school in their own way, instructional needs would be better met and all other issues 
would fall into place without specifically geared efforts on instructional innovation 
(Huerta, 2002). As long as parents were convinced that the old guard had personal 
credibility and professional knowledge, they were content to leave decisions about 
instructional development up to them while they, as parents, focused their efforts more on 
other school issues such as school events, maintaining facilities, and parent-teacher 
workshops (Meyer & Rowan, 1983). Because of this underlying belief, the old guard was 
rarely confronted by parents about instructional issues.  
However, after almost eight years since the founding SCE had not yet focused on 
instructional development and a cohesive new curriculum since the founders had 
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continuously struggled to sustain the fragile participatory organization.  This situation 
created a lingering sense of distress about the lag between organizational and 
instructional progress. Mr. Park, a teacher, said,  
―One day a colleague teacher in a nearby school told me that even though 
he was deeply impressed by the innovative decision making processes and 
parent-teacher relationships, he was frustrated with SCE‘s lack of progress 
in pedagogical areas. To be frank, I didn‘t have much to say to my 
colleague. Indeed, I think that the lack of pedagogical innovation was 
SCE‘s Achilles‘ heel.‖ 
This sentiment was ubiquitous and a source of recurring distress among the parents and 
teachers, especially from 2008 onwards. However, from the inception, the motivation that 
spurred SCE‘s change was not to advance instructional innovation or develop a new 
curriculum.  Rather, it arose as a reaction to what it did not want to be. The founding 
teachers and parents wanted a school that would realize their espoused values of familial 
and caring community, celebrate parent participation, and cultivate democratic education. 
Furthermore, under the highly standardized national curriculum in South Korea, there 
was not much room for instructional innovation in the first place. As a consequence, the 
founding teachers creatively added new layers of innovative practices in ―after-school 
curriculum activities, or sheltered time for creativity or interdisciplinary studies within an 
otherwise standardized environment‖ (Hargreaves, 2009: 97).  
This strategy can be seen as what Thelen and Mahoney call institutional layering 
that can eventually lead to consequential change such as more flexible conditions of 
teaching, learning and leadership even in an era of test-driven reform (Hargreaves, 2009: 
97).  However, the efforts for creative instructional progress were gradually superseded 
by the more pressing organizational governance agenda in the form of parent 
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participation, empowerment, and democratic community (Fullan, 2001).  This emphasis 
on organizational governance by the old guard was rooted in their ideology of teacher 
activism and educational movements (Oakes et al., 1998; Oakes & Lipton, 2003; Sachs, 
2001). They justified their efforts by saying that too much focus on instructional change 
might sidetrack the more pressing issues of sustaining the fragile organization in terms of 
organizational structures and governance.  
Instructional innovation required specialized skills and knowledge in which the 
old guard was not particularly strong.  They were superb activists, but not well equipped 
with instructional skills.  As the old guard became more committed to innovation in 
governance, they inadvertently paid insufficient attention to pedagogical innovation. 
Moreover, the activist teachers could not do all things at once.  When they voluntarily 
undertook administrative tasks that were normally carried out by principals to enhance 
empowerment and democratization, their energy for the classroom and pedagogical 
innovation was easily drained (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006). They had to run the school and 
lead the school community while teaching their classes like other teachers. In addition, in 
reality, parents never participated to the extent the founding members idealistically 
anticipated, further increasing the teachers‘ administrative burdens.  Mr. Rhyu said,  
―I am deeply satisfied with what I am doing here at SCE. But I don‘t think 
the configuration of SCE in which teachers carry out dual task of 
managing the school and teaching children simultaneously is normal or 
desirable. Do you know what kind of a school I really desire?  I really 
want work at a school in which I can only devote myself wholeheartedly 
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to my class and my children without worrying about administrative 
issues
34.‖ (Quote from Lee, 2007: 18) 
SCE‘s vision of ―a small and beautiful school that cultivated authentic learning 
and genuine life‖ was too vague as a direction for developing instructional programs. 
Without cohesive and coherent guidelines of what this vision meant, even though the 
founding teachers worked on improving pedagogical practices, their efforts were easily 
dissipated and misdirected (Chen, 2009; Fullan, 2001; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006).  As a 
consequence, these founding teachers engaged in endless discussions about what 
authentic and genuine pedagogical practices looked like and what they were supposed to 
do to achieve the goals, without producing much in the way of tangible outcomes or 
visible progress (Polletta, 2002, 2005). Furthermore, as its symbolic form of innovation 
gained widespread currency among reform-minded teachers, parents, and policy-makers, 
there was no specific external pressure for concrete instructional development.   
As the symbolic form of SCE‘s change became taken-for-granted, the founders 
were less likely to attend to further development, including instructional development 
(Green et al., 2009).  While this delayed the development of tangible change and 
implementation, the change agents could also focus on broader issue such as system level 
change.  Over time, symbolic change can ironically enacted substantive change: the focus 
of chapter six (Denis et al., 1996; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006, 2009; Onoma, 2010; 
Seo et al., 2004; Zbaracki, 1998).  
                                                 
34
 Burnout is particularly problematic for startup and innovative organizations in which actors 
may overwork to compensate for insufficient resources and underdeveloped procedures (Barker, 
1999; Chen, 2009) 
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Conclusion 
To discover how SCE sustained its innovation over time requires examining what 
happened during the initial stages as well as when SCE‘s stabilized. This section took a 
step in this direction. Findings from this chapter demonstrated that SCE both maintained 
its original mission and sustained its change by actively enhancing and skillfully 
coordinating participation, exercising resilient leadership with moral purpose, navigating 
tricky relations between SCE and the district office, and theorizing and amplifying 
change into a broader organizational field through networking and media.  
However, despite the good intentions to run the school with the principles of 
participatory democracy and non-hierarchical decision-making, SCE was not immune to 
the well-known pathologies of underorganizing characterized by masked hegemony, 
tyrannical pressure for group conformity, panoptic surveillance, arbitrary rules and 
procedures and incessant firefighting (Freeman, 1972; Barker, 1993, 1999; Polletta, 2002, 
2010; Chen, 2009), which were far removed from the original mission and promise of 
SCE‘s innovation (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009).  SCE experienced conflicts over its core 
principals of participatory democracy and collectivist decision-making as it matured due 
to poorly-defined rules and procedures.   
This discussion of recurrent conflicts sets the stage for the chapter six in which I 
address the institutionalization or re-bureaucratization of the SCE‘s innovation (Greif & 
Leid, 2004; Pierson, 2004; Olsen, 2009; Styhre, 2006; Tsai, 2006)  
SCE‘s paradoxical success fraught with contradictions and internal problems 
presents a fascinating puzzle for those wishing to understand the organizational forces 
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that hold SIC together. Contrary to conventional assumptions of successful educational 
change free of conflict and division, SCE‘s successes begat contradictions which were 
not paralyzing. Indeed, the successes and contradictions seem inextricably interconnected 
(Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). In isolation, the change processes would have been 
insufficient and incomplete (Armstrong, 2002). The change processes led to 
consequential change only because they occurred in a proper sequence and pace 
(Armstrong, 2002; Huy, 2001; Pierson, 2004; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010). We can better 
understand the complexities and paradoxes that are common to many contemporary 
educational changes by looking at SIC‘s quintessential nature (Fink, 1999; Fullan, 2005; 
Hargreaves, 2003). 
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 Chapter 6 
Institutionalizing change 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the institutionalization of change.  It begins with the rise 
of the new guard. Next, I examine the introduction of bureaucratic and more formalized 
mechanisms into SCE‘s participatory democratic form of innovation.  I highlight how 
SCE struggled to manage tensions between the two competing logics and I propose a way 
to synthesize them, building a sustainable hybrid whereby the school might have attained 
a balance between enhancing participatory democracy and enabling substantive 
innovation in terms of instruction as well as governance, rather than privileging one end 
at the expense of another. 
The changing of the guard 
The rise of the new guard: endogenous change  
The continued growth and evolution of SCE combined with changes in the 
political environment, the departure of the old guard and the cumulative weight of 
internal contradictions made the old guard‘s way of change increasingly vulnerable to an 
attack and fueled the rise of the new guard (Voss & , 2000; Farjoun, 2002; Zilber, 2002;; 
Onoma, 2009). The members became increasingly concerned with achieving authentic 
innovation and were increasingly critical of SCE which they saw as being inauthentic and 
oversold. While the quest for authenticity had been a recurring preoccupation and 
foundational belief at SCE, in the aftermath of the draining leadership succession crisis 
and the departure of its charismatic leaders, its importance had been intensified 
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(Hochschild, 1983; Starratt, 2005). The new guard, Mr. Yoon and Mr. Han, with new 
interpretations of SCE‘s situation and new strategies for improving SCE, came to wield 
their influence as a result of these. They had become embittered by the old guard‘s 
double talk and superficial innovation that had not produced tangible outcomes. The new 
guard thought that the old guard‘s symbolic approach consisted of too many empty 
promises. They were particularly concerned with authenticity (Selznick, 1957; Kraatz & 
Block, 2008; Kraatz, 2009)
35
 and regarded SCE‘s innovation as inauthentic, oligarchic, 
alienating, and bubble-like. Whereas the old guard attempted to cover up the incomplete 
nature of SCE‘s innovation, the starting point for the new guard was the candid exposure 
of inconsistency between ideals and practices (Hoedemaekers, 2009; Kraatz, 2009).  This 
critique of the old guard led to a search for alternative ways of approaching school 
innovation that were consistent with SCE‘s original vision of change.  The new guard 
struggled to create ways of acting where a desired school innovation, characterized by 
caring, democracy, and authenticity, would be present in the process of implementing 
change (Armstrong, 2002; Leach, 2009)
36
. Mr. Yoon, who was one of the founding 
members of SCE, returned to SCE in 2009 just two months before Mr. Rhyu left for a 
new position.  He had been a committed member of the KTU for more than twenty years. 
                                                 
35 Ironically, Peter Fleming (2009) claims that authenticity (e.g. ―Just be yourself‖) is a key 
element of the new neo-liberalism that is deployed as a way of engineering new forms of 
legitimacy and new sources of social values and innovation. In the context of neo-liberalism, he 
argues we need to take this development more seriously.  
36
 To the innocent teachers, their change efforts were similar to self-correction provoked by the 
desire to atone for feelings of guilt and shame (Gould, 2002; Armstrong, 2002). They talked 
about the imperative of the renewal of SCE in these tones on many occasions.  
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He was also a best-selling author of Korean children‘s literature. He identified himself as 
an activist who had not been properly appreciated by dominant activists like the old guard. 
He said that he had been actively involved in developing a progressive way of teaching 
and curriculum development rather than fighting in the street. He thought that the 
dominant activists always devalued this kind of activism. He further argued that they 
never respected his efforts as a real movement and thought that these were minor or even 
risky issues that might sidetrack them from the urgency of their politically-driven 
movements.  
When this kind of activism was accepted within the dominant movement, it 
required the subordination of instruction to politics. During the period of his service from 
2001 to 2004, he had refused to subordinate instruction to governance and relationship-
building strategies.  The old guard repressed Mr. Yoon‘s critique on the ground that the 
success of SCE depended on forming a ―single unified front‖ (Dyrness, 2008) in which 
there was no room for internal conflict or critique. They even called him an ―egoist‖ who 
lived in his own isolated world. Having gone through intimidation and shunning within 
SCE, Mr. Yoon found that attempting to make a space for himself within SCE was 
simply too difficult and painful. Instead, he decided to leave SCE altogether in 2004. 
Although it was his decision to leave SCE, he was virtually expelled by the old guard.  
Even after leaving SCE, Mr. Yoon was tormented by the guilty feeling that he left 
behind friends, coworkers, and students (Klatch, 2004). In addition, he suffered from a 
diminished sense of self-esteem due to the fact that he was a ―quitter‖ (Klatch, 2004).  
Due to his traumatic experience he said that he never paid a visit to SCE again, even 
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when his son, who attended SCE, begged him to visit to see his old classmates. Instead, 
he had arduously engaged in a teacher activist network of Korean language teachers to 
develop an alternative curriculum and texts for Korean language. He served as the 
president of the network from 2005-2007. Leading this large-scale national teacher 
network gave him a broader perspective on educational change and helped him see 
beyond the microcosm of unionized activists. He also recognized that he could learn a lot 
from non-activist teachers and even bureaucrats, thus overcoming the sharp dichotomy 
between activism and bureaucracy. Furthermore, he became less caught up in the 
traditional politically-driven activism and became more confident with instruction and 
curriculum oriented activism. Through these experiences Mr. Yoon metamorphosed into 
a resilient teacher leader with enhanced skills and new visions (Voss & Sherman, 2000; 
Collins, 2003). Mr. Yoon returned to SCE in 2009 with ambition and expected to 
revitalize the school with these skills and strategies.  
Meanwhile, Mr. Han had stayed at SCE since 2003 (except 2004-2006 during 
which he stayed in Canada while his wife pursued a masters‘ degree37).  While Mr. Yoon 
invoked authenticity, Mr. Han was more interested in the ―public good.‖ Mr. Han said to 
me that,  
―When I was a teachers‘ college student, I was fascinated by the social 
democracy of Scandinavian countries and this interest in the ―public good‖ 
led me into joining the KTU.‖  
                                                 
37
 Mr. Han said that this experience gave him much needed recuperation and new perspectives 
about education that were helpful in implementing change at SCE.  
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Although the adversarial nature of the KTU did not fit perfectly with his beliefs, since 
there was no teacher‘s union advocating social democracy in the 1990s, he had to settle 
for second best. He met one of the old guard, Mr. Kang, who was the president of a local 
branch of the KTU and his relationship with Mr. Kang brought him to SCE in 2003. With 
regard to the relationship, Mr. Han said that, 
―I always tried to keep a certain distance from Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu 
while cooperating with them as much as I could because I knew that my 
personality and ideology don‘t fit quite well for their ideology and 
accompanying strategies.‖ 
 While Mr. Yoon considered him an activist, Mr. Han insisted that ―I am not an 
activist like Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang. I just want to live up to my beliefs.‖ Mr. Han drew 
a distinction between being an activist and doing activism and avoided the activist 
identity on the ground that he was not tireless and selfless and that he did not want to bear 
the heavy burden of being activist like Mr. Rhyu or Mr. Kang. In fact, in South Korea the 
term ―activist‖ is a loaded word and it was hard to be an activist teacher openly, 
considering the conservative tendency of the profession in South Korea.  This self-
identification made it difficult for him to completely devote himself to the old guard‘s 
way. For this reason, he said that he was viewed by the old guard as a ―too logical‖ 
person who would not fully commit to the cause of educational movement. In other 
words, he had been an ―inside-outsider‖ within SCE.   
Mr. Han was flexible, resilient and compromising enough to survive SCE‘s ebbs 
and flows under the old guard‘s reign. He had also been viewed by teachers and parents 
as ―clumsy, naïve, and having ADHD (Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder).‖ He 
said that this incongruity between his inner intelligence and outward appearance might 
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have contributed to his longevity at SCE. He often said “what is seemingly the most non-
political action ironically could be the most political thing!‖ This idea was at somewhat 
odds with the premises of the old guard. While Mr. Han had been on thin ice due to his 
ambivalent and half-hearted attitude, he still attempted to address contradictions and 
transform SCE by employing passive actions such as voicing his concerns (Oliver, 1991; 
Farjoun, 2002). What finally spurred him to step forward was Mr. Yoon, who brought a 
new vision with him and was willing to take political risks (Voss & Sherman, 2000). 
Before Mr. Yoon‘s arrival, it was unconceivable for Mr. Han to pursue alternative ways 
of innovation that could address internal contradictions and inadequacies in opposition to 
the old guard‘s orthodoxies. However, with Mr. Yoon‘s arrival and enhanced capacities, 
it became possible for the new guard to seek to resolve the internal contradictions and 
pursue disruptive changes at SCE (Farjoun, 2002).  
With the strengthening of the new guard, the old guard‘s practices became much 
more vulnerable. The old practices became susceptible to change because the old guard 
lost some of its authority after the painful succession crisis. The new guard‘s ideas 
presented a radical departure from the premises of the old guard. However, the new guard 
was aware that it was the old guard‘s efforts that had made SCE‘s innovation and that the 
platform they had made was an invaluable resource that the new guard wanted to 
appropriate (Meyer & Kretschmer, 2007; Lounsbury & Schneiberg, 2009).  The new 
guard‘s different views, interpretations, and skills, allowed disruptive change that 
revitalized SCE (Voss & Sherman, 2000; Armstrong, 2002; Farjoun, 2002; Seo & Creed, 
2002). However, the change initiatives made by the new guard did not lead smoothly to 
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the desired goals. Much of the agenda advocated by the innocent teachers was at odds 
with the diehard old guard‘s efforts. This created a paralyzing internal crisis within SCE 
(Armstrong, 2002).  
Creative recombination of formalization with participatory democracy 
 
In the early stage, SCE had emphasized community, participation, democracy and 
relationships, but the new guard was disenchanted with these idealistic concepts. The new 
guard raised questions about how a caring and inclusive community generated exclusion, 
internal division, and alienation; how democratic leadership relied on undemocratic 
means such as backstage fire fighting; how an empowered community achieved so little 
instructional innovation.  As pragmatic solutions to these problems, the new guard 
claimed that SCE should stress authenticity, public good, instructional innovation, and a 
redeployment of formalized and impartial rules, procedures, and routines (Haveman & 
Rao, 1997; Haveman et al., 2007).  The new guard strategically exploited the incongruity 
between the members‘ stated values and their actual behaviors. As Mr. Han noted: 
―SCE‘s fundamental problems are too many empty promises and lip-
service that is not accompanied by corresponding practices‖  
The new guard exploited this inner conflict by providing individual members with the 
opportunity to reconcile their moral imperatives and actual behaviors (Hargrave & Van 
de Ven, 2009).  This authentically expressive strategy has not been well considered in the 
literature of change, but is starting to be regarded as both important and intertwined with 
more instrumental tactics (Fullan, 2002).  
To put this strategy into practice, in May 2009, the new guard launched a series of 
open and reflective discussions for in-depth diagnosis and reassessment of SCE‘s 
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direction with all members. These were one-week long events that were held from early 
evening to late night. The new guard encouraged parents to talk about any problems and 
criticism they held about SCE. The underlying reasons for having this discussion were 
based on the new guard‘s diagnosis of the problems and their proposed solutions.  Mr. 
Yoon said that,  
―I think that SCE has been dominated by the ―culture of avoidance‖ that 
did not raise certain topics for fear of offending the old guard and in the 
hope of preserving harmony. I think this attitude had been only allowing 
some people to act in controlling ways and led to oligarchical tendencies‖  
The new guard particularly emphasized that the members should abandon the 
habit of attempting to solve problems in the background by relying on informal 
relationships rather than formal and transparent procedures. Mr. Han noted that, 
―Some of members‘ habitual reliance on informal problem solving have 
subverted the formal procedures and public good and made SCE more like 
a club-like organization (See also Haveman, et al., 2007; Chen, 2009).  
Similarly, at a PTA meeting, Mr. Yoon remarked:  
―Why should teachers and parents meet personally for any issue that is not 
about children? I don‘t think we need to. If teachers and parents have to 
meet for children‘s matter, they can always meet at school, not a restaurant 
or a pub. We, teachers, have our own family lives. Please do not expect us 
to meet after 5 p.m. We are not supermen like Mr. Kang and Mr. Rhyu
38
. I 
don‘t think that their way is desirable and even sustainable.‖  
The new guard attempted to fulfill the ideals of professionalism characterized by 
impartiality and the public good by advancing formal procedures and rules in decision 
making and by disrupting the entrenched routines that valued informal and intimate 
                                                 
38
 As this demonstrates that the new guard did not try to be heroes and were more likely to avoid 
the chronic problem of burnout (Barker, 1999; Chen, 2009).   
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procedures and face-to-face relationships. In so doing, they challenged the prevailing 
view of SCE‘s values that emphasized close relationships between teachers and parents 
and strong parent participation.  
When the new guard pursued this goal, several staff members voiced their 
concerns. For example, the new principal Choi explained: 
―It‘s similar to entering a political minefield. I don‘t know why we need to 
do this in the first place, let alone whether it works or not. We‘d better not 
rush into the minefield too deep!‖ 
While this was a seemingly radical departure from the old guard‘s way, it did not mean 
that the new guard abandoned all forms of informal relationships. Rather, they wanted to 
rectify the problems of the small groups and factions that dominated the decision making 
processes behind the scenes.  Mr. Han explained  
―We do not attempt to discard all sorts of informal and intimate 
relationship-based approaches and parent participation. Rather, we just 
want to replace the informal relationship-based culture with that of 
―transparency‖ and ―responsible participation‖ within the impartial and 
formalized setting in which members do not need to solicit informal 
cliques or inner circle for information and influence any longer at SCE.‖  
The new guard redeployed rules, and procedures as ―practical solutions‖ to the 
entangled problems of alienation, favoritism, and oligarchical degeneration of SCE from 
which they perceived the school had suffered (Haveman et al., 2007; Michels, 
2001[1912]; Voss & Sherman, 2000)
39
.  The redeployment of these measures could be 
                                                 
39
 Chen (2009) suggests that ―growing organizations, including those with collectivist practices, 
will formalize as they encounter underorganizing problems.‖ Like these organizations, at least at 
the beginning, the new guard seemed to inadvertently trigger bureaucratization to address 
emerging problems as SCE matured.  
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understood as the evolving response of the new guard who struggled to reconcile their 
sense of participatory democracy and authenticity. Mr. Yoon said that,  
―These formal procedures and practices would enhance participatory 
democracy and authenticity.‖ 
In order to curb resistance, Mr. Yoon portrayed these formal measures as safeguards of 
the public good and transparency. In contrast to the old guard who emphasized 
enthusiasm about SCE‘s change, the new guard argued that  
―Although enthusiasm and mission are important, relying on these 
measures alone is not enough to sustain an organization over an extended 
period‖ (Mr. Han, teacher).  
Instead, they argued that too much dependence on these fleeting means and neglect of 
formalization would end up generating a vicious cycle of corrosive relationship, 
concealed hegemony, and incessant fire-fighting (Chen, 2009). The new guard‘s strategy 
was consistent with Staggenborg‘s (1988) claims that  
―Collectivist and movement organizations were inevitably tyrannized by 
informal elites without professionalization and formalization and proposed 
that in order to overcome the oligarchical transformation of non-
bureaucratic organizations social movement scholars distinguish types of 
formalized organizations rather than equating them all together as 
―bureaucratic.‖  
Similarly, Clemens and Minkoff (2004) argue that  
―In some cases, formal organization may be associated with more radical 
actions (Rucht, 1999) or even the reinvigoration of organizations that had 
succumbed to quiescent oligarchy (Voss & Sherman, 2000). Within 
formal organizations, movements like mobilizations may generate 
significant change (Katzenstein, 1998; Scully & Creed, 1999) (p. 156).‖ 
In addition, the new guard claimed that SCE could bring more energy to 
instruction and curriculum by establishing organizational routines and procedures. 
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Without clear and consistent curriculum/instructional guidelines, keeping SCE operating 
in the basic sense demanded too much energy and time of the staff members. Mr. Yoon 
explained: 
―There are so many things to discuss during the faculty meeting –school 
events, school visit requests, the rush of student applications, addressing 
conflicts among parents, community relationships, etc. Thus, we paid too 
little attention to instruction. Once we established the solid procedures and 
routines regarding these issues, teachers could focus more on teaching and 
learning without worrying about other issues.‖  
Some parents who were still loyal to the old guard and missing the ―good old days‖ 
attempted to wield power to stop the new direction of the new guard.  A parent hardliner 
posted a provocative article on the school‘s website:  
―It‘s time to rise and act, SCE! The instrumental and inhumane attempt to 
formalize SCE will ruin all our hard-earned participatory democracy and 
beloved community!‖ (Chae-Yeon‘s father).   
With regard to the new guard‘s drive for formalization, Mr. Rhyu‘s initial reaction was 
dismissive. He noted: 
―I think Mr. Yoon‘s plan is misguided. His diagnosis might be correct, but 
his proposed solution is wrong. It‘s like he is setting about a new task that 
is way beyond his capacity. Furthermore, the late night discussions are too 
much for ordinary parents. It will only cause participatory fatigue! 
Teachers are supposed to do their job. That‘s what they are paid for. All 
they need is to try to ―communicate‖ better with parents rather than ask 
them to come and decide everything together. That‘s the real meaning of 
participatory democracy in the real world! In this sense, I think the real 
meaning of SCE is more a ‗solace‘ than anything else to parents with 
broken hearts within the South Korean education system (Mr. Rhyu, a 
teacher).‖ 
The aversion to formalization and bureaucratization is a typical reaction in organizations 
aspiring to alternative democratic governance and collectivist decision-making. It is also 
resonates with classic social movement scholarship. As early as Robert Michels‘s 
  
162 
 
(2001[1912]) famous analysis of the iron law of oligarchy, social movement scholars 
have maintained that to the extent that formalization and bureaucratization of social 
movements  reduce spontaneity and disruption, these organizations tend to regress to 
conventional and routine organizations.  Piven and Cloward (1977) claimed that 
organizations are antithetical to effective mobilization. The dream of intimate and 
informal relationship and beloved community dies hard at the SCE (Mansbridge & 
Karpowitz, 2005). In reaction to these criticisms, Mr. Han argued that SCE needed to 
reconsider the nostalgic and idealistic interpretation of participation and distinguish 
between good participation and interference. He noted:  
―What ‗good old days‘? Good old days have never existed at SCE! 
Decreased participation? Ironically, that‘s what SCE should bring back. I 
think that SCE‘s parents need to curb their enthusiasm and empty words 
that are not accompanied with actual action. Here, under the good 
intention of enhancing democratic participation and building a caring 
community, parent participation has been romanticized too much, to the 
extent that it has resulted in disabling confusion and interference. It‘s time 
to make a distinction ―between participation and interference‖ at SCE so 
that this school can be run in a more sustainable way.‖  
Similarly, Mr. Yoon acknowledged that the emphasis on formalized rules and procedures 
would weaken participation and erode intimate relationships among members. He also 
admitted that he did not pay enough attention to relationship building with the 
longstanding members. Mr. Yoon said that,  
―Since I have been back at SCE for less than a year, I have had little time 
and opportunity to establish trustful relationships with parent members‖  
The informal and relationship-based approach enjoyed by the old guard was closed to Mr. 
Yoon at least for a while until he built relationships, and the formalized approach he 
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pursued was the only practical option that remained at that moment (Hallett, 2006). But 
Mr. Yoon was optimistic about the future direction of SCE.   
―With more time, I think that the relational cracks existing between the 
new teachers and the longstanding parents will be filled through the 
accumulation of mutual trust and the demonstration of authenticity rather 
than through the activist teachers‘ political savvy and thick-skin people 
skills. I am optimistic that SCE will eventually pull together in a better 
direction. It just takes time, maybe one or two years, maybe more.‖ (Mr. 
Yoon, teacher) 
The redeployment of principal’s leadership 
After going through the unprepared leadership succession and the sudden 
departure of Mr. Rhyu, the new guard was preoccupied with the question of how they 
could improve SCE‘s leadership structure so that it would outlast just a few strong 
charismatic leaders. Given the high priority of circumscribing the formal authority of the 
principal and emphasizing normative participatory democracy in SCE‘s earlier stage, the 
old guard did not prescribe what leadership and administrative arrangement could support 
sustainable participatory democratic innovation in a public school context and or how it 
could gain synergistic capacity and expertise of formal leadership without undermining 
democratic control (Olsen, 2008). On the contrary, emphasizing that dependence on 
charismatic leadership was unsustainable, they argued that SCE should establish an 
institutionalized leadership initiative. On the basis of their own experience with the old 
guard, they were aware that the lack of formal authority would not automatically bring 
about a more democratic leadership, but might instead give rise to ―teacher autocracy‖ in 
which domineering behaviors would be deployed to fill the leadership void. Under this 
situation, they recognized that it would generate as much stress as they would have 
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undergone in a conventional school (Barker, 1993; Hargreaves & Fink, 2005; Scully & 
Levy, 2007; Denis et al., 2003). Their experience spurred them to reconsider the meaning 
and the nature of leadership in the context of an innovative school embracing a 
participatory democratic approach.  
Meanwhile, from the very beginning of his incumbency in 2008, the new 
principal, Mr. Choi, was expected to follow the footsteps of his predecessor Principal Lee 
by becoming a ―hands-off‖ principal. Mr. Rhyu and his clique members kept trying to 
box him in his office. He seemed to comply with the members‘ expectations. He was 
perceived as a ―head-bowed‖ principal by the members (Park, 2009). He was more like a 
―silhouette‖ principal who lived in limbo until the powerful Mr. Rhyu left SCE in 2009 
(Farquhar, 1991). According to Mr. Woo, ―many members believed that he was an 
interim principal until Mr. Rhyu was promoted to SCE principal.‖  In contrast to the old 
guard who actively attempted to delimit Principal Lee‘s authority and power, the new 
guard persuaded Principal Choi to exercise more leadership and engage in more activities. 
Based on their belief that formal authority could foster genuine participation and 
sustainable school change, they sought to reinstate the formal basis of the principal‘s 
leadership (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Harris et al., 2007; 
O‘Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; Polletta, 2002).  
―We kept persuading Principal Choi to actively engage in more school 
activities as a leader. We believed that we could do a much better job with 
his expertise and experience.‖ (Mr. Han, teacher)  
Similarly, Mr. Yoon said,  
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―During many occasions over the course of my career, I recognized that 
there are many things that only an experienced principal could observe 
while everyone else fails to notice them. So, I am trying to learn from their 
experience and expertise in these areas even when I do not always agree 
with them in other areas.‖  
In the beginning, Principal Choi had reservations about actively engaging in school 
decision making because he was not sure whether it would be good or not in SCE‘s 
context. However, as Principal Lee and teachers developed trust in each other, he 
gradually engaged in more of these activities. Based on mutual trust and shared 
understanding, Principal Choi attempted to be a ―servant leader.‖ By denying his 
positional power and by being friendly with the teachers, Principal Lee had been 
respected and trusted by the new guard. Mr. Han often portrayed the principal as a 
―principal from another planet40‖ in that he was so different from other principals who 
tend to act as if they are little emperors in their small kingdoms. The new guard explained 
that they could reinforce democratic values and public good sentiments by redefining the 
principal as someone who has the formal and impartial authority to represent SCE. By 
reestablishing the stable and impartial power basis through rehabilitating principalship, 
they could circumvent personal and arbitrary appropriation of power at SCE and 
reinvigorate democratic decision making (Olsen, 2008). Moreover, by building an 
alliance with the principal who shared common beliefs and goals, the new guard was able 
to gain direct control over administrative processes and resources and fulfill their goals of 
focusing more on pedagogical development without much impediment (Sachs, 2002; 
Tilcsik, 2010). Simultaneously, the new guard tried to distribute tasks and responsibilities 
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so that some members would not do all the work and monopolize power (Hargreaves & 
Fink, 2005). Metaphorically, they sought to create a ―many-headed hydra‖ that would be 
difficult to kill and forget, thus helping address the challenge of leadership succession 
and sustainability of the organization (Morrill, 2006).   
Overall, the new guard‘s strategy was consistent with Harris et al.‘s (2007) claim 
of the necessity of formal leadership alongside distributed leadership. Harris et al. (2007), 
argue that,    
―… although distributed leadership initiatives are meant to flatten 
hierarchies and empower teachers by having them engage in high impact 
and enriched work, by virtue of their positional and symbolic authority 
principals still matter a great deal to these reforms. The paradox is that 
without stable, consistent leadership in schools distributed leadership will 
be incredibly vulnerable, as we have seen in chapter 6, and ultimately 
fragile. Furthermore, distributing leadership is not a way of reducing the 
workload of the head teacher. In short, distributing leadership to teachers 
does not result in fewer demands on those formal leadership positions. 
(Harris et al., 2007: 322)‖ 
However, establishing the formal basis of principal leadership was challenging for 
SCE, as it had depended on the prevailing logic of participatory democracy.  Despite 
Principal Choi‘s representation of himself as a servant, many parents viewed him with 
suspicion. They tended to equate principals as agents of bureaucracy and assumed that 
the restoration of the principal‘s power would trigger the resurgence of bureaucracy at 
SCE. This attitude was akin to Michels‘ (2001[1912]) famous iron law of oligarchy:  
―The iron law predicts that the appointment of professional leaders fosters 
goal displacement. As leaders become invested in retaining their own 
power and organizational building, they direct efforts away from goals 
that reflected members‘ interests (Michels, 2001[1912]; quote from Voss 
& Sherman, 2000: 10).‖ 
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Similarly, Mr. Rhyu, who was still influential at SCE, raised concerns about the close 
relationship between the new guard and Principal Choi.  
―I‘m concerned about the recent developments at SCE. Mr. Yoon and Mr. 
Han are too close to principal Choi. If they cannot maintain distance from 
the principal, they run into the danger of becoming yes-men. They won‘t 
be able to say ―no‖ to him. It will be a serious problem later on. I always 
tried to keep a certain distance from Principal Lee. It allowed me to have 
some space to delimit his power. 
41‖   
In responding to these suspicions and fears raised by some parents about the seemingly 
regaining power of Principal Choi, Mr. Yoon argued that,  
―The most important thing to remember is that everything depends on who 
the person is. Even bureaucracy is still operated by people. Thus, 
bureaucracy also can take very different forms depending on who occupies 
the principal position.‖  
His emphasis on people within bureaucracies resonates with Gouldner‘s rejection of the 
fixed image of bureaucracy as an iron-cage, an image that the old guard and their 
follower parents accepted without exception. Gouldner (1954) argues,  
―The social scene described has sometimes been so completely stripped of 
people that the impression is unintentionally rendered that there are 
disembodied forces afoot, able to realize their ambitions apart from human 
action. This has colored some analyses of bureaucracy with funereal 
overtones, lending dramatic persuasiveness to the pessimistic portrayal of 
administrative systems‖ (p.16; quoted from Hallett, 2006: 220). 
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 This invokes the fable of ―the Scorpion and the Frog.‖ The story is about a scorpion asking a 
frog to carry him across a river. The frog is afraid of being stung, but the scorpion reassures him 
that if it stung the frog, the frog would sink and the scorpion would drown as well. The frog then 
agrees; nevertheless, in mid-river, the scorpion stings him, dooming the two of them. When asked 
why, the scorpion explains, "I'm a scorpion; it's my nature." This fable illustrates the 
insuppressible nature of one‘s self at its base level and the concomitant result that may affect any 
innately antagonistic relationship. Similarly, Mr. Rhyu seemed to view the relationship between 
teachers and principals as structurally determined.  
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Recently, renewed interest in leadership in democratic organizations challenges 
the inevitability of oligarchical tendencies in leadership and instead seeks to understand 
the contingent relationship between the nature of leadership and the maturity of the 
organization. The findings demonstrate that the possibility of formalized leadership that 
enhances participation while alleviating the negative effects of structurelessness and 
arbitrariness within the context of school change. Furthermore, some scholars assert the 
notion of hybridity or hybrid leadership that problematize binaries such as 
participative/autocratic, concentrated/ dispersed, or hierarchy/heterarchy and capture the 
paradoxical aspects of leadership (Gronn, 2008; Collinson & Collinson, 2009). These 
developments in the leadership literature are similar to the evolution of leadership that 
embraces formal leadership while still boosting participation and empowerment at SCE. 
The reinstatement of the principal‘s leadership pointed to the transition from familial and 
parental form of authority to professionalized authority based on rational routines, 
procedures, and rules (Fullan & Hargreaves, 1998; Rojas, 2010).  Whether the evolving 
leadership configuration of SCE that blends positional authority and democratic control 
will support sustainable innovation without diluting SCE‘s original goals remains to be 
seen.   
Building collaborative relationship with neighboring schools  
In the summer in 2009, the new guard applied to the Government grant initiative 
for ―Rural School Renewal (전원학교 (Cheon-Won-Hak-Gyo)‖) in collaboration with 
three neighboring rural schools.  By attempting to forge a school network with the 
neighboring rural schools, so called an ―Edu-Belt (에듀벨트),‖ these four schools 
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planned to improve less-favored schools and aimed to advance the interest of social 
justice. In persuading the principals of these schools to work together to pursue a 
common mission, Principal Choi exercised remarkable inspirational leadership 
(Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009). In the fall in 2009, when this plan was approved by the 
Korean Ministry of Educational and Human Resources, SCE was given a total of one 
million dollars for the three year implementation period.  
With this initiative, the new guard and the principal emphasized the importance of 
building collaborative relationships with the ―neighboring‖ schools and school district. 
The old guard started networking and partnership with schools at a distance where like-
minded educators and parents pursued SIC, and then the new guard attempted to forge a 
network near home by capitalizing on the foundation that the old guard had already 
established. In order to convince the skeptical members about network building, the new 
guard argued that although the old guard had made efforts to establish the Small School 
Network connecting many rural schools in other regions to spread innovation, SCE now 
needed to work together with neighboring schools. Otherwise, they argued, SCE might be 
criticized as a self-indulgent school and its change would be delegitimized, being prey to 
jealousy from other schools in the district that would undermine its chances of sustaining 
long-term success (Hargreaves & Bascia, 2000). Mr. Yoon noted that: 
―It is now impossible for SCE to remain an isolated island. If it does, SCE 
will be criticized by other educators and parents as selfish and narrow-
minded. The mission of SCE is to improve the public good and advance 
the quality of education for all schools. Our efforts to build collaborative 
relationships with three neighboring schools are one way to prepare the 
ground for this vision.‖  
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This effort of working together with neighboring schools helped SCE ease tensions with 
the sponsoring school district. Thus, it allowed SCE to create a more positive image of its 
change as legitimate and overcome SCE‘s previous negative image as a ―den‖ for activist 
teachers (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; Chen & O‘Mahony, 2009). In turn, the heightened 
legitimacy provided more favorable conditions for spreading SCE‘s innovation more 
widely (Armstrong, 2002; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). More pragmatically, they knew 
that they were now able to renovate the old school buildings and equip the school with 
cutting edge educational technologies and learning materials, thus further enhancing 
organizational maintenance and sustainability.  
However, this approach was in stark contrast to the old guard‘s strategies. While 
the old guard also maintained cooperative relations with other schools and the school 
district to secure resources and funding, it did so only minimally and defensively. The 
underlying reasons for this strategy were that any concessions would jeopardize SCE‘s 
hard-earned autonomy and force SCE to abandon their goals and cherished practices for 
more conventional bureaucratic practices, thus triggering ―mission drift‖ (Chen, 2009: 
156; See also, Huerta, 2002; Coy & Hedeen, 2005; Coy et al., 2005; Levy & Scully, 
2007). Some parent members worried about this initiative as well. They were concerned 
that this government initiative would trigger the bureaucratization of SCE and eventually 
make SCE more like conventional schools.  When the new guard pursued this initiative 
they did not take the time to consult with parents due to the limited application period. 
This procedural mistake added fuel to the dormant conflict behind a series of the recent 
developments introduced by the new guard. Parents registered the following objections: 
  
171 
 
―We had done well without the luxuries of modern school buildings and 
cutting edge educational technologies. We don‘t need fancy laptops for all 
the children and electric blackboards in every classroom. I think these 
things are at odds with SCE‘s original vision. Those things only destroy 
SCE‘s spirit of freedom, love of nature, and children‘s creativity.‖ (Chae-
Hyun‘s dad) 
―Who on earth decided this? Who wanted this? Parents don‘t want it. The 
teachers and principal do! Parents had no ideas what was happening about 
this until the teachers announced that our school was selected for rural 
renewal. It really bothered parents that we were sidestepped by the 
teachers. I think there is a chasm between teachers and parents, and it is 
getting wider.‖ (Yun-Hee‘s mom)  
―It‘s time for SCE‘s parents to courageously stand up and end the teachers‘ 
maneuver to erode SCE‘s innovation and become a dummy of the school 
district! We should guard SCE against any attempt to accommodate and 
appropriate SCE by government entities.‖ (Mi-Na‘s dad) 
As these interview excerpts demonstrate, these parents were concerned that the more 
dependent SCE was on the government for needed resources, the more likely it was to 
comply with institutional norms. They were worried that SCE would yield to institutional 
pressures by receiving resources and funding. These concerns had obvious affinities with 
the social movement literature that shows how government support co-opts social 
movements and turns them into the hierarchical entities that they have vehemently 
avoided and how isomorphic pressures can lead alternative organizations to mimic the 
institutional forms that they see around them (Rothschild & Whitt, 1986; Simons & 
Ingram, 1997; Chen & Mahoney, 2009; Huerta, 2009).  Parents argued that the new 
guard‘s efforts to enhance SCE‘s sustainability by adopting the government initiative 
would only increase the risk of ―the regression to the mean‖ (Fink, 1999; 2001; 
Hargreaves & Giles, 2006; Hargreaves & Goodson, 2006). They claimed that it was 
similar to ―riding the tiger‖ or ―jumping on the wrong wagon‖ with the vain hope that the 
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alliance with the government would expedite their goals and secure their survival 
(Armstrong, 2002). On the contrary, they argued, this initiative would only cause SCE to 
become prey to the government, perpetuating the primacy of bureaucracy and its 
oppressive practices (Selznick, 1949; Coy & Hedeen, 2005).   
SCE appeared to be falling apart. As the new guard and founding parents held 
competing ideas of how things should be done, they experienced growing pains in 
working together to implement a participatory decision making process for school 
decision-making. Mr. Woo explained:  
―Do you know that SCE is experiencing a crisis42? Parents are agitated.  
Mr. Yoon and Mr. Han do not understand the importance of informal 
relationships at SCE. They are fixated on developing curriculum. 
Overlooking the importance of relationships between teachers and parents 
is like ―throwing a baby out with the bath water.‖ As a matter of fact, they 
are tone-deaf in social relationships. They are not, politically savvy 
teachers like the Mr. Rhyu and Mr. Kang. They always take things at face 
value. They are authentic, but the flip side is that they are gullible. I think 
there should be some kind of a ―third‖ way between the old guard and the 
new guard that might work better for SCE‘s development.‖  
In reaction to these criticisms, the new guard emphasized the moral imperative of the 
Edu-belt initiative on the ground that it would promote genuine bottom-up collaboration 
with neighboring schools and reach educators beyond the single organizational change 
approach (Fullan, 2003; 2007; 2010). Mr. Han explained: 
―Some members always oppose for the opposition‘s sake before trying to 
do anything new. They always want to keep SCE as it is or even go back 
some imagined past, believing that the past was best and any change 
would only to make SCE deteriorate. The rural school initiative would 
help us move beyond our selfish and narrow adherence to our school 
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perception of a crisis in order to rationalize the desirability of the status quo.  
  
173 
 
towards schools around us. We can improve our school and provide our 
children with more enriched learning opportunities by working together 
with other educators in these schools.‖  
With regard to the some members‘ skepticism about receiving resources from the school 
district, Mr. Han explained in at a parent-teacher meeting: 
―We just want to make our school space more livable. Since SCE had been 
poorly maintained by the school district for many years, the school 
facilities are awful. There is no reason for us to endure the terrible 
facilities just because we are attempting to be an innovative school! If we 
attempt to implement an innovation that could be more significant and 
consequential in the long run, we need to think about our innovation 
within a long-term perspective. Trying to squeeze our limited energies and 
poor resources may not be the best answer.‖  
Parents‘ concerns were gradually diminished and even the resistant parents were 
satisfied with the renovated facilities and the new educational materials. The new guard 
also sought to alleviate parents‘ resistance by portraying the rural renewal initiative and 
the renovation project as ―neutral‖ and ―technical‖ in addition to emphasizing its moral 
purpose (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009). By emphasizing the ―technical‖ aspects, the 
new guard diminished the possibility of resistance for ideological reasons.   
The more favorable receptivity to this rural renewal initiative was also partly 
driven by demographic change. Many founding parent members who were the most vocal 
members left SCE as their children graduated. The departure of the founding parents and 
the old guard provided the new guard with more favorable conditions to realize their 
vision of how their organization should be run. This finding is akin to Hargreaves and 
Goodson‘s (2006) finding that demographic change substantially influences the direction 
and sustainability of innovative schools over time. Furthermore, a convergence of 
common interest between the old guard and new guard emerged. Since the old guard 
  
174 
 
altered their change strategies towards ―bottom-up change through top-down policies‖ 
and broader change within institutional spheres, they endorsed the new guard‘s endeavor 
to move beyond the single organizational change at SCE and to build partnerships with 
other schools to spread change. The old guard thought the new network initiative would 
legitimize SCE‘s change. In turn, the new guard gained support and resources to fulfill 
their goals as the old guard occupied the positions of power in the school district. It was 
consistent with the research findings suggesting that schools are more likely to sustain 
and deepen reform over time when school and district policy and priorities are aligned 
with reform (Coburn, 2004).  
Whether SCE‘s adoption of the government grant and the more collaborative 
move towards the district facilitated SCE‘s innovative practices and organizational 
maintenance is not yet clear. As Hoffman (2001) suggests, ―organizational action is not a 
strict reaction; conversely, organizational action is not defined autonomously without the 
influence of external bounds‖ (Hoffman, 2001; 197). Institutional and organizational 
dynamics are tightly intertwined.  Yet, most studies have focused on macro-level 
influence at the organizational level without examining how organizing logics are 
developed or applied by actors within organizations (Friedland and Alford 1991; Rao et 
al. 2003; Chen, 2009; Chen & O‘Mahony; Huerta, 2002, 2009a, 2009b). Conversely, 
most studies have focused only on a single organizational change without paying 
attention to the ecological effects of the change among other organizations. More detailed 
analyses of micro-level action and ecological dynamics of an organizational change 
would help explain how organizational actors adopt co-existing logics and practices and 
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how an innovative organization interacts with other neighboring organizations to improve 
their own and others‘ organizations (Rojas, 2007; O‘Mahony & Beckhy, 2008; Chen, 
2009; Chen & O‘Mahony, in press, 2009).   
Harnessing instructional development 
As I mentioned earlier, the new guard held a different view of change than the old 
guard, even though they had been chosen by the old guard for sharing similar goals and 
missions. Unlike the old guard, the new guard was more interested in instructional and 
curricular development. As the new guard accumulated influence, experience, and 
capacities, they attempted to redress the issue of insufficient instructional innovation head 
on. The new guard argued that it was futile to sustain SCE‘s innovation through parent 
participation and teacher empowerment when there was no substantial instructional 
innovation and tangible curriculum development. Furthermore, they argued that as SCE‘s 
innovation became more widely known as a model school change, the disparity between 
SCE‘s image and suboptimal instructional practices only made SCE more vulnerable to 
external scrutiny and potential criticism (Hernes, 2003). They also pointed out that it was 
necessary to adapt the original curriculum to the new school environment whereby the 
student enrollment had almost doubled in recent years. As a result, in 2010, Mr. Yoon 
developed a new SCE‘s instructional and curriculum guide booklets for teachers and 
parents. He also developed student‘s workbooks for each subjects. 
However, the new guard‘s emphasis on developing a new curriculum and clear 
guidelines for SCE‘s activities also created tensions and conflicts between the new guard 
and long-standing parents. Although these parents acknowledged and welcomed the new 
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initiatives, they were concerned that the new guard‘s focus on curriculum development 
and classroom instruction would cancel out many of SCE‘s innovative promises and 
inadvertently bring unwanted bureaucratization and standardization back to SCE:  
―I don‘t know why Mr. Yoon brought forward the new curriculum issue 
all of a sudden. SCE has been doing fine with the current curriculum over 
the past eight years.‖ (Hyun-Soo‘s dad, parent and the president of the 
SCE School council) 
―It seems to me that Mr. Yoon and Mr. Han viewed curriculum 
development as a wizard‘s magic stone. They seem to think that as long as 
SCE had a decent and tangible curriculum, all of SCE‘s problems would 
be resolved overnight. I don‘t agree with their impetus for curriculum 
development. In the process they would limit teachers‘ and students‘ 
abilities to creatively teach and learn.‖ (Mr. Choo, teacher) 
―When I was listening to Mr. Yoon‘s accounts on the new curriculum 
initiative, I tried to come up with a proper image that might visualize the 
role of more standardized curriculum and guideline in the SCE community. 
Figuratively speaking, the new curriculum looks like regulations for a 
family of five to me. What does a family of five need that for? I am 
worried that the new curriculum and instruction drive will erode our 
carefully developed participatory decision-making and SCE‘s free spirit.‖ 
(Myung-Hoon‘s mom) 
These skeptical parents and teachers tended to see the new guard‘s move of curriculum 
development as a ―Trojan horse‖ which would weaken their participation and autonomy 
and bring traditional professionalism that emphasizes teachers‘ expertise back to SCE 
(Henig & Stone, 2008). Meanwhile, the supporting parents welcomed this new 
development and disputed the skeptical parents‘ cynicism.  
―It might be true that the space for parent participation might decline a 
little bit than before. But I do trust the new guard because they are really 
sincere persons and I know that they take their jobs really seriously. 
Particularly, I support Mr. Yoon‘s new direction that emphasizes 
solidifying curriculum and instruction more than parent participation. As a 
matter of fact, I don‘t think that we came to SCE to ―communicate‖ more 
with teachers, although that is important. How could I expect to 
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communicate with the teachers to such an extent that I could have candid 
talks with them when I am not be able to do that with my wife at home? 
(Chae-Rin‘s dad)  
The new guard was encouraged by the supporting parents, but they were 
somewhat puzzled at the unexpected reaction of these parents because they had 
anticipated that parents would welcome their initiative to focus on instructional 
innovation. Although the parents delayed the new guard for a short while, this spurred the 
new guard to reevaluate whether they single-mindedly emphasized curriculum and 
instructional development while diminishing the values of parent participation and 
democratic decision makings (Wright & Fung, 2003; Kim et al., 2007).  That is, these 
ongoing debates about how to balance the pursuit of technical instructional development 
and preserve participatory democratic practices helped resist the temptation to 
inadvertently redeploy formalized routines and standardization of instruction without 
being mindful of what these would actually lead to (Pierson, 2004; Dorado, 2005; 
McDonald & Shirley, 2009; Sauder & Espeland, 2008). Furthermore, thanks to the 
ongoing debates and conflicts, the new guard gained the opportunity of ―going to the 
balcony‖ (Heifetz, 1994).  It gradually became more appreciative of the fact that it was 
the old guard‘s laborious efforts that had made the SCE‘s innovation possible, and that 
they now could pay more attention to the instructional issues due to the organizational 
platform the old guard had built. They recognized that they could further improve SCE 
and insure SCE‘s innovation more effectively when they capitalized on the foundation 
the old guard laid out, rather than striving to dismantle it (Abrahamson, 2004; Elsbach & 
Sutton, 1992; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2009; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010).  In other words, 
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it dawned on them that their strategy of improving SCE by forsaking the old guard‘s 
practices would be similar to, as Joshua Gamson (1993) pointed out, ―an odd endeavor, 
much like pulling the rug out from under one‘s own feet, not knowing how and where 
one will land (p. 594; See also Armstrong, 2002).‖ With regard to this, Mr. Yoon posted 
a reflective article on SCE‘s website: 
―Either blind adherence to utopian community participatory democracy or 
the obsessive pursuit of instructional improvement would not bring 
sustainable change to SCE. As people can‘t see the wood for the trees, I 
recognized that being preoccupied by the desire to resolve the gap 
between the ideal and the substantive enactment in terms of teaching by 
developing a new curriculum and change guide, I could have left the door 
of SCE wide open to the bureaucracy that might have invited bigger 
contradictions. It is important for the change-minded teacher to be mindful 
of the importance of striking a balance between democratic governance 
and tangible instructional progress
43
.‖  
 
 
Institutionalization of change: evading the iron cage and avoiding the disabling chaos 
 
The phenomenon of bureaucratization and formalization of social movements is 
not new.  However, what separates SCE‘s evolution from these organizations is that 
ongoing struggle about the consequences of bureaucratization promoted reflection that 
led to adjustments to the process rather than passive institutionalization.  Thus, the 
exploration that even social movements and alternative organizations inevitably succumb 
to the formalization and institutionalization and that this process is solely determined by 
external enforcement and isomorphic pressures overlooks the active and dynamic internal 
process of institutionalization (DiMaggio, 1988; Huerta, 2002, 2009a, 2009b; Coburn, 
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2004; Scott, 2008; Sauder & Espeland, 2008; Battilana, 2009; Onoma, 2009; Chen & 
O‘Mahony, 2009).  
Contrary to these assumptions, ―institutionalization is a product of the political 
efforts of actors to accomplish their ends (DiMaggio, 1988:13).‖  It is a dynamic and 
political process in which the logic of bureaucratization or isomorphic pressures to 
conform are actively continuously mediated and negotiated by actors in the organizations 
(Zilber, 2002; Hallett & Ventresca, 2006; Binder, 2007; Sauder & Espeland, 2008; 
Hallett, 2009; Chen, 2009; Chen & O‘Mahony, 2009). By going beyond the accounts of 
conventional institutionalization, this account affords a more realistic and comprehensive 
view of institutional processes in which the members‘ coordinated and divergent actions 
were accompanied by sporadic and unpredictable coupling and decoupling (Denis et al., 
2001; Pierson, 2004; Dorado, 2005; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Leach, 2009).  
Concerning SCE‘s development over time as the members became more experienced 
with participatory democracy and had a more mature understanding of it, they came to 
adopt participatory and communal forms of practices more genuinely while embracing 
the enabling functions of organizational routines and formalized bureaucratic procedures 
(Chen, 2009). While the new guard reinforced their professional expertise and redeployed 
formal decision making procedures in certain matters, they still urged parents to take 
action, particularly in initiating and carrying out school community activities and 
volunteering for school events. They argued that coordinating parent participation 
enabled further participation.   In so doing, the school could attain a balance between 
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enhancing participatory democracy and enabling substantive innovation in terms of 
instruction as well as governance rather than privileging one at the expense of another.  
The emergence of a more sustainable organizational form blending participatory 
democratic approaches and a professional logic emerged from the collective sense 
making and problem solving activities of the members.  It is consistent with the notion 
that institutions can be created and sustained by ―spatially dispersed, heterogeneous 
activity by actors with various kinds and levels of resources (Lounsbury & Crumley, 
2007: 993).‖  This overcomes the reductionists‘ fallacy of actor-centered functionalism 
that assumes ―actors did everything; actors messed everything (Pierson, 2004; See also, 
Thelen, 2004),‖ as well as the fallacy of structural determinism.  
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CHAPTER 7 
DISCUSSION: RECONCEPTUALIZING SELF-INITIATED CHANGE 
Three initial research questions guided my research:  
 What mechanisms do the change agents of SIC employ, how do they implement 
these mechanisms and why do they employ them?  
 What are the characteristics of the processes of SIC? What are the pacing and the 
sequencing of the change?  
 How does SIC unfold over time, and why?  
In answering these three initial questions a fourth research question emerged that 
summates the other three and that would lead on to my conclusion: 
 What implications do an investigation of self-initiated change in one school for 
understanding existing theories of self-initiated and imposed educational change? 
This section is divided into three parts. I first present the change mechanisms that 
generate SIC. The mechanisms involve conversion, layering, and recombination that 
embody the ideal of ―change without pain‖ by balancing change and stability 
(Abrahamson, 2004).  Then, I depict the slow moving process of change. This process is 
associated with two paradoxes: the two-fold task of implementing change while running 
it; and internal and external contradictions.  Lastly, I highlight the dialectical and cyclical 
development of change dimensions and the skillful way of juxtaposing them. Based on 
these analyses, I propose ways of conceptualizing SIC as: ―change without pain‖; ―slow-
moving change‖; ―dialectical/ cyclical change.‖  Then, in the following conclusion 
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chapter, I will discuss the broader implications of this study on educational change, 
which is linked to my fourth research question.  
Change mechanisms: change without pain 
The generative mechanisms for addressing questions of how SIC emerges, 
sustains, develops, and evolves over time are institutional conversion, institutional 
layering, and recombination. As I have illuminated, the old guard tried to construct an 
alternative method of change by exploiting the gap between rules and effects and 
searching out vulnerabilities of existing institutional arrangements without significantly 
changing the formal structure of public schools. For example, when there was a school 
closing crisis, the old guard seized the opportunity. By turning to the strategy of 
institutional conversion, they successfully transformed the closing school into an 
innovative school. And when the political and institutional resistance declined in 
response to favorable political winds, like the emergence of the politically progressive 
superintendent in the region, they successfully layered their school innovation strategies 
on top of the existing systems.  
The detailed analysis of SCE‘s change tells us how SIC at the margin can lead to 
structural and systematic change in a very incremental and gradual way (Palier, 2005; 
Thelen & Streeck, 2005). As the findings suggest, layering has proved particularly 
important in amplifying local organization change into system-level consequential 
change in an organizational field. This development is quite different from large-scale 
and abrupt change which is the case of excessive pain and repetitive fatigue (Abrahamson, 
2004; Hargreaves, 2004).  
  
183 
 
During the process of change, ―considerable continuities on the surface masked 
important underlying changes resulting from the way in which conventional rules and 
procedures of bureaucratic schooling are reinterpreted and converted to new forms‖ 
(Thelen & Streeck, 2005: 29). Since the old guard cultivated change from within the 
context of existing opportunities and constraints – working around arrangements they 
could not change while attempting to harness others in new ways, the change avoided 
generating too much pain, proceeding incrementally and without much resistance and 
interruption from institutional incumbents (Thelen & Streeck, 2005).  This means that, 
contrary to the conventional theory of change that asserts that only exogenous and abrupt 
change only generates fundamental, systemic change, change can be created through 
endogenous sources in an incremental way within the existing system.  However, this 
does not mean that SIC denies exogenous factors for change. Rather, the findings of this 
study suggest that when endogenous and exogenous forces for change combine, a 
consequential change is more likely (Deeg, 2005) 
Moreover, recombination is integral to the mechanisms of SIC.  Recombination 
can involve the redeployment of the old rules or even practices that have been abandoned 
(Schneiberg, 2007; Thelen & Streeck, 2010). While the old guard as activists was more 
likely to utilize the recombination mechanisms to exploit or appropriate the existing 
system, the new guard used recombination as a tool to synthesize existing elements in a 
more complementary way.  The new guard pursued building a sustainable hybrid form of 
participatory change and principled professionalism (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009). For 
example, it ―creatively‖ recombined participatory democracy with the formalized rules 
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and procedures.  Engaging in a national teacher network of Korean language teachers as a 
successful leader provided the new guard with a broader view of educational change and 
helped them transcend the rigid view that activism and bureaucracy are mutually 
exclusive. In addition, the internal contradictions of masked hegemony, tyrannical 
pressure for group conformity, and firefighting that spurred them to redeploy the 
formalized measures as pragmatic solutions to entangled problems.  The new guard 
argued that the redeployment of formal procedures and practices was necessary to move 
beyond the initial stage of organizational change. They argued that in order to secure 
sustainable change and that enthusiasm and a compelling mission themselves were not 
enough to sustain an organization over an extended period of time, they needed to 
institutionalize routines, curriculum, and decision-making procedures (Fullan, 2007; 
Cuban et al., 2010).  They particularly emphasized the importance of institutionalizing 
and distributing leadership after going through a painful leadership succession crisis and 
the sudden departure of their charismatic leaders (Hargreaves & Fink, 2006).  
The reintroduction of bureaucratic mechanisms into SCE‘s participatory change 
process seemed to be an apparent reversal that could be viewed as a regression to the 
conventional school.  This view is misleading because formalized rules and procedures 
were used to promote instructional development and preserve participatory democracy. 
Not all formalized organizations are ―bureaucratic‖ (See also, Voss & Sherman, 2000; 
Chen, 2009) and as Clemens and Minkoff (2004) argue, formal organizations may be 
associated with radical actions (Rucht, 1999) or even the reinvigoration of organizations 
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that had succumbed to quiescent oligarchy (Voss & Sherman, 2000). Likewise, as 
Polletta (2002) suggests,  
‗‗No one believes any longer that decisions can be made by strict 
consensus. Activists are more comfortable with rules, less hostile to power, 
and more attuned to inequalities concealed in informal relations‘‘ (p. 202). 
Recombination mechanisms can be most successful and powerful when they make a 
sustainable hybrid out of seemingly mutually exclusive elements or logics (Abrahamson, 
2004; Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Campbell, 2005).  Hargrave and Van de Ven (2009) 
suggest that,  
―The change agents, whether incumbents or challengers, will be most 
effective when they take both/and rather than either/or orientation to 
managing contradictions. The simultaneous embrace of contradictory 
poles can stimulate creativity and innovation. In contrast, practices that 
address one pole of contradiction but not the other might inadvertently 
work against themselves by releasing pressure to satisfy the contradictory 
pole‖ (p. 129) 
Contrary to the LSR model that looks outwards and invokes exogenous shocks 
which profoundly subvert existing routines, established way of thinking and experience, 
SIC looks inwards and backwards at ―what change agents can do on or with existing 
institutional arrangements and at how the histories of path creation themselves generate 
resources for transformation or the creation of new forms‖ (Schneiberg, 2007: 51; see 
also, Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009).  In a similar vein, given the nature of incremental and 
endogenous small-scale change, SCE‘s change can also be conceptualized as a ―positive 
deviance‖ (Cameron, 2009; Hargreaves, 2007) or ―micro-mobilization‖ (Scully & Segal, 
2002) whereby the change agents drew on the pre-given arrangements and practices 
around them and engaged in creative recombination rather than wholesale destruction 
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(Abrahamson, 2004; Campbell, 2004; Hargreaves, 2004; Schneiberg, 2007; Thelen & 
Mahoney, 2010).  
Based on the findings of this study, I propose that SIC can be conceptualized as 
change without pain (Abrahamson, 2004) or at least with less pain than is common in 
large-scale reform. This does not mean that I subscribe to the static and romanticized 
notion that SIC is free of pain and conflict. This view overlooks important dilemmas that 
may be embedded in self-initiated change and makes it difficult for us  to respond to them 
effectively (Abrahamson, 2004; Armstrong, 2002).  Resilient change agents can stand 
some pain in challenging circumstances by making it meaningful through a strong sense 
of purpose and supportive partnership (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009). For example, Mr. 
Rhyu noted that, 
―The suffering and adversity of making and sustaining SCE‘s change are 
nothing compared the ones I had to endure at bureaucratic and 
authoritarian schools in which I could not breathe well. SCE is a sort of 
hope and redemption to me who had been suffocated by the oppressive 
and inhumane system. I would be willing to and am ready to accept any 
further hardship or pain that might be involved in any change like SCE‘s.‖  
In sum, SIC, or change with minimal, necessary pain, requires balancing stability with 
change in order to exploit the benefits of both and avoid the unnecessary disruption that 
might be caused by either in isolation (Thelen & Streeck, 2005).  However, change 
mechanisms are insufficient to initiate and sustain SIC. We also need to take the change 
processes seriously. In the following section, I will examine SIC change processes.  
Change processes: slow moving change  
There has been an assumption in much of the recent literature of educational 
change that fundamental change depends upon relatively rapid and large-scale change 
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across entire system ((Barber, 2009; Darling-Hammond, 2005; Fullan, 2000, 2009; Honig, 
2004; Hopkins, 2007)).  However, the change that I studied illustrates a school change 
characterized by a relatively slow and sometimes unintended process toward systemic 
improvement.  There is very little understanding about how this type of change occurs in 
the educational change literature and in institutional change studies.  For example, 
according to the punctuated equilibrium theory in which change occurs in rapid bursts, 
followed by long periods of stasis within institutional literature, small changes do not 
accumulate into big ones, yet that is what I observed at SCE. The amplifying actions and 
their dynamic interplay with contextual conditions escalated the accumulation of small 
changes into a pattern that ultimately became radical and large-scale. How did this 
change happen? Without closely examining the dynamic nature of the SIC change 
process, the change process remains mysterious. This suggests that we need to pay more 
attention to pacing of change over time (Ancona et al., 2001; Fullan, 2009; Huy, 2001; 
Pierson, 2004). The analysis of temporal processes is crucial with change that evolves 
over long periods of time.  This section illustrates the distinct nature of the process of 
slow moving change.   
First, as mentioned earlier, the multiple dimensions of change (i.e. technological, 
political, and cultural) are often incompatible with each other (Orren & Skowronek, 1994; 
Thelen & Mahoney, 2010; Weick, 1976). One way to resolve the tensions among them is 
through pacing (Blau, 1964; Denis et al., 1996, 2001).  Rather than achieving change 
with less pain by utilizing recombination to reduce disruption, pacing aims to achieve 
change by ―alternating, over time, periods of greater stability with periods of greater 
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change in order to use the benefits of each to counterbalance the pain brought on by the 
other‖ (Abrahamson, 2004: 165).  The pacing approach resonates well with incremental 
changes (Abrahamson, 2004; Reay et al., 2006). This approach enables change agents to 
manage of the risks of attempting disruptive change and to solidify early gains (Reay et 
al., 2006).  
Second, careful consideration of sequence and temporal pacing is especially 
crucial to understanding the change process characterized by ―the sizable time lag 
between actions and the long-term consequences of those actions and the unintended 
consequences in settings of great complexity and high uncertainty (Pierson, 2004: 14).‖ 
The time lag between actions and both intended and unintended consequence is 
ubiquitous in any attempt at change (Fullan, 2001; Pierson, 2004). These lagging 
elements were present in an acute form within SIC or its bottom-up change processes 
because of the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties in power structure, goals, and 
strategies involved (Denis et al., 1996).  
Moreover, in many cases, change agents of SIC found themselves ―building a 
plane while flying it‖ (Honig, 2002, 2009; See also Muncey & McQuillan, 1996).  Since 
the change took place accidentally, participants had competing interests which could not 
be resolved at the initiation stage (Fullan, 2001). The problem of lack of clarity carried 
over into the implementation phase where the seeds of conflicts hiding beneath the 
surface became more visible (Fullan, 2001). The implementation process became even 
more complicated because the founding members wanted to achieve SIC characterized by 
enhanced participation of teachers and parents along with democratic decision making, as 
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an alternative to hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of schooling. While this approach 
can provide schools with discretion over their work and create conditions important for 
strengthening teaching and learning (Honig, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009), it is difficult to 
implement and sustain once it is set in motion (Honig, 2002, 2003; Stone, 2001).   
From the outset, SCE confronted many challenges in implementing its change. 
Internally, it was difficult to coordinate the divergent interests and contradictory values 
among people involved. Externally, because SCE‘s change agents disrupted existing 
arrangements and suggested alternatives while also preserving positive elements of the 
existing arrangements, the relationship with the school district was complicated. 
Therefore, survival and sustainability were always the most immediate priorities.  As a 
result, change agents had to carry out the dual task of simultaneously disrupting 
institutional arrangements (change) and maintaining the nascent organization (stability). 
They had to provide members with both a sense of urgency for change and s sense of 
security about their organization. Implementing change while maintaining stability is 
extremely difficult and may delay the change process substantially (Seo et al., 2004).  
Thus, in studying SIC, researchers need to pay particular attention to its temporal 
processes.   
Third tension that needs to be addressed in the process of change is internal/ 
external contradiction (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009).  In the SIC process, actors must 
simultaneously develop and manage their organization‘s internal capabilities, culture, and 
systems and also attend to the external environment.  This issue may become particularly 
challenging when school change moves beyond the initial implementation due to that of 
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sustaining change over time (Coburn, 1004). According to Fink (2000), the change 
process may contain a paradox of sustainability and scaling up, of endurance and breadth, 
where they are inversely related.  This tension grew increasingly acute at SCE when the 
more the change diverged from its origins, and the more comprehensive the goals of the 
change became (Coburn, 2004).  However, in contrast to Fink‘s claim, my findings of 
this study suggest that because SCE‘s change was closely intertwined with the broader 
systems and district, it was better able to sustain change.   
This study has documented a case of slow-moving but consequential educational 
change. According to Quack and Djelic (2005), the metaphor of ―stalactite change‖ 
characterizes the process of change in which a succession of incremental steps is 
nevertheless consequential.  
―The image is that of minuscule drops of water falling from the vault of a 
cave. In itself, it seems insignificant with no impact on the cave as a whole. 
However, under given conditions of temperature, the succession and 
combination of large numbers of droplets may lead to an aggregation of 
the calcite contained in those drops. After a long while, the result is a thick 
landscape of innovatively shaped stalactites and stalagmites and a 
consequential transformation, one could say, of the cave as a whole.‖ (p. 
276)  
This conceptualization of incremental SIC helps scholars overcome the sharp 
dichotomy between abrupt and radical change on the one hand, and incremental and 
piecemeal change on the other (Djelic & Quack, 2003; Reay et al., 2006; Scully & Segal, 
2002), thereby providing a way to reconcile the tension between LSR and SIC.   
Change dimension: dialectical and cyclical change  
My research goal was to explore the change dimensions of SIC and trace the 
change in the three dimensions over time. House and McQuillan (1998) suggest that in 
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order to successfully implement educational change we should take an integrative 
approach that appreciates all three dimensions of change simultaneously.  They argue that 
an inadequate or partial understanding of all these three dimensions results in superficial 
changes or even reform failure (House & McQuillan, 2005; See also, Fullan, 2001).  
However, in practice, an integrative enactment of the changes in these dimensions is 
more complicated than often assumed.  This is because the three dimensions are unlikely 
to change in unison (Orren & Skowronek, 1994; Skowronek, 1995) and because changes 
in one dimension may lag behind changes in another (Campbell, 2004; Denis et al., 1996, 
2001; Langley, 1999, in press; North, 1990; Pierson, 2004; Zbaracki, 1998).  Thelen and 
Streeck (2005) explain that,  
―Human actors seem to be quite capable to operate simultaneously in different 
institutional contexts governed by different logics, moving back and forth 
between them, or playing them off against one another. Also, human societies 
appear to have enough slack, and their causal texture usually seems to be loose 
enough (or cause takes enough time to turn into effect) to be tolerant of 
considerable friction between differently constructed institutions or action 
spaces. All societies, in other words, are in some way hybrids, some more and 
some less (p. 21).‖ 
For example, it is commonly assumed that structural changes are easier to bring about 
than normative ones (Bartunek, 1984; Fullan, 2001). However, the temporal enactment of 
the change dimension may be more complicated. Sometimes, cultural or normative 
change can be easier to begin than structural change when a small group of like-minded 
people attempt to launch a change that fits their worldviews within the existing structural 
constraints (Armstrong, 2002; Armstrong & Bernstein, 2008; Hargreaves, 1994; 
Meyerson & Scully, 1995; Raeburn, 2004; Rojas, 2007; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010. In 
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other words, in SCE, ‗reculturing‘ was easier to begin and achieve than ‗restructuring‘ 
(Hargreaves, 1994; See also, Kotter, 2008).   
If institutions are made up of conflicting and contradictory dimensions or logics, 
such as those associated with ‗symbolic versus substantive‘ elements (Orren & 
Skowronek, 1994; Thelen & Mahoney, 2010; Thelen & Streeck, 2005), then it is 
important to not only integrate the change dimensions but also to disaggregate them and 
track them over time (Campbell, 2004).  Campbell (2004) argues that by tracking 
dimensions of change over time, we can determine what the pattern of change has been. 
If the change involves all three dimensions suddenly and simultaneously over a given 
period time, then it can be regarded as a revolutionary change. If it involves relatively 
few changes, or if one change occurs first, then another, over a long period of time, we 
regard it as a model of more evolutionary and incremental change. In other words, he 
claims that ―the pattern of change can be differentiated according to how many 
dimensions change and how fast they do so (p. 40).‖ While LSRs tend to be multifaceted, 
simultaneous, and expeditious in order to reach new coherent configurations rapidly, 
SICs proceed incrementally and sequentially (Huy, 2001; Mintzberg & Huy, 2003).  
Identifying the relevant dimensions over time in SIC is particularly difficult since 
it is a ―lumpy and uneven process‖ (Campbell, 2004:39). The number and dynamics of 
factors that interact and affect the process of change are too overwhelming to plan in 
advance in a determined way (Fullan, 2001).  For example, even if a SIC is inspired with 
a more radical innovation, it may still attempt to change only one dimension at a time if 
its agents ―do not believe that they have the capacities to implement and sustain the 
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changes in multiple dimensions at the same time‖ (Campbell, 2004: 183).  Thus, contrary 
to the wisdom emphasizing integrative approaches in implementing educational change 
(Bolman & Deal, 2003; House & McQuillan, 2005), sometimes it is too risky to integrate 
these three dimensions all at once (Aldrich, 1994; Bryk et al., 1998; Fullan, 1998, 2001). 
As Fullan (2001) argues, ―attempting too much too quickly can result in massive failure‖ 
(p. 71). Thus, it can therefore be beneficial for SIC to selectively implement change in 
each dimension (technological, cultural, and political dimensions) in an appropriate 
sequence and pace and with mindful juxtaposition (Campbell, 2004; Huy, 2001; Pierson, 
2004).  
In order to address the multiple and contradictory dimensions of change a 
dialectical perspective is required.  Although incremental change may suggest a smooth 
―stepwise‖ change from one dimension to another.  At the sub-organizational level, there 
is a tendency for change to be characterized by oscillations and reversals (Scully & Segal, 
2002), but the disparities and contradictions between espoused goals and actual 
enactments may in turn encourage people to reexamine their initial beliefs and values 
driving change.  For example, when they were promoted by the old guard, SCE‘s 
innovations were seen a politically and symbolically driven form of change. When they 
were promoted by the more professional-oriented new guard, greater formalization might 
paradoxically have supported a restoration of the original innovation (Denis et al., 1996; 
2001; Haveman et al., 2007; Sonnenshein, 2010).  SIC can be non-linear, iterative, 
interactive, cyclical and regressive (Campbell, 2004; Denis et al., 1996, 2001; Fullan, 
2001; Kew, 2010; Zbaracki, 1998).  It is also dialectical in the sense that new 
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arrangements are challenged by proponents of alternative arrangements (Farjoun, 2001, 
2010; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009; Seo & Creed, 2001).  Such dialectical processes 
can actually enhance rather than undermine sustainability.  Fullan (2005) claims that 
―sustainability is cyclical for two fundamental reasons: one has to do with energy, and the 
other with periodic plateaus, where additional time and ingenuity are required for the next 
adaptive breakthrough‖ (p. 25).  Cameron and Quinn (1988) argue that without dialectical 
tension between simultaneous oppositions, unproductive schismogenesis occurs.  They 
refer to schismogenesis as ―a process of self-reinforcement where one action or attribute 
perpetuates itself until it becomes extreme and therefore dysfunctional‖ (1988:6).  All 
this is consistent with the notion that educational change can be created and sustained by 
distributed, heterogeneous activity by actors with various kinds of resources (Hargreaves 
& Fink, 2006; Spillane et al., 2001), thus overcoming the reductionists‘ fallacy of 
charismatic or transformative leadership that assumes ―actors did everything; actors 
messed up everything‖ (Pierson, 2004).  
SIC can therefore be conceptualized as a cyclical and dialectical change that can 
reorient change agents towards deeper appreciation of the initial goals (redeployment) or 
towards a new thesis (progressive change).  With time, the synthesis becomes the thesis 
for a new cycle of dialectical change (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2006, 2009). Thus, 
change processes are ‗unfinished‘ work. In order to sustain change over time, even SIC, 
not to mention mandated LSCs, must therefore leave scope and flexibility for ongoing 
modification of, continuous learning and engagement with the change itself (Hargreaves, 
2004). 
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Chapter 8 
 Conclusion 
This chapter delves into the implications of this study to theory of educational 
change, practical implications, and suggestions for future studies.  
Implications for a theory of educational change  
In addition to understanding the mechanisms, processes and dimensions of SIC, 
this study in particular has broader implications for educational change as a whole, which 
focus on the fourth research question: ―What implications does an investigation of self-
initiated change in one school have for understanding existing theories of self-initiated 
and imposed educational change?‖ 
This study has focused on the nature of SIC that is incremental but consequential.  
It has examined the mechanisms, processes and dimensions of change. It has also offered 
a new exploratory conceptualization of SIC. The existing theory of educational change 
does not adequately explain what I observed at SCE. While the model of LSR suggests 
that self-initiated change do not accumulate into consequential ones, this study has shown 
that abrupt and exogenous LSR is not necessary for radical widespread change to happen. 
Indeed, as Hargreaves and Shirley (2009) claim 
―some of the most effective educational change efforts do not begin with 
governments, although governments can create the conditions in which 
they flourish, These reform movements work around governments, beside 
it, and sometimes even against it‖ (p. 50).  
Similarly, as Hargreaves (2000) suggests,   
 ―Educational change must connect teachers to the system and society in 
an activist way, where they can see themselves not just as effects of the 
context, but as part of the context, and as agents who can and must 
influence how others perceive, shape, and support their work‖ (p. 244).  
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This is not to argue that we should abandon LSR or replace it with pure bottom-
up, self-initiated change. Rather, we need to recognize that LSR and SIC are not mutually 
exclusive. There need be no sharp distinction between the two if SICs turn into deep and 
pervasive changes (―Self-initiated‖ LSR) over time; or if apparent LSRs stem from many 
SICs (Campbell, 2004; Huy, 200; Van de Ven & Garud, 1993).  Hence, there need to be 
more creative and rhythmic recombinations of LSC and SIC along with well-articulated 
pacing and sequencing whereby systematic planning, data, and professional development 
programs can be used to create an environment more conducive to SIC that can be 
consequential over time (Abrahamson, 2004; Giles & Hargreaves, 2006; Hargreaves, 
2007, 2009; Hargreaves & Shirley, 2009; Huy &  Mintzberg, 2003).   
Second, in the literature of educational change and sustainability, the fates of 
innovative schools are often pessimistic.  They seem destined for short-term success 
followed by long-term decline. Innovative schools tend to follow the trajectories of 
predictable and inevitable decline due to factors such as changing leadership, the gradual 
loss of key teaching staff, changes in the size and composition of student demography, 
and shifts in policy or district priorities that amount to an ―attrition of change‖ (Fink, 
1999; Giles & Hargreaves, 2006; Goodson & Hargreaves, 2006; Sarason, 1990). In 
contrast to this tendency, the findings of this study show that SIC that is small, 
endogenous and incremental can sustain change and even become consequential at a 
system-level by becoming a learning organization, building multiple networks with other 
schools and educators, seizing favorable political opportunities and maintaining activism 
while institutionalizing change. Positive educational change can cause complacency 
  
197 
 
within the organization and jealousy among other neighboring schools, leading the 
organization to follow the sad destinies of many other innovative schools, but in this 
study‘s case of SIC, the old guard stayed off the attrition of change by becoming 
painstakingly self-reflective.  Even at the height of success, Mr. Rhyu was vigilant about 
self-indulgence and complacency. The new guard sought to resolve the internal 
contradictions of change and stability by institutionalizing change while maintaining 
participatory engagement.  
Implications for practice 
This study offers implications for educational change practice. First, in building 
partnerships with parents, educators need a new, more principled professionalism that 
means ―more than showing greater individual empathy, intimate friendship toward and 
understanding of parents‖ (Hargreaves, 2000: 244). Creating a more principled, open and 
inclusive professionalism should be more about public projects enhancing moral purpose 
and social justice (Hargreaves, 2000). Given the profoundly political complexities 
involved in SIC, in order to prevent the damaging effects of micropolitics, teachers and 
administrators involved in school change efforts should engage in open and honest 
dialogue (Datnow, 2000). According to Datnow,  
―By bringing micropolitics out into the open, rather than allowing them to 
fester beneath the surface – only to later find that they can derail reform…, 
educators can work toward dismantling them and toward creating 
meaningful, long term   school reform‖ (Datnow, 2000: 154).  
Second, with regard to change mechanisms, in utilizing the recombination 
strategy, the change agents who are committed to a particular change or distinctive 
beliefs are easily susceptible to short-term opportunism that is ―the pursuit of immediate, 
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short-run advantages in a way inadequately controlled by considerations of principle and 
ultimate consequence‖ (Selznick, 1957: 143), leading to loss of integrity and legitimacy 
(Fullan, 2003; Hargreaves & Fink, 2006; Kraatz, 2009; Selznick, 1957). Thus, while it is 
important to exploit openings for change, the essence of the change leadership is about 
striking a balance between change and stability and between integrity and political skills 
so as to develop long-term capacities for change and sustainability (Fullan, 2005; 
Selznick, 1957).  
Third, with regard to change dimensions, the dialectical and cyclical nature of 
change suggests that change agents might pay more attention to the fact that their 
practices can have contradictory outcomes which leaders either do not always understand 
or of which they are unaware. For example, as Bascia and Hargreaves (2000) point out, 
―Change puts some people in the limelight and others in the shadows. Some are keen to 
be on the leading edge of change; others find themselves on the sharp edge‖ (p. 3). 
Collinson (2005) notes that apparently successful leadership practices inherently generate 
their own resistance. The management of contradictions is an important but 
undertheorized and underdeveloped area in the literature of change (Hargreaves, 1994; 
Fullan, 1999, 2001; Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009).  This study suggests that change 
agents cannot creatively manage contradictions unless they recognize that processes of 
change are dialectical, recursive, and cyclical (Denis et al., 1996; 2001; Hargrave & Van 
de Ven, 2009; Sonnenshein, 2010). This creative management can release creativity and 
lessen adverse unintended consequences (Hargrave & Van de Ven, 2009).  
Limitations and future studies 
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While this study provides benefits for researchers and practitioners, it also 
possesses limitations. First, this research was conducted in a single organization. Thus, it 
was beyond the scope of this study to analyze how the mechanisms, processes and 
dimensions of change might vary in different settings. This study aimed to generate and 
extend theory, and further research is necessary to test the proposed models in other 
settings, including schools in urban settings and mid-sized schools.  
Second, while this case study maps the relatively early evolution of continuous 
school change and change that is still unfolding, it is uncertain whether SCE will sustain 
its change and transform the school over longer periods of time.  Future work can pick up 
where this case study ends, to explore the ongoing development of school change and its 
impact over time. Furthermore, we need more longitudinal and historically grounded 
studies that trace the evolution of educational change and analyze the sustainability of 
change over long periods (Hargreaves & Goodson, 2006).  
Finally, future work may also examine the diffusion of SCE‘s change. This study 
identifies a distinctive pattern of scaling up of change. Consistent with Hargreaves & 
Shirley‘s (2009) finding, the old guard started networking and partnership with schools at 
a distance where like-minded educators and parents pursued SIC, then the new guard 
attempted to forge a network nearer to home by capitalizing on the foundation the old 
guard had already established. This rise and trajectory of scaling up resonates with the 
theory of mimetic and normative isomorphism in the institutional literature. Mimetic 
isomorphism refers to a process of imitation or modeling whereby organizations mimic 
the policies, practices, and structure of other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
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This source of change stems from the ―tendency of administrators to emulate apparently 
successful forms‖ (Raeburn, 2004: 133). It seems that in the early stages mimetic 
isomorphism served as a source for diffusion of SCE‘s change. In addition to mimetic 
pressures, institutional scholars identify normative isomorphism that derives from the 
pressures to ―establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy‖ 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 70).  This also seems to have played a key role in the 
diffusion of SCE‘s change near home. More thorough study of this is beyond the scope of 
the current study. Future studies of diffusion of change need to address this issue in a 
more systematic way.  
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